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(i) 
ABSTRACT. 
The purpose of this study is to provide some under- 
standing of the actual behaviour of government expenditures. 
Firstly, on the basis of a cross-section analysis, an 
attempt is made not only to further test the income 
hypothesis, suggested by the recent cross-section studies, 
that government expenditure as a share of national output 
and real per capita income are correlated, but also to 
examine whether the rate of change of this share is constant 
over all the different ranges of income or whether it is an 
increasing and/or diminishing function of income. The 
analysis suggests the income hypothesis that government 
expenditure as a share of G. N. P. increases at a diminishing 
rate with the increasing level of economic development. It 
fi r. 
is also evident from this analysis that geographical location 
could also be an important factor influencing the level of 
4 public expenditure. 
Secondly, on the basis of a time-series analysis, which 
is primarily concerned with studying the time pattern of 
expenditure growth, the Peacock-Wiseman "displacement effect" 
hypothesis is tested for a number of countries, not only 
with regard to the World Wars but also with regard to 
the 
Great Depression. An attempt is made to make some quantitative 
(ii) 
measurement and test of significance of the "displacement 
effect". Furthermore, it is examined whether an upheaval 
is associated with a change in the rate of growth of 
government expenditure with relation to economic growth. 
The analysis suggests a significant shift in the level of 
government expenditure with relation to economic growth, 
(or. the, ""displacement effect") associated with the World 
Wars in the case of each country included, except Sweden 
which did not, directly participate in the War. A significant 
shift is also observed to be associated with the Great 
Depression in the United States and Canada which were most 
affected by that upheaval. Furthermore, a significant 
change in the rate of growth of government expenditure with 
relation to economic growth is observed to be associated with 
a major upheaval. No generalisation,. however, can be made 
about the direction of such change. -. _ 
Finally, some plausible explanations of the two sets of 
statistical observations and hypotheses are provided; the 
questions concerning. the compatibility of the statistical 
findings and techniques used in the two different approaches 
are discussed; and the possibilities of further research 
concerning the actual behaviour of public expenditure are 
explored. 
(iii) 
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
The primary aims of this study are: first, to determine the 
relationship, if any, between public expenditure and the level of 
economic development on the basis of a cross-section sample of 
countries chosen at different stages of economic development; 
second, to, study the time pattern of public expenditure in relation 
to economic growth, on the basis of a time-series approach, for 
a number of countries. An attempt is also made to provide 
plausible explanations for the statistical observations and 
hypotheses suggested by both approaches. It is hoped that such 
a study may provide a greater understanding of the actual 
behaviour of government expenditure. 
Research in the field of public expenditure has been com- 
paratively neglected. For example, with regard to consumers' 
behaviour, many hypotheses have been developed and rigorously 
tested against empirical data. But there are very few hypotheses 
which have been put forth and tested concerning the actual behaviour 
of government expenditure. Although there has been tremendous 
growth of public expenditure in many countries in recent years, 
the interest of economists or specialists in public finance was 
confined, from after the Great Depression until recently, almost 
exclusively to the analysis of. the probable short-run effect of 
taxes, public debt and public expenditures upon levels of 
employment, incomes and prices, with an almost complete disregard 
2. 
for the analysis of the determinants of the size and structure 
of public expenditure. Interest in the main was centred on the 
analysis of the economic effects of budgetary policies, princi- 
pally because of the problems brought to notice by the Great 
Depression and the stimulus provided by the General Theory of 
Keynes. Lack of interest in analysing the actual behaviour of 
government expenditure was probably due to the innate diffi- 
culties, conceptual and statistical, in explaining the highly 
complex behaviour of government expenditure. Nevertheless, 
some analysis and explanation of the behaviour of government 
expenditure, which in some countries comprises more than one 
third of the national output, is of great importance, "if", as 
is pointed out by Peacock and Wiseman, *$progress in other 
fields is not to be nullified by our inadequacy in this one. "1 
Whatever the research carried out in the field of public 
expenditure, it has been directed largely toward the development 
of normative theories. Such normative theories of public 
expenditure, based on old or new welfare economics (the difference 
between old and new welfare economics-being less than is frequently 
1 Alan T. Peacock and Jack Wiseman, -The Growth of Public 
E enditure in the United Kingdom, N. B. E. R., Princeton 
University Press, Princeton, 1961, page 12. 
3" 
supposed'), seek to-provide the,, rule of maximisation: of social 
welfare and/or the preservation of the 'ideal' conditions of 
individual choice., Such welfare, theories attempt-. to provide,,,,.,. -., 
criteria which should determine-the revenue and-expenditure 
policies of: a government rather than explain bow the revenue and 
expenditure policies-are, inhfact determined. 
Some of these theories, more, or-less similar, are based on 
old welfare economicsLandýhaves. asxtheir basis "The Ability-to-pay 
Theory" and , 
the corollary.!! The Sacrifice, Theories". They 
attempt to provide the; rule, of ('maximisation of. welfare". The 
State is considered by; theorists as an-organic entity whose. 
revenue and expenditure policies are-then prescribed-by marginal 
criteria, -similar to those usually applied for 
individual 
consumer's. equilibrium on the basis ofmaximisation of utility. 
Leaving aside the fundamental-weaknesses of, such theories (due 
to-the assumption of cardinal measurement and inter-personal 
comparison of: utility. and'the political philosophy, behind their 
organismic.. theory of state, with which: one"may not agree), what, 
is more important from our point of view is that the ability 
See E. J. Mishan, "A Survey-of Welfare Economics", 1939-59, 
Economic Journal, June.. 1960, for-the different criteria or 
tests developed by different welfare theorists (Kaldor-Hicks, 
Scitovsky, Samuelson, Little) to sole the income distribution 
problem and how-such criteria involve logical flaws. 
Dr. Mishan has pointed out in his survey article, "without 
some expressed partiality for one distribution of welfare 
over all others there is no case in welfare economics for 
prescribing a movement from a non-optimal position fo any 
optimal position". Thus one can hardly avoid inter-personal 
comparison of utility. Also see Dr. Mishan'a article"A- 
Re-app*sal of the Principles of Resource Allocation", Economics, 
1 . 
of such welfare theories to explain the actual behaviour of 
government expenditure is insignificant, because there is no 
reason to believe that the men who run the government will follow 
the rule of "maximisation of social welfare", even assuming 
that an unambiguous and logical definition of it is possible. 
Then there are the so-called ethically neutral theories 
of public expenditure, based on new welfare economics. These 
are as follows: an. extended version of the traditional benefit 
theory, i. e. the Voluntary-exchange Theory of Lindahl and others; 
a modified version of the same approach in general equilibrium 
terms by Samuelson; and through incorporating voting mechanism 
into the 'polar' case model by Musgrave, keeping in mind the 
Wicksellian point that otherwise the individual will contribute 
nothing towards the satisfaction of public wants. 
1 'We do not 
intend to describe these theories or discuss their internal 
weaknesses (e. g. because of the difficulties encountered in 
making consumers reveal their preferences, choosing the single 
best optimum; and because of the problem of merit wants, and the 
1 See R. A. Musgrave and Alan T. Peacock, eds. Classics in the 
Theory of Public Finance, London, International Economic 
Association, Macmillan & Co. Ltd., 1958, Introduction, 
R. A. Musgrave, The Theo of Public Finance, McGraw-Hill 
Company, Inc., 1959, Chapter and 6; P. A. Samuelson, "The 
Pure Theory of Public Expenditure", Review of Economics and 
Statistics, Vol. XXXVI, No. if, November 1954; "A Digramatic 
Exposition of the Theory of Public Expenditure", same Review, 
Vol. XXXVII, No. 4, November, 1955; "Aspects of Public 
Expenditure Theories", same Review, Vol. XL, No. 4, November 
1958; Julius Margolis, "A Comment on. the Pure Theory of Public 
Expenditure", same Review, Vol. XXXVII, No. if, November 1955; 
G. Colm, 'Comments on Samuelson's Theory of Public Expenditure", 
same Review, Vol. XXVIII, No. 4, November 1956; James M. 
Buchanan, "Fiscal Institutions and Efficiency in Collective 
Outlay's, American Economic Review, MaL 1964. 
5" 
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well known weaknesses of the welfare economics on which they 
stand, such as the second best arguments, logical flaws involved 
in different compensation tests developed by different economists 
a' 
c 
to solve the income distribution problem, etc. which severely 
limit the applicability of welfare economics to policy problems). 
But what is more important from our point of view is that such 
an approach, by making individual choices the sole criterion for 
a theory of budget determination, involves highly unrealistic 
assumptions about the behaviour of a government. The men who 
run a government, while formulating its budgetary policies, do 
not formulate solely with reference to the criterion of the 
preservation of the individual choice prescribed by such a 
theory. Thus, due to the considerable gulf between the aims 
of policy makers and those prescribed by such welfare theorists, 
the ability of such theories to provide an explanation for the 
actual behaviour of government expenditure seems insignificant. 
Recently, Buchanan and Tullock in their book "The Calculus of 
Consent" have made another attempt to construct a normative "theory 
of collective choice"' analogous to the theory of markets. It is 
assumed that individual citizens seek to maximise utilities or 
to minimise the interdependence costs, i. e., external costs plus 
decision making costs, when they participate in the collective 
1 J. M. ' Buchanan and G. *Tü]1ock, The Calculus of Consent, Logical 
Foundations of Constitutional Democracy, Ann Arbor: The 
University of Michigan Press, 1962. 
6. 
choice, as they do in the market. On the basis of such an 
assumption they demonstrate the calculus through which $ýid_ 
constitutional decisions, i. e. those which will maximise 
efficiency or utility for all individuals, can be made. As 
regards the constitutional decisions, they are mainly concerned with 
two types of decision, viz., whether an activity should be left 
within the public sector,, -and, if so, what voting rules should 
be decided upon for that activity. 'From the calculus of. a 
single vidu i it is concluded that in'principle it should 
be possible `to achieve ` ""ideal'I constitutional decisions " by 
unanimous consent, because-of the'assumption Of "equal uncertainty" 
for every individual. Thus theýlevel'and'structure of public 
expenditure`generated-by such a constitution can also be considered 
"ideal". 
Their model 'alsö''suffers from-' several logical weaknesses, 
which reduce its applicability in a policy context. For example, 
leaving aside the second best- arguments, the "lequal uncertainty" 
assumption does not necessarily mean that the'subjective evaluation 
of the expected costs if the activity is left to the private 
sector, the expected decision making costs and the external 
costs of collective activity, andithe rate of discount for 
conversion of the expected costs into their present values, would 
be the same for every individual. Such costs even under the 
assumption of "equal uncertainty"" for every individual may be 
?. 
different for different individuals because of the differences 
in political ideologies, differences in attitudes to risk, and 
also because of the varying degrees of information, because of 
which different individuals would decide for different rules. 
Thus, "efficiency"', the criterion for which is assumed to be 
unanimous consent is not possible even at the constitutional 
level of decisions. Buchanan and Tullock in their attempt 
to save their model from the criticisms levelled against the 
compensation tests, or, in other words, to make it ethically 
neutral, accepted too readily that unanimous consent should 
always be possible at the level of constitutional decisions. 
And, once the assumption of "equal uncertainty" for every 
individual is discarded, their model for constitutional decision 
making falls into pieces. Of course every individual is uncertain 
about his precise role in any one of the whole chain of collective 
choices that will actually have to be made in future, but the 
degree of uncertainty is likely to be different for different 
individuals. For example a very poor man with average 
intelligence assumes that the probability of his becoming a 
millionaire is very low. And for a millionaire the probability 
of his becoming a poor man is likely to be very low. For a 
physician, the probability of becoming a street-cleaner is very 
low and vice versa. Therefore, the preferences for separate 
8. 
issues, while choosing a decision making rule, are not randomly 
distributed-as thought by Buchanan and Tullock. - An individual- 
can predict-with some degree of-certainty whether he is likely 
tobe in a winning or. losing coalition on any, specificiissue. 
Therefore the assumption, of "equal, uncertainty"t does , not? seem., 
to--be'a realistic-one and-once, -this assumption is-discarded--it 
seems rather-impossible; that unanimous consent could ever; be---., 
reached.. 
Their so often mentioned analogy with the economic exchange 
in the market is not= a: correct-one. - In a market, nobody, -is 
coercedýto'enter a bargain,; and=all parties: involved-ina. bargain 
benefit. :, - But' in a-political-choice., process,, coercion is afpart 
of that process. - Some participants, or, citizens might expect 
a net loss', from some constitutional rules, =,,, but although they-. ' 
disagree may not be able : to; stop, the. -enactment_of. _such rules. :;. 
They. may-still have? to accept the-membership ofrthat. state"because 
the cost of=moving to some other state. may be more=, than, the losses 
from, those, constitutional rules, tand also, because of-the-. family. ' 
ties, difficulties of obtaining citizenshipýin other state, etc. 
Therefore,. the-constitutional-choice process cannot be rightly 
compared-with,: the market-choice"process. - -. Similar-sorts-of 
arguments can be put forth to falsify., _their. ý: 
1ame-analogy. t 
What is cricial from our-point of view is that their model 
does not depict any. real existing constitution. No constitution 
is framed by unanimous consent. The amendment of a constitution 
9" 
is similarly never done. by-such. consent. The existing. setfof 
constitutional rules, in any country also does not usually reflect 
the consensus of opinion. It-is highly, unrealistic,, to, assume 
that every citizen agrees with, the constitutional rules which 
were. framed: several decades or centuries before his birth, and, 
therefore, without reference to his consent.. Thuns, because of 
the unrealistic nature. of the. model, their theory of collective 
choice , cannot,. providef any, explanation. of, the actual behaviour.. =s,; 
of public expenditure. 
It may also be pointed-out that the, foregoing normative 
theories of-public expenditure are-concerned only with: the 
static level of analysis. Welfare economics, upon which these 
theories are based, , has-been developed mostly. in relation-to 
static analysis and hardly any formal dynamic welfare analysis 
exists. Therefore, in a, dynamic . setting, that ., 
is, ;,. in,, conditions 
of continuing changes in:. industrial, andsocio-political,.. structure, 
people! s fiscal attitudes, etc., in-a growing economy, -the 
inadequacies of such static theories and their welfare 'calculus' 
to provide an explanation of. the actual-behaviour of public.,,, . 
expenditures-become even more apparent. 
In contrast, to. the above mentioned normative=theories, 
recently Anthony ýDowns, has attempted to, construct: a. theory of 
democratic government decision-making, on the-basis of some 
behaviouristic assumptions about government. . It is assumed 
10. 
on the basisof the self-interest axiom that every government 
tries to maximise its length of life, because by doing so its 
members can further their private ends, which are the income, 
power, or prestige which come from holding office. Fx'öm this 
Downs derives his'hypothesis that a democratic government tries 
to'' maximise' votes. And `a' voter, for whom the objective is 
. r, .Y assumed'*to be the maximisation of' utility Ifrom government's 
policies', votes for the`party'in power if the policies pursued by 
the government correspond more nearly to his preferences 
than the" policies assümedtorbepursüed'by the opposition 
party: " Because of the mutual interdependence of the self 
interest of the voters and the men who run the government, it 
is said tha the government policies would usually correspond 
to the preferences of thIe voters. 
The assumption that a gövernment tries to-maimise its 
length of life could be considered a reasonable one 
if the self- 
interest axiom be accepted. However, the vote-maximisation 
hypothesis and the' corollary hypothesis that the government 
policies, including expenditure policies, would usually correspond 
to`the preferences of the majority Iof, voters "cannot always be 
accepted due'to several difficulties. Some of these difficulties 
are recognised by Anthony Downs himself, when he discusses both 
the possibility of a "coalition-of-minorities" strategy by the 
opposition party by uniting the "passionate&' minorities on some 
issues and when the government encounters the "Arrow Problem" 
11. 
for some issues, which leads to°the paradoxes ofecyclical'-v 
majority.. 
1` Besides, in an uncertain world with imperfect;? , 
knowledge' and where , information involves ý costs, there ° are x" -'_ 
other-factors which cause deviations from the majority-principle. 
Many voters areýnot well informed aboutrthe, facts necessary for 
their voting decisions, -and could'beinfluenced-by, persuation. 
A government, therefore, would give more favour to the voters who 
provide money or, services. to influence the voters' opinion. ', ° 
The preferences of-the interest groups also receive greater; 
weight because they, may: mouldýpublic opinion' through persuation. 
Thus deviations-from the majority principle could take place 
because the politicians attach different weights to the different 
voters I, preferences. 
Furthermore, Downs discusses the nature and consequences' of 
political rationality under a supersimplified model of democracy. 
In his'-model of direct democracy, a party. (orýcoalition of -' 
parties . if, there are more than two parties) must be-elected by 
the support- of a majority, of, those voting, in the -election. ' Such 
a model of democracy is highly. unrealistic. No' governmental 
system in any "democracytI resembles such. 'a supersimplified model 
of democracy. 
1 Anthony Downs, An Economic Theory of Democrac , Harper and 
----Brothers, New York 1957 (Chapter IV, for the difficulties 
mentioned above). Also his articles, "An Economic Theory 
of Political Action in ,a Democracy", Journal -of Political 
Econo 9 LXV 1957 and 'why the Government Budget is Too slin a Democracy', World Politics, July 1960. 
S 
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In a representative democracy which is the, usual form of 
democracy, it. can be shown that as the number of voters and the 
number of constituencies, increase, as limit, a party. can win with 
the support of J of all the voters. It is, of course, necessary 
that such a group of J of the voters must be fairly_evenly 
distributed among a simple majority of the constituencies and 
must be absent in other constituencies. This fact makes it 
difficult fora party to win elections with a support of just 
about - of the voters. However, the fact that a. party in a two- 
party system under a representative democracy, could win. even, 
with the votes of about of the voters makes it clear that 
once a 
, 
government is assured of the votes of such a group of, 
voters, it is not necessary for the government to maximise 
votes. Thus, failure to maximise votes may be compatible with 
the achievement of its objective, i. e. to continue in power. 
Furthermore, a voter while casting his vote for a party 
votes for a bundle of policiessupposed, to be, pursued in future 
if. that 
, party comes 
into, power. He. is interested in the total 
effect of government policies as_a whole... The expenditure 
policies are only a. fraction of theFtotal, policies pursued by 
a government. The deviation of-the'-expenditure policies from 
his preferences could be tolerated_to, a great extent if he can 
be compensated by favourable policies in other spheres. 
Thereforej,, although his assumption that a government tries 
to maximise its length of life could be considered a reasonable 
13. 
one, his vote-maximisation hypothesis and the correlary hypothesis 
that a government's policies would correspond to the preferences 
of the majority of voters are dubious. It is only for those 
expenditure policies where we find some reason to believe that 
citizens or voters are likely to have strong preferences so 
that major deviations of expenditure policies cannot be easily 
compensated by other compensatory policies, and where the problems 
mentioned above either-do not exist or, their existence does not 
create significant deviations from majority preferences, that 
voters' preferences-may provide some explanation for expenditure 
policies. 
Recently, however, -=because°of the considerable 
broadening 
of the impact of the public sector upon the economy, and the 
growing interest-in the problems of economic growth which has 
. conferred considerable significance on this impact, some interest 
has been directed towards studying the behaviour of government 
expenditure on the basis of empirical data and historical facts, 
with a view to discovering if there are generalizations which 
could be-made-about the behaviour of=ýpublic expenditure, or 
whether public expenditures are solely-a function of the specific 
political and-social policies, pursued in any country. 
Such astudy isiof great-importance. for a study. -of the 
economic growth process itself. In the economic growth models 
developed so far by the growth theorists, government expenditure 
14. 
is either ignored completely or some assumptions about the 
relationship between public-expenditure and other variables are 
made which have little relevance to the actual behaviour of 
governments, because of which such models are not suitable for 
the purposes'of economic policies. Such a model, to be of any 
use for. policy, purposes, - should incorporate some explanation of 
the behaviour of public expenditure in the general explanation 
of. 'the: process of: economic growth. - Hence, recently, interest 
has been directed towards empirical investigations concerning the 
behaviour of government expenditure with relation to the level 
of economic development and the time pattern of growth of govern- 
ment expenditure with relation to economic growth; and certain 
inductive-hypothese have been deduced from-such empirical 
observations. - We are, specifically interested in those hypotheses 
because our studyiis=also concerned with the-empirical observation 
of the'behaviour of public expenditure in different countries 
and at different times,. which we consider a fruitful approach is 
understanding the actual behaviour of public expenditure. 
" In'"chapter II, therefore, we conduct a review of the recent 
empirical studies, and. the inductive hypotheses suggested by these 
studies. . Recently, -several economists, on the basis of a 
cross-section' approach, have attempted to examine the relationslp 
15. 
between government expenditure as a share of national output 
and the degree of economic development. Their statistical 
findings suggest an income hypothesis, namely that there is 
a positive correlation between the two. A summary of the 
statistical findings of the recent cross-section studies and 
our criticisms, general and specific of each study, are given 
in that chapter. Certain inductive hypotheses are also 
deduced from the historical time-series approach. After 
a very brief review of Wagner's 'Law' of increasing state 
activity, which is concerned exclusively with the secular growth 
of public expenditure with relation to national output, we 
comment on the Peacock and Wisemans' "displacement effect" 
hypothesis, which is concerned with the time pattern of 
expenditure growth. We also discuss the limitations and 
significance of the concept of the "tolerable burden" of 
taxation offered as an explanatory tool in justification of 
the "displacement effect" hypothesis. 
In chapter III9 on the basis of a cross-section approach, 
an attempt is made not only to further test the income hypothesis, 
suggested by the recent cross-section studies, that government 
expenditure as a share of national output and real per capita 
income are correlated, but also to examine whether the rate of 
change of such share is constant over all the different ranges 
16. 
of income or whether it is an increasing and/or diminishing 
function of income, (the important problem which was overlooked 
by the earlier studies) with the help of a double logarithmic 
polynomial regression function. In addition to the description 
of the statistical procedure and measures adopted, it provides 
also a discussion of some of the related conceptual and 
statistical problems, the reasons for the choice of particular 
measures and also their limitations. The statistical procedure 
and measures adopted in our cross-section study attempt to avoid 
as far as possible the limitations of the earlier studies. 
The tables and the sources of data used in the cross-section 
study, and also the major divergences, if any, from the concepts 
adopted for this study are given in Appendix A. 
In chapter IV9 we pursue our analysis on the basis of a 
time-series approach, in which we are primarily concerned in 
studying the time pattern of expenditure growth with relation 
to economic growth. Peacock's and Wiseman's "displacement 
effect" hypothesis is tested for a number of countries, not 
only with regard to world Wars but also with regard to the 
Great Depression, which may also be considered to be a major 
social upheaval in the case of some countries. An attempt is 
made to form some quantitative measurement and test of sig- 
nificance of the "displacement effect". We furthermore consider 
whether this ""effect'l is associated with a change in the rate of 
growth of government expenditure in relation to economic growth. 
The statistical procedure, measures and techniques used in the 
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case of time-series studies, the related conceptual and 
statistical problems, and the limitations of our findings 
are also discussed in that chapter. The tables and sources 
of data used in the time-series analyses are given in Appendix 
B. 
In the last chapter, an attempt is made to provide some 
plausible explanations for the two sets of statistical 
observations and hypotheses from two independent approaches. 
Although wherever possible some justification on empirical 
grounds has been provided, the explanations offered are, by 
and large, speculative. We discuss also plausible reasons 
for the differences in statistical findings for different 
countries included in the time-series approach, the inter- 
relationship between the different explanations offered for 
our findings, and the compatability of the statistical 
findings of, and technique employed by one approach with 
those of the other. Finally, some comments upon the 
possibilities of further research concerning the actual 
behaviour of public expenditure are given, in view of the 
limitations and usefulness of our approach. 
1S. 
CHAPTER TWO 
RECENT EMPIRICAL STUDIES AND Th'E INDUCTIVE h'YPOTHESES 
Certain inductive hypotheses concerning the behaviour of 
public expenditure have been inferred from empirical observations. 
They are of special interest to us because our study is also concerned 
with the empirical observations of public expenditure. In section 
I of this chapter we make a review of the recent empirical studies, 
based on a cross-section approach, which suggest an income hypothesis, 
i. e. the relationship between government expenditure as a share of 
national output and the degree of economic development. In section 
II, we review the inductive hypotheses deduced from a historical 
time-series approach. Wagner's "Law", which has been well reviewed 
in the recent literature is considered first very briefly. The 
major part of this section is devoted to reviewing Peacock's and 
Wiseman's displacement effect hypothesis, deduced from their 
statistical observations of the time-pattern of the growth of 
British public expenditure; and their explanatory hypothesis based 
basically on the concept of 'tolerable burden' of taxation. 
I. Cross-section studies and the hypothesis concerning, the 
relationship between government expenditure as a share of 
national, output and the degree of Economic Development. 
Recently several cross-section studies undertaken by I4ertin. 
and Lewis, Oshima, and Williamson `and Mesmer, have tried to examine 
the relationship between the levels of public expenditure, (or 
public revenue only in.. the study by Oshima) and levels of economic' 
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development. 1 Their statistical findings suggest the hypothesis that 
there is a positive correlation between government expenditure as a 
share of national output and the degree of economic development. 
Our criticisms of the above mentioned studies are confined 
mainly to the statistical procedure and technique adopted by these 
studies. The criticisms specific to each study are offered below. 
The general comment, however, is that the important problem which 
has been overlooked in these cross-section analyses involves the 
determination of the rate of change of government expenditure as a 
share of national output with relation to that of economic growth 
(or real per capita income). That is, no attempt has been made to 
determine, if there is a correlation, whether the rate of change of 
government expenditure as a share of some national income aggregate 
with relation to that of economic growth is a constant or decreasing 
or increasing function of income over all the different ranges of 
income or whether it is an increasing function for some ranges but 
a decreasing function for other ranges of income. 
The main criticisms of the article by Martin and Lewis are the 
following. First, the sample of countries chosen by them is small. 
The total number of countries selected by them is 16. Besides, one 
might think, as pointed out by Williamson in his study, that the 
results obtained from their sample are heavily biased towards 
A. M. Martin and W. A. Lewis, "Patterns of Public Revenue and 
Expenditure", The Manchester School of Economic and Social Studies, 
Sept. 1956; H. T. Oshima "Share of Government in Gross National 
Product in various countries", American Economic Review, June 
1957; Jeffery G. Williamson, "Public Expenditure and Revenue: 
An International Comparison", The Manchester School of Economic 
and Social Studies, January 1g 1; T. D. Mesmer, Government 
Expenditure and Economic Growth - An International Comparative 
Study, an unpublished Ph. D. thesis, Wisconsin University, 1961. 
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welfare nations. 
Second, the time-period chosen for their cross-section study was 
one year, i. e. 1953 or 1954 (except in the case of Columbia, for 
which the figures are for 1947, because of the non-availability of 
data. ) Although a cross-section analysis refers to a point of 
time, the main criterion for the choice of time, is that the 'time' 
chosen should be 'normal'. 
, 
One particular year cannot be considered 
sufficiently normal for all the countries to be a good basis of 
comparison. An average of several years, apparently not abnormal 
years, is a better choice; so that abnormality, if any, in any 
particular year may bejessened. Again the choice of 1953, which 
was a boom year for most countries, is. likely to show government 
expenditure as a percentage of G. N. P. lower for most countries and 
the share may be relatively lower for those countries which are 
more vulnerable. to business cycles and also are better equipped to 
use anticyclical monetary and fiscal policies. 
Third, in their study, no rigorous statistical technique is 
used to study the relationship. For example a "rough relationship 
between public expenditure and G. N. P. per head"' is assumed to exist 
by just showing how the mean current expenditure as a percentage of 
G. N. P. is different for four different groups of countries. No 
test of the significance of the difference between such means for 
different groups of countries was made. The test would have shown 
that they do not differ significantly. The trough relationship" 
shown between total public expenditure and G. N. P. per head is too 
rough-to reject the null hypothesis about such relationship. 
1 Martin and Lewis, op. cit., page 205. 
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Similarly, their coefficient of rank correlation of only . 46 between 
"basic" expenditure (i. e. excluding public expenditure on defence, 
public debt, social insurance scheme and food or agricultural 
subsidies) as a percentage of G. N. P. and per capita G. N. P. is also 
too small to be significant for a sample size of 16. Their 'slight 
correlation' could in fact be no correlation. Their conclusions, 
therefore, are based on very inadequate and improper statistical 
analysis. As Williamson points out, "in the analysis only 
classification and casual empiricism result"a. 
1 
H. T. Oshirats study, however, is based on a larger sample 
(N = 32) and he has used post-war averages (1948 - 1954) for the 
share of government in gross domestic product, instead of taking the 
figures of a single year. His broad generalisations are based 
on the comparison of the ' percentage' of government total receipts 
(the sum of all taxes, income from government property, profits of 
government enterprises, and non-tax receipts of all levels of 
government less subsidies) to gross domestic product at current 
prices for "more developed" countries and 'tless developed" countries. 
The expenditure of government, with which our interest lies, 
are not taken into account. The sample of countries (N = 32) is 
divided into two broad groups - namely Ilmore developed" and "less 
developed"Tcountries; each group of countries is listed in order of 
their post-war averages of share of government total receipts in 
G. D. P. 'at current prices. No attempt is made to compare the 
1 Williamson, op. cit., page 43. 
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figures of per capita income of different countries or even to 
compare their ranks as regards per capita income with such averages; 
and the reader lacking information about the degree of economic 
development of different countries is left to guess 'the underlying 
pattern' which he thinks It is that of a direct variation between 
the percentage share of government in gross domestic product and the 
degree of development of the economy"". 
1 His broad division of 
countries between 'more developed' and 'less developed' countries 
also would not be acceptable to everybody. For example, is Chile 
"more developed" than Puerto Rico or even Malaya? Rosenstein- 
Rodan's figures of per capita G. N. P. however, suggest the opposite. 
The per capita G. N. P. figures at money and real exchange rate for 
Chile are %348.4 and X452.9 respectively, whereas for Puerto Rico 
and Malaya they are $643.0 and 0771.6; %368.3 and 0552.4 respectively 
for 1961.2 H. T. Oshima's generalisations, as those of Martin and 
Lewis, are also based on extremely inadequate statistical findings. 
Jefferey G. Williamson's paper in the r-ianchester School attempts 
ifa more rigorous statistical test of the relationship'13 suggested by 
Martin and Lewis. His study is based on a larger sample (N = 32). 
An average of government expenditure and G. N. P. data over a period 
of several years (usually 1951 - 1957) is used. Nevertheless, 
it 
1 H. T. Oshima, op. cit., page 384. 
2 P. N. Rosenstein-Rodan, "International Aid for Underdeveloped 
., 
Countries',, The Review of Economics and Statistics, Vol. XLIII, 
May 1961. 
3 J" G. 1Ji1liamson, op. cit., page 43. 
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may be pointed out that the period of years chosen by him (1951 - 
1957) may not be considered a period of "not-abnormale years. The 
period chosen by, him (and also that by Oshima) includes-the period 
of the Korean War and the ensuing period of boom, which are likely 
to create abnormal-distortions in the averages of government ,, 
expenditure and income, and at varying amounts for different countries. 
Our main criticisms to his study however, are the following: 
-. First, his definition of government expenditure includes only 
current expenditure.; Capital, expenditures or, expenditures on 
capital account, of a government are excluded from his definition 
of. government expenditure. No reason for such-exclusion is given by 
Williamson; nor do we see-any reason for such exclusion. It is 
not possible to have a clear cut distinction between current and 
capital expenditure, but to exclude one or the other is highly 
arbitrary. The effects of financing and spending on the economy 
of one is in no way less important than the other.. Both types of 
expenditures are equally important for policy decisions and are 
determined fundamentally 
. by. the same political process. 
In the 
study-of the relationship between government expenditure and the 
level of economic, -development, it is not reasonable to assume 
that 
capital expenditures are exogeneously determined and the relation- 
ship, if any, exists only between current expenditure and level of 
per capita income. The exclusion of capital expenditure from total 
expenditure gives a distorted view of government expenditure as a 
share of G. N. P. Furthermore the distortion is likely to be 
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proportionately more for developing countries than for the developed 
ones, because capital expenditure as a share of total public 
expenditure (or even of G. N. P. ) is likely to be higher for the 
developing countries than for the developed ones. We will discuss 
in detail in Chapter V the importance of capital expenditure as an 
explanation for the relationship between government expenditure and 
level of economic development observed in our cross-section study 
in Chapter III. 
Second, the statistical technique employed by Williamson is 
an application of an univariate regression function. He is 
"primarily concerned with the evidence of a positive correlation 
between per capita income and the government share'", 
' 
and he uses 
a linear double logarithmic function as a basis for either accepting 
or rejecting the hypothesis. This relationship, however, gives him 
"a measure of elasticity as welle. The rate of change of current 
government expenditure as a share of G. N. P. with relation to the 
rate of change of per capita income is assumed to be constant and 
greater than unity. His statistical analysis was not pursued 
further in order to verify whether that rate of change is constant 
over all the different ranges of per capita income, as assumed by 
him, or whether that rate of change is an increasing and/or diminishing 
function of income. 
Dr. Mesmer in his study "Government Expenditure and Economic 
Growth - An International Comparative Study", which was "designed to 
1 J. G. Williamson, op. cit., fn. 2, page 48. 
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explore the relationship between government expenditure and 
economic growth", 
'1 
provides some interesting and useful results. 
He has, however, used the share of the male labour force in primary 
and tertiary industries and the share of population living in cities 
of 20,000 or more as his measures of economic growth and complexity. 
Several reasons are given by him for the use of such measures 
instead of the usually`acceppted measure of economic growth, i. e. 
real per capita income. Dr. Mesmer states Omeasures of real 
income per capita, in addition to being'somewhat abstract, have 
other defects that handicap their use, especially in international 
comparative studies"; "the defects of these measures relate 1) 
doubts about the applicability of national income concepts to under- 
developed countries ............: and 2) the problems of conversion 
of national income estimates. 112 "Economic growth (rising real per 
capita income) is associated with a decreasing share of the labour 
force in primary industries (agriculture, forestry, fishery) and 
an increasing share in tertiary industries (commerce, transport, 
storage, communication, services). Such changes in the occupational 
and industrial composition of the labour force are typically accom- 
panied by a shift in the residence from rural to urban areas. "3 
Hence the three measures of economic growth that are used in his 
study are: the share of the male labour force in primary and 
its 
share in tertiary industries, and finally the share of population 
1 T. D. Mesmer, op. cit., preface. 
2 Ibid, pages 22 - 23- 
3 Ibid, pages 21 - 22. 
26. 
living in cities of 20,000 or more. 
We do not disagree with him as regards the conceptual and 
statistical difficulties involved in the measurement of real per 
capita income, which are discussed in some detail in the next 
chapter. But, are his measures free from such difficulties? 
Can his measures be substituted for the usually accepted measure 
of economic growth, (i. e. real per capita income) without dis- 
torting 'the relationship between government expenditure and 
economic growth, ' which his study is "designed to explore"? 
His measures also involve several conceptual and statistical 
problems and as a result are unlikely to be more reliable or less 
abstract than measures of real per capita income. Some of such 
problems are noted by Dr. Mesmer himself. As regards the 
occupational distinction, one has severe doubts about the 
applicability of such distinctions especially in under-developed 
countries where many persons are employed in agriculture, fishing, 
cottage industries, and trading simultaneously because 'specialisation' 
in any particular work does not exist for such people. Besides, in 
those countries, either labour statistics do not exist or they are 
very unreliable. With regard to a measure of urbanisation, the 
nature of urbanisation is different for countries at different 
levels of economic development; and the definition of 'urban area' 
is bound to be arbitrary. 
The use of the percentage of economically active male population 
in primary and tertiary industries as measures of economic growth 
according to Dr. Mesmer, is based on the validity of "firmly 
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established generalisation that a high average level of real income 
per head-is always associated with a low proportion of the working 
population engaged in primary production and a high proportion of 
the working population engaged in tertiary production. " But how 
can. such generalisations be established without first making some 
estimate. of real per capita income? If measures of real per capita 
income are discarded., as defective, should not the generalisation 
based on-such measures be discarded too? 
Although we. think that there is likely to be a high correlation 
between his measures and the usually accepted measure of economic 
development, i. e.. real per capita income, 
1 
such a correlation would 
be-far-from being a perfect one, and because of this we shall stick 
to the. -commonly accepted measure of real per capita income. 
However, Dr. Mesmer's methodology and simple linear correlation 
exercise which shows a highly significant positive correlation between 
government expenditure (as a percentage of G. N. P. at market prices) 
Clark-Fisher thesis (see Colin Clark, Conditions of Economic 
Progress, 2nd edition, MacMillan & Co. Ltd., London, 1951; 
Allen G. B. Fisher, "A note on Tertiary Production", Economic 
Journal, December 1952) that a high level of real per capita 
income is always associated with a low percentage of population 
employed in primary industries and a high proportion of popu- 
lation engaged in tertiary industries, is questioned by several 
economists (e. g. P. T. Bauer and B. S. Yamey in "Economic 
Progress and Occupational. Distribution", Economic Journal, 
December 1951; Simon Rottenberg, "Note on Economic Progress 
and Occupational Distribution", Review of Economics and 
Statistics May 1953) on the grounds of conceptual and 
statistical difficulties, already mentioned, for measurement 
of industrial distribution of labour force and because of 
the assumption on, regarding income-elasticity of demand for 
different products behind such generalisation. A U-shaped 
curve for employment in tertiary production with relation to 
level of economic development could also be a possibility. 
There is also a strong presumption that urbanisation is a diminishing function of real per capita income. 
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and the degree of urbanisation (and a significant correlation 
between such shares of government expenditures in G. N. P. and the 
occupational distribution of male labour force), are useful; and 
some of his results are used in this study, for example the relation- 
ship between the degree of urbanisation and government expenditure 
as 'a share of G. N. P. 'is used as one of the explanations in chapter V 
for our statistical observations. 
In the next chapter an attempt is made not only to test further 
the hypothesis, suggested by the above-mentioned cross-section 
analyses, that government expenditure as a share of national product 
and level of economic development (or real per capita income) are 
correlated, ' but also to examine whether the rate of change of such 
a share with relation to that'of real per capita income is constant 
over all the different ranges of income or whether it is an increasing 
and/or diminishing function income. The possible tests of significance 
of our statistical findings'from'a cross-section approach will be 
made. The. statistical procedure and technique, to be adopted for 
our cross-section analysis'iin, chapter III, -, avoid as far as possible 
the aboved mentioned criticisms. 
II. Historical Time-series Approach - The displacement effect 
hypothesis and the concept of tolerable burden of taxation. 
Following the historical time-series approach for the study of 
the behaviour of public expenditure, towards the end of the last 
century Adolph Wagner tried to establish generalizations about 
government expenditure by direct inference from historical evidence. 
On the basis of his empirical observation in a number of countries 
29. 
he deduced his t'Law" of increasing state activity, according to 
which government expenditure must increase at a rate faster than 
that of national output. In order to provide explanations and 
"justification" of his "Law" he "distinguishes between several 
types of state activities and shows why the rate of growth for each 
type of government"expenditure should be faster than that of 
national' output. His explanations and justifications are based 
on his-7particular social and political phylosophy. The 'proof' 
of his law depends on the'validity of the organic theory of state in 
which the state, including all individuals within it, is considered 
" as an organic entity. 
1 Therefore, as pointed-out-by Peacock 
and' Wiseman, ' although his-"Law" is based upon historical evidence, 
'tits acceptance as anything more than a statistical' observation 
requires acceptance also of Wagner's own very-special view of the 
nature of'the state as a political entity". 
` 
For a discussion and criticisms of the organismic theory, 
see James M. Buchanan, "The Pure Theory of Government Finance", 
Journal of Political Economy, December, 1949; also reprinted 
in his Fiscal Theory and Political Economy, Selected Essa , 
1960. 
2 Alan'T. Peacock and Jack Wiseman, The Growth of Public 
Expenditure in the United Kingdom, op. cit., page 1 For 
afull discussion of Wagner's Law and the criticisms, see 
ibid., chapter 2, and Dr. J. Veverka and Mrs. Andic, The 
Growth of Public Expenditure in Germany since Unification", 
Finanzarchiv, January 1964. For an English translation of 
the most relevant extracts from Wagner's study 
(Finanzwissenschaft, Leipzig 1890,3rd edition), see Adolph 
Wagner, Three Entracts on Public Finance, in R. A. Musgrave 
and A. T. Peacock (Eds. ), Classics in The Theory of Public 
Finance, op. cit. 
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While rejecting, Wagner's conclusions, however, they adopt 
his historical approach and study the behaviour of British public 
expenditure by looking at the relevant time-series statistical. 
data and the historical facts., Moreover, Wagner did not, pay 
any attention to the time pattern of expenditure growth; he was 
interested only in the secular growth of public expenditure with 
relation to national output., On the other hand, Peacock. and 
Wiseman are concerned primarily with the time pattern of expenditure 
growth;,. and, on the basis of their,, 
-, -time-series 
study of British 
public expenditure, have tried "to evolve hypotheses that may 
explain, the-. evolution., of, government expenditure in other countries 
and at other times", 
1 We consider below their displacement effect 
hypothesis and the explanation, based on the concept-of 'tolerable 
burden' of taxation, put forth in justification of that hypothesis. 
Their statistical findings, as depicted by the charts, showing 
the growth of British Public expenditure, and G. N. P. reveal a pattern 
of, expenditure growth which is characterised by peaks of increasing 
heights separated by plateaus. The major expenditure peaks occur 
during the. periods of the two world wars. Obviously one would 
expect the government expenditure as a share of G. N. P. to rise 
during the war years because of the extraordinary war expenditures. 
But the important, finding of Professors Peacock and Wiseman was that 
"the divergence in the time-pattern of the two series" (p. 25) namely 
that of G. N. P. and government expenditure cannot be attributed simply 
1 Alan T. Peacock and Jack Wiseman, op. cit., page 3. 
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to the abnormal government expenditures during the war years. 
"Although British government expenditure declines after the wars, it 
does not return to the prewar level, ...... in Britain the plateaus 
of expenditure establish themselves at successively higher levels, 
and the share of government expenditure in national product remains 
much. greater after the war than it was immediately before them". 
1 
This upward shift in the level of government expenditure with relation 
to national--output is called by them the "displacement effect". It 
was shown that the tdisplacement" exists. independently of the 
effects of permanent influences such as population and price changes. 
2 
The effects of unemployment on government expenditure in 
Britain were found to be temporary, i. e. there was no lasting 
upward displacement effect. Moreover, the displacement effect of 
either world war does not disappear by removing the "war-related', 
expenditures from the total government expenditure series. The 
curve of residual government expenditure still shows the displacement 
3 
effect. 
Although, as pointed out by Peacock and Wiseman "the precise 
explanation of displacement in particular cannot be free from 
speculation", 
4 
their plausible explanation of the displacement 
1 Ibid., pages 25 - 26. 
2 For a discussion of the specific reasons and the statistical 
procedure for the elimination of the price and population 
effects, see chapter IV, section III (ii). 
3 For a discussion of the specific reasons for the exclusion of 
war-related expenditures, see Peacock and Wiseman, op. cit., 
chapter 4 and also chapter IV, Section III (iii) of this study. 
4+ Peacock and Wiseman, op. cit., page 70. 
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hypothesis is based basically on'the concept of "tolerable burden 
of taxation". According, to them, people's ideas about a tolerable 
burden can be separated from their notions of a desirable level of 
public expenditure because the choices made through the political 
process are inherently different from those made through markets. 
Also, it-was pointed out that there is likely to be a gap between 
the two sorts of ideas, because of the tendency to the underestimation 
of the 'burden' and overestimation of the 'desirable' level of public 
expenditure on the part of'an individual. But, it is their ideas 
about a tolerable burden of taxation which determine largely what 
the level of public expenditure would be. 
1 It is said that during 
normal periods ideas about a tolerable burden of taxation tend to be 
fairly stable. This does not mean that during such periods public 
expenditures would not grow at all., If 'people's ideas are related 
to the tax rates rather than the total payments, then, if on the 
whole the tax-rates are progressive, government expenditure as a 
share of G. N. P. may increase with increasing G. -N. P. But in times 
of social upheaval like war people accept tax levels formerly 
thought intolerable. The acceptance of new tax levels continue 
even after the upheaval has disappeared because people get accustomed 
to new burdens of taxation. As they say, tit is harder to get the 
saddle on the horse than to keep it there". 
2 Thus it is possible for 
a government to undertake those public expenditures which it may have 
1 Peacock and Wiseman also recognise the importance of other 
factors such as changes in the attitude towards public expenditure, 
widening of tax opportunities etc.. because of the ""ins ection 
effect of war; but the concept of tolerable burden of 
taxation 
is assigned a special role in the explanation of the 'displacement 
effect'. 
2 Peacock and Wiseman, op. cit., Page XXZV. 
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considered desirable before the social disturbance but which were 
not undertaken because the accepted ideas of tolerable burden of 
taxation before the disturbance was too low to permit the financing 
of those expenditures. Thus a shift in people's ideas about the 
tolerable burden due to a social upheaval may give rise to a shift 
in the level of public expenditure, with relation to national 
output, which is described as a 'displacement effect". 
In what follows, the significance and limitations of the 
concept of the tolerable burden of taxation as an explanatory 
tool are discussed first; our comment on the 'displacement effect' 
hypothesis are given next. 
As far as the concept of the tolerable burden of taxation`is 
concerned, it provides some explanation of the time pattern of public 
expenditure, if the shifts in the level of public expenditure as a 
share of G. N. P. are associated with some social upheaval like war 
during which people get accustomed to a higher burden of taxation, 
which continues even after the upheaval is over. But, suppose 
such a shift if any, is found to be associated with a severe 
depression, as is shown in chapter-IV in the case of the U. S. A. 
and Canada where such a shift is associated with the Great Depression, 
during which taxes are rather cut down, then we cannot say that such 
a shift occurred because people got accustomed to higher burden of 
taxation. If the taxes are cut down during such a prolonged 
depression, the concept of the tolerable burden of taxation would 
rather suggest a shift in the downward direction. We have to look 
at some other relevant factors which could provide some plausible 
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explanation for such a shift after depression, e. g. change in the 
attitude towards public expenditure. 
1 If some "new" expenditures 
are thought to be highly desirable because of the "inspection effect" 
of a severe depression, financing of such expenditures could be 
tolerated. Such a shift in the level of public expenditure may 
occur not because people got accustomed to the high level of taxation 
during depression, but because of the change in the attitude towards 
public expenditure during that upheaval, which may permit the 
acceptance of new taxes after the upheaval is over to finance 
these 11new" expenditures considered not so highly desirable before 
such an upheaval. 
If some public expenditures are financed by public debt or new 
money creation during a severe depression, the ýIburden" or the 
opportunity costs of financing such expenditures may be considered 
almost zero during that period. The "burden'l or opportunity costs 
of public debt or money creation is not always zero (e. g. under 
conditions of full employment) and even during depression, after a 
certain limit is reached, the opportunity costs of financing by public 
debt or new money creation may be more than that of taxes. 
2 There- 
fore, though the concept of the tolerable burden of taxation cannot 
explain such a growth of public expenditure during a depression, yet 
we can say that the tolerable burden of financing the government 
This factor of course. is frequently mentioned by Peacock and 
Wiseman, but in their analysis of the growth of public expenditure 
in the U. K. significance is mainly attached to the concept of 
tolerable burden of taxation because the Great Depression did 
not give rise to any 'shift' in the level of public expenditure 
in the U. K. 
2 J. M. Buchanan, Public Principles of Public Debt, Homewood, 
Illionois, Richard D. Irwin, Inc., 1958. J. Wiseman, "The 
Logic of National Debt Policy", Westminster Bank Review, Aug., 
1961. 
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expenditure (i. e. through public debt, money creation, and taxation) 
determines largely the level up to which the changed ideas about 
" 
desirable level of public expenditure could be implemented. The 
ideas about the desirable level of public expenditure may change during 
a depression, but the implementation of such ideas is possible 
because of the possibility of incurring higher expenditures without 
increasing (or even lowering) the total burden of financing such 
public expenditures. Thus it can be maintained that public 
expenditures are determined largely by the burden of financing such 
expenditures. 
Our analysis of the gr'oi th of government expenditure during 
depression explains how the concept of a tolerable burden of taxation 
cannot provide an explanation for the growth of expenditures 
during 
such periods. Besides, even during normal periods public expendi- 
tures are financed to some extent in varying degrees in different 
countries by deficit financing. Therefore, -it seems that if we 
expand the concept of the tolerable burden so as to include not 
only that of taxes but also that of other methods of financing 
government expenditures, which may be called the 'tolerable burden 
of financing government expenditures', such an expanded concept of 
"tolerable" could provide a better explanation of the growth of 
public expenditure. 
However, the major portion of the government expenditures has 
usually been financed by taxes during normal periods, inmost 
countries. This is so, firstly because of the prevalent favourable 
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attitude towards balanced budgets, 
' 
secondly because, in case of 
full-employment or near full employment, deficit financing is not 
costless. The opportunity costs of deficit financing may be more 
than that of tax financing after a point. If, most of the government 
expenditure is financed by taxes, we can. say that in normal periods, 
by and large, it is the tolerable burden of taxation which determines 
largely the level of public expenditure. 
Again, a conceptual separation of the ideas about desirable 
level of public expenditure and ideas of the tolerable burden cannot 
always be made. In some cases there is an inter-dependence between 
the two sorts of ideas. For example, assume that specific taxes 
are levied for the financing of old age pensions and such taxes are 
directly proportional to the benefits to be received during old age; 
or, that the tax payments for old age pensions are equivalent to 
the insurance premiums which an individual would pay to a, private 
insurance company if he wished to receive, the same. amount of benefits 
during his old age. The question is: are his ideas about "burden" 
of such taxes determined independently of the corresponding, public 
expenditure? Such taxes would have zero "burden" for those 
individuals who would have insured themselves with a private 
insurance company if the government had not introduced an old age , 
pension scheme. It will of course., involve some "burden" for those 
who would not have insured themselves, because of the compulsive 
In the recent empirical study of fiscal attitudes of American 
people, Eva Mueller's study shows that, although "there is no 
evidence that the existing federal debt causes great concern 
or uneasiness"; "predominantly negative attitudes toward 
deficits were expressed, however, when the advisability of 
additionsl deficits came under discussion", page 217, "Public 
Attitude toward Fiscal Programs", The Quarterly Journal of 
Economics, May 1963" 
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nature of taxes. In this case too, "burden" is felt to the extent 
that he feels his restriction of choice. To take another example, 
suppose a specific tax is used to give foreign aid, and the individual 
thinks rightly or wrongly, that no benefit could accrue to himself, 
it will entail a burden equal to the utilities thought to be foregone 
by'such tax payments. Thus ideas about "tolerable burden" are 
not independent-of public expenditures. 
These are a few extreme examples which simply show how the 
two sorts of ideas cannot be'separated completely. However, one 
may say that such payments which provide direct benefits proportional 
to the payments cannot be considered taxes, because of the direct 
quid pro quo. Others may hold a different view because of the 
compulsive nature of"such payments, which distinguish them from 
prices and fees. However, the main question is should we consider 
such expenditures as public expenditures? If we are to consider 
them as public expenditures as we do, no matter whether we call them 
taxes or not, the ideas of tolerable burden of financing such 
expenditures cannot be completely separated from the notions of 
desirable public expenditure; they influence each other. This also 
has been verified recently by Eva Mueller's empirical study con- 
cerning people's attitudes towards government expenditure and taxes. 
Her findings clearly show that people are sometimes willing to accept 
tax increases for the increase in'government expenditurejwhich they 
consider highly desirable. ' 
See Eva Mueller, "Public Attitudes Toward Fiscal Programs", 
op. cit. We will discuss in detail her empirical findings 
concerning peoples attitudes towards government expenditure and taxes in chapter V, section II in connection with the plausible 
explanations of our statistical findings. 
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Although we argued above that a conceptual separation between 
the two sorts of ideas cannot always be made; nevertheless, since 
in almost all countries most of the taxes (in varying degrees) are 
not only compulsory but also do not have any direct quid pro quo, 
because of the indivisible nature of the benefits provided by 
public expenditures and also because of redistributive consideration, 
it could thus at the same time be thought reasonable that, to a 
large extent, the people's ideas about the tolerable burden are 
determined independently of their ideas of desirable public 
expenditure. When an individual Rnows that his benefits from 
public expenditures do not depend on the amount of taxes paid 
by him, why would his ideas about desirable level of public 
expenditure depend solely on his ideas about the tolerable burden? 
Thus, as pointed out by Peacock and Wiseman, there is likely to be 
a gap between the two sorts of ideas. Eva Mueller's enrpirical 
findings (see chapter V, section II), while providing support for 
our view that a conceptual separation between the two sorts of 
ideas cannot always be made, also clearly indicate the existence 
of a gap between them. 
It may, however, be pointed out that although it is not 
possible to give any objective measurement of such a subjective 
tolerable burden or to describe by any mathematical terms the 
relationship of such a burden with that of the economic, political 
and social factors, e. g. level of G. N. P., distribution of income, 
social and industrial structure, political ideologies, etc., which 
seem to influence such a burden, still the concept is useful because 
it focuses our attention on some of the relevant factors which could 
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influence the growth and time pattern of public expenditure. 
Our comments on the displacement effect hypothesis are the 
following: 
Firstly, the displacement effect hypothesis was deduced from 
Peacocks and iliseman's statistical observations of time pattern of 
growth of public expenditure in the United Kingdom only. Before 
one can make any generalisation, this needs to be tested for a 
number of countries. Secondly, even in the case of the United 
Kingdom, although the existence of such effect was depicted with 
the help of charts and the corresponding tables, no quantitative 
measurement and test of significance of that effect was attempted. 
That is, the level of confidence which can be put on the displacement 
effect hypothesis as against the corresponding null hypothesis was 
not ascertained. Thirdly, the displacement effect'refers only to 
the shift in the level of government expenditure with, relation to 
national output. No attempt was made to investigate the effect 
of a social upheaval, if any, on the rate of growth of government 
expenditure. 
In view of the above mentioned comments, an attempt is made in 
chapter IV to test the "displacement effect" hypothesis for 
different 
countries not only with regard to the World Wars but also with regard 
to the Great Depression which could also be considered'a major social 
upheaval for some countries. Some quantitative measurement and 
test of significance of that 'effect' will be made. We will also 
examine whether such a 'shift' in the level of government expenditure 
is associated with a change in the rate of growth of government 
expenditure with relation to economic growth. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
PUBLIC EXPENDITURE AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT -A CROSS-SECTION 
APPROACH. 
I. Introduction 
In this chapter, an attempt is made to examine the 
relationship between public expenditure and economic development 
from a cross-section sample of countries chosen from different 
stages of. economic development. We shall verify the hypothesis 
suggested by recent cross-section studies (which we reviewed in 
chapter II)-that government expenditure as a share of national 
output and the level of economic development (real per capita 
income) are correlated. At the same time we shall investigate 
whether the rate of change of such a share with relation to that 
of real per capita: income is constant over all the different 
ranges of income or whether it is an increasing and/or diminishing 
function of income. 
Section II of this chapter states the objectives in the 
form of specific questions which we are interested in answering. 
Section III is concerned with the statistical procedure and 
measures (viz. measurement of public expenditure as a share 
of G. N. P. and real per capita income of different countries, 
the time-period involved, and the choice of sample of countries) 
adopted for this study. We discuss some of the different 
measures suggested or adopted by different economists, the related 
conceptual and statistical difficulties, the arguments in 
justification of the measures adopted in the study and also 
the limitations of our measures in that section. The statistical 
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tables, the sources and the major divergences, if any, 
from the concepts adopted in this study in the case of each 
country included in our sample are given in the Appendix A. 
Section IV is concerned with the statistical technique 
used in the study. Finally, Section V provides the answers to 
the specific questions asked in Section II and describes the 
hypotheses supported by our statistical observations. 
II. Objectives 
The main objective of our cross-section analysis is to 
study the relationship between public expenditure and the 
level of economic development on the basis of a sample 
comprising a large number of countries selected from different 
stages of economic development. 
Specific questions, which we are interested in answering 
with a view to studying this relationship are : - 
(l) Is there a correlation between government expenditure 
as a share of G. N. P. and real per capita income? 
(2) If there is a correlation, is the rate of change of 
government expenditure expressed as a proportion of 
G. N. P. with relation to the rate of change of real 
per capita income constant over all the different 
ranges of per capita income? Or, is it a diminishing 
function of income? Or, is it an increasing function 
of income? Or, is it an increasing function for some 
ranges of income, but a decreasing function for other 
levels of income? 
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III. Statistical Procedure and Measures 
(i) Measurement of public ext, enditure as a share of G. N. P. 
There are various different measures of the government 
sector suggested and/or adopted by different economists, depending 
upon the objectives of a study and also on the availability of 
data. To mention a few, for example, Abramovitz and Eliasberg, 
in order to study the growth of public employment in the U. K. 
and to compare trends of. public employment in the U. K. with 
those, in_, the U. S. A., used the ratio of public employment to 
the total labour 1- "Measurement of the scope and trend 
of-government activity" by Fabricant, and Lipsey is "approached 
through the drafts it makes upon the productive resources of 
the nation". 
2. In order to measure the 'resources absorbed' in 
government activity, in addition to data on government 
employees in relation to total, employment, _, 
they used data on 
government's share in nation's stock of capital goods and 
government purchases from private industry. Their "measure 
of input" includes (1) payrolls (and pension payments), (2) 
purchases of goods and services from private industry, (3) 
an imputed rental on government owned capital goods. Since 
their objective is to measure government's absorption of real, 
resources, their "measure, of, input" is not intended to provide 
"the usual estimate of expenditure". 
1. Moses Abramovitz and Vera Eliasberg, The Growth of-Public 
Employment in Great Britain, Princeton, Princeton University 
Press 1957. 
2. Solomon Fabricant, assisted by Robert E. Lipsey, The Trend of 
Government Activity in the United States since 1900, N"B"E"R", 
New York 1952, Chapter 2, page 10. 
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However, as our main objective is to study the' relationship 
between government expenditure and the level of economic 
development, a ratio of government expenditure to'some national 
income aggregate is a more appropriate measure. Besides, in an 
international comparative study, the statistical measures that 
one chooses depend upon the availability of data. The large 
variety of data used by'Fabricant and Lipsey in order to measure 
the trend of government's absorption of resources in the U. S. A. 
is not available for many of the countries. The budgetary and 
national accounts data for many countries, however, are 
collected and made available regularly and with continuous 
improvement. The choice of a measure which depends on such 
data, therefore, would enable further testing of our hypothesis 
with reference to some future time-period. 
Economists, however, disagree as regards the inclusion or 
exclusion of certain items in government expenditure and also 
about the selection of particular national income aggregates. 
(G. N. P. at factor cost or at market prices, or national income). 
The ratio of government expenditure to national income aggregates 
would depend upon the concepts of government expenditure and 
national income used. The problems connected with the different 
concepts have been debated in the literature of recent years 
and we do not intend to go into details of the controversy. 
Nevertheless, the main elements of controversy and the reasons 
for our choice of particular concepts are given below. 
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As regards the government expenditure, the numerator in 
such a ratio, the main controversy arises about the inclusion or 
exclusion of transfer payments. It is being argued that, since 
transfer payments are excluded from national income aggregates, 
they should also be excluded from 'government expenditure. ' 
Because, if we are using the ratio of government expenditure to 
some national income aggregates, the numerator should be fully 
included in the denominator, otherwise a comparison of government 
expenditure with national income may be "seriously misleading". 
1 
If the transfer payments and subsidies are included in 
government expenditure, the ratio results. in a false structure 
2 
quotient in the sense given to that term by Ohlsson. The 
exclusion of transfer payments is also-, favoured by those who 
think that the government can be regarded either as ,a final 
consumer of the services of public servants°and of the goods 
and services purchased and used-ýby the-: government, 
3 
or as an' 
enterprise, selling public goads and services at prices equivalent 
1. Alan Sweezy, "Comparison of Government Expenditure with 
National Income", The American Economic Review, December, 1952. 
2. See Ingvar Ohlsson, On National Accounting,, National Institute 
of Economic Research, Stockholm, 1961, pages 230-235, for his 
discussion of false and genuine structure quotients. Ohlsson 
defines genuine structure quotients as being those in which 
the numerator forms a part of the denominator, homogeneous 
items are included in the numerators and denominators. Or, if 
the numerator is subtracted from the denominator, the residual 
is of the same type as the numerator and represents the 
remaining part of that total which is the denominator. 
rnment 3. See for instance, Francis Bator, The Questions of _Government Spe nding, (Harper Bros., New York, 1960). 
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to taxes. We agree that on technical grounds the exclusion 
of transfer payments from the concept of government 
expenditure, when they are excluded from national income 
aggregates, would be justified. But the exclusion of transfer 
payments on the basis of the construction of a government 
either as a final consumer or as an enterprise cannot be 
justified. As Gerald Colm pointed out, "both these 
constructions fail to recognise the true role of government in 
the economic system - the performance of such functions as 
cannot be adequately performed by the market system, or which 
the community does not wish to have performed by enterprise 
in response to a market demand". 
'- 
If one is concerned with 
gauging the portion of total demand determined by political 
process, then the concept of public expenditure should include 
transfer payments, because the incomes and the consequent demand 
due to transfer payments are created not by the market but by 
government. The purchase of goods and services and transfer 
payments are both determined by the political decisions made 
through the political process and are often the policy alternatives 
to achieve a specific end. In this study, therefore, we preferred 
to include transfer payments in the concept of government 
expenditure. 
1. Gerald Colm "The Government Sector: A Re-examination of 
Controversial Issues", Studies in Income and Wealth, 
Vol. XX., Princeton, Princeton University Press, pages 113 
and 114. 
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As regards the choice of a measure of national income 
aggregate, we have selected G. N. P. at market prices. Since 
government purchases are made at market prices, the national 
income aggregate selected should be at market prices rather 
than at factor cost in order to maintain logical consistency. 
The deduction of indirect taxes from G. N. P. in order to compute 
G. N. P. at factor cost-is based on the doubtful assumption about 
the shiftability of such taxes. It has been shown by several 
economists-that-some direct taxes, e. g. the corporation profit 
tax, are shifted on to the consumers to an even greater extent 
than some of the indirect taxes. 
1' Besides, as argued by Colm, 
the deduction of indirect taxes from G. N. P. means "that the price 
excluding taxes, corresponds to the rewards of factors of 
production, namely, labour, management and-capital. This concept 
makes sense only if government is interpreted solely as a 
'consumer"'. We have already rejected this. Moreover, R. Frisch, 
has also said, as quoted by Colm, "one cannot claim factor cost 
to be a relevant national=income concept except by considering 
government as a nuisance, a"non-productive class. "2 
1. R. A. Musgrave and Marian Kryyniak, The Shifting of 
Corporation Income Tax, 1963, The John Hopkin Press, 
Baltimore, 1963. 
2. Gerald Colm, op. cit. page 121. 
4 
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We preferred gross national product to net national product 
mainly on practical statistical grounds, since capital 
depreciation cannot be measured directly. Besides, since the 
available government expenditure data are usually gross of 
depreciation of the public capital stock, it is appropriate 
to choose a measure of national product which is also gross of 
capital depreciation for the sake of logical consistency. 
The concept of government expenditure should include 
expenditure of all the different levels of government (i. e. of 
central and local governments, in the case of a unitary state, 
and also of governments of regions, i. e. state, or canton or 
province, in the case of a federal state) and of closely related 
bodies such as social security funds. It was not possible to 
adopt this concept and our concept of government expenditure 
excludes that fraction of local government expenditure, which 
is financed by revenue raised by local governments themselves 
because of the non-availability of the necessary data for many 
countries and also because of the wide differences in the nature 
of local authorities in different countries. Our concept of 
government expenditure in the cross-section approach, therefore, 
includes purchases of goods and services (current and capital), 
transfer payments (e. g. interest payments, social security 
payments, etc. ) loans and advances granted by central government, 
and, in the case of a federal state, by regional governments also, 
A 
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and by closely related bodies such as national insurance funds. 
The total expenditure is taken net of transactions between the 
central government, regional governments, and associated bodies, 
and of transactions between the different departments of the 
same governments. The government expenditure also includes 
transfers and loans to the local governments either by central 
governments and/or regional governments. As government 
expenditure includes such transfers and loans to local authorities, 
it excludes only that portion of local government expenditure 
which is financed by their own revenue. 
The exclusion of such expenditure is undoubtedly one of 
the limitations of our study. It was, however, shown by 
Dr. Mesmer that the linear correlation coefficient between total 
central government expenditure (including transfers to local 
governments) as ,a percentage of 
G. N. P. and total central, 
regional and local government expenditure as a percentage of 
G. N. P. was +. 91 (for fifty countries. )1 Such a correlation 
coefficient would be even higher than 0.91 when regional 
governments' expenditure are added to that of central government. 
Dr. Mesmer's estimates of total central, regional and local 
government expenditure were "necessarily crude". Nevertheless, 
such an extremely high correlation coefficient suggests that the 
limitation due to the exclusion of some expenditures of local 
authorities is not likely to change our conclusions. 
1. T. D. Mesmer, Government Expenditure and Economic Growth, 
op. cit. 
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A variety of sources were used for the government 
expenditure data. But as the budgetary systems and accounting 
practices vary from country to country, only reasonable 
approximations to the concept of government expenditure set forth 
above could be achieved, although an attempt is being made to 
ensure comparability, consistency and accuracy as far as possible. 
1 
The major divergences from the definition adopted in this study, 
in case of particular countries, however, are noted, together 
with the sources utilised for each country, in Appendix A. 
Similarly, complete accuracy, comparability and consistency 
cannot be achieved for G. N. P. at market prices, because of the 
differences in concept, scope and coverage of G. N. P.; and the 
fact that the reliability of G. N. P. estimates is undoubtedly 
different for different countries. Estimates are likely to be 
less reliable for low-income countries because of their less 
developed accounting techniques, and also because of the existence 
of a-large non-monetised sector, the imputation of income or 
output of which cannot avoid arbitrariness. 
1. For a detailed discussion of the main difficulties in 
international comparisons of government expenditures see 
"General Note to Public Finance statistics" published in 
United Nations Statistical Year Book. 
---. 
Z 
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(ii) Measurement of real per capita income. 
This sub-section is not intended to provide a detailed 
discussion of the conceptual and statistical problems involved 
in international comparison of national product or per capita 
income, the discussion of which, and controversies as regards 
the methods, can be found in the recent writings of several 
economists and statisticians. 
1 After a very brief note of some 
of the problems involved in such comparisons, we shall devote 
the rest of this sub-section to showing why Rosenstein-Rodan's 
measures are chosen in preference to some other available 
2 
measures. 
In short, the problems of international comparisons of 
income are no different from the problems of comparisons of 
income over time. One of the main problems in such comparisons 
either between one country and another or between one time and 
another is the choice of weights or prices in terms of which 
1. See for instance, John W. Kendrick, "Introduction: Problems 
in the International Comparison of the Account", Studies 
in Income and Wealth Vol. -XX, Princeton, Princeton 
University 
Press 195?; Hans Stachle, "International Comparison of Real 
National Income", Studies in Income and Wealth, Vol. II, ' 
Conference on Research in Income and Wealth, N. B. E. B. 1949; 
Irving B. Kravis, 'The Scope of Economic Activity in- 
International Income Comparisons", Studies in Income and 
Wealth, Vol. XX; Dorothy S. Brady and Abner Hurwitz, 
"Measuring Comparative Purchasing Power", Studies in Income 
and Wealth, Vol. XX; Everett E. Hagen, "Some Facts about 
Income Levels and Economic Growth", Review of Economics & 
Statistics, Feb., 1960; H. C. Edey and A. T. Peacock, National 
Income & Social Accounting, Hutchinson & Co. Ltd., London, 
1959, Chapter VI. 
2. P. N. Rosenstein-Rodan, "International Aid for Underdeveloped 
Countries", Review of Economics and Statistics, May 1961, 
Vol. XLIII, No. 2. A 
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output of different countries or at different dates is to 
be measured. But the different prices or weights may give different 
results. In the case of a comparison between one time and 
another, for example, Laspeyer's index at the base year's 
weights may differ from Paasche's index calculated at current 
year weights; similarly in case of international comparisons 
of G. N. P., differences in the level of G. N. P. of different 
countries at U. S. prices would be different from those given 
by using prices of some other country as weights. The weights 
or relative prices between different goods and services differ 
between countries and also between one time and another; 
because of which, comparisons of the level of income either 
over time or between countries cannot produce unambiguous 
results. There are many other problems and difficulties in 
such comparisons. Because of the differences in taste, need, 
and technology, the goods produced and used in different 
countries differ in quality; some goods produced and used in 
one country may not be available in another country whose 
prices might have been taken as weights. Some may think that 
an international comparison of the level of income is meaningless 
because of such conceptual and statistical difficulties and 
because of the divergencies in concept, scope and methodology 
(which are mentioned in the previous sub-section) of the national 
I 
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income estimates of different countries. Of course, an 
international comparison of the level of income cannot be 
completely relied upon. But it is no more improper to make 
such comparisons than to compare levels of income over a 
considerable period of time within one country, because the 
problems are the same in both cases. 
Several comparisons of the level of per capita income 
between different countries have been made recently by several 
people and organisations. Why did we choose Rosenstein-Rodan's 
measure in preference to other available measures? 
The conventional method of comparison is to convert the 
national income estimates of different countries expressed 
in each country's own currency into estimates expressed in a 
single currency by the use of exchange rates. In the Yearbook 
of National Accounts Statistics published by United Nations, 
estimates of total and per capita gross domestic product 
expressed in U. S. dollars have been prepared by using that 
conventional method. For countries with a single fixed exchange 
rate, the conversion rate selected. is usually the par value 
of the currency. For countries with a single fluctuating rate, 
the conversion rate is usually the annual average of import 
and export rates. And for countries with multiple exchange 
rates, the conversion rate chosen is usually an average of the 
implicit rates obtained by comparing the values of exports and 
imports in dollars and national currency units. 
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For the purpose of comparing the level of real income 
or the relative amount of goods and services produced and 
consumed per annum, the method of conversion of national 
incomes to a common unit by use of foreign exchange rates is 
grossly arbitrary. As Jacob Viner points out "this method 
of course, involves conscious or unconscious acceptance of 
the purchasing-power-parity theory of the foreign exchange, 
in its crudest, least qualified and most indefensible form..... 
Given the present instability of exchange rates, the prevalence 
of exchange controls, and the existence of multiple exchange 
rates, this is a peculiarly inappropriate time for following 
a method which under the best of circumstances is unsusceptible 
of a logical defence, regardless of the purpose of comparison. '' 
Everett E. Hagen also objects to the use of exchange rates 
because it tends to understate the level of income of low-income 
countries relative to that of high-income countries. This is 
so because the goods and services produced and'consumed 
domestically in low-income countries are muchcheaper, relative 
to the same goods and services in high-income countries, than 
those which are exported. The goods and services in which a 
1. Jacob Viner, "Comment on Irving B. Kravis' paper", 
op. cit. page 397. 
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low-income country has the greatest advantage are not 
exported because many of such goods and services are non- 
transportable. Foreign exchange rates may only reflect the 
relative prices of goods and services which enter into foreign 
trade, which are not typical of relative prices within low- 
income and high-income countries. ` The recent study by 
Gilbert and associates has also demonstrated that'-when the 
output of eight countries of Western Europe in"1955 was priced 
in dollars by direct comparison of prices, the value of output 
was about 50 per cent greater than that obtained by use of an 
exchange rate. 
2 As was suggested by Kuznets some years ago, if 
the per capita income of low-income countries were as low as 
exchange rate conversions indicated, a majority of people in 
those countries would literally have died of'starvation. 
In the United Nations' Yearbook of National Accounts, 1963, 
a 'second set of dollar estimates of total and per capita G. D. P. 
based on the calculated parity rates'of exchange rather than 
par values was presented for the first time. The parity rates 
1. Everett E. 'Hagen, "Some Facts about Income Levels and 
Economic Growth", op. cit., and comment on Kravis' paper 
op* cit. 
2. Milton Gilbert and associates, Comparative National 
Products and Price Levels, O. E. C. D., Paris 1958. 
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for several years were estimated by adjusting the official 
or free market exchange rates in 1938 for each country by 
the relative change in the level of prices from 1938 to the 
year in question, between the United States and the country 
concerned. In some instances the starting point for the 
calculations was the official rate of exchange in 1929. 
Such parity conversion does not solve the problems mentioned 
above with regard to exchange rate conversions. The exchange 
rates prevailing in 1938 (in some cases 1929) are utilised 
as a starting point for calculating the parity rates. On what 
basis can the official or free rates of exchange in 1938 (or 1929) 
be considered as reflecting the real purchasing power of 
different currencies? 
Thus, the use of direct price comparisons as well as 
adjustments for greater comparability of national income 
aggregates gives more plausible real income measures than 
those obtained by the use of exchange rates. We have chosen 
Rosenstein-Rodan's figures of real per capita G. N. P. in 1961 
for our cross-section study in the absence of any better 
alternative recent figures. His real G. N. P. per head indicates 
the purchasing power of G. N. P. compared to United States prices. 
The details of the calculation of such figures are given in 
Explanatory Notes for Table 1-A and 2-B, and 2-A-1 included in 
1 the Appendix of his study. 
1. P. N. Rosenstein-Rodan, op. cit. 
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(ü3) Time-period 
A cross-section analysis which compares government 
expenditure as a share of G. N. P. with the level of economic 
development refers to a point of time. The criteria which 
we need to follow as regards the choice of 'time' are: - 
(a) Time chosen should be 'normal', i. e. it should not 
be time of war or great depression or boom; because 
otherwise government expenditure as a share of G. N. P. may 
be higher or lower than what it would be under normal 
circumstances and may also introduce bias in favour of or 
against some countries. For example, if we choose a 
depression year, government expenditure as a share of G. N. P. 
is likely to be higher for most countries and may be 
relatively higher for developed countries since these 
countries are more vulnerable to business cycles and also 
are better equipped to use anti-cyclical monetary and fiscal 
weapons. 
(b) It should be a recent point of time, if only one 
cross-section comparison is intended. This criterion is 
based mainly on practical grounds of increased availability 
and reliability of national income and government expenditure 
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data in recent years, because of the increased work and 
research put into the compilation of such data by individual 
countries and by international organisations towards some 
standardisation of National Accounts necessary for such 
international comparisons. Besides, an analysis which 
refers to a recent time is likely to be of more use, if any, 
for policy purposes, than such an analysis based on a year 
like 1880. 
One recent year, however, cannot be considered 
sufficiently "normal" for all the countries, to be a good 
basis of comparison. An average of several years, apparently 
not abnormal years, is a better choice, so that abnormality 
(if any) in any particular year for a country, may be 
lessened. 
In this study, therefore, an average of government 
expenditure and G. N. P. data for the most recent five years 
(i. e. 1958-1962, with some exceptions because of non-availability 
of data) is used. The period of 1958-1962 is a period of 
"relative peace" and without severe depression or boom. 
Any abnormal distortion in any particular year in case of 
a country being averaged over five years, is considerably 
lessened. 
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In the case of ratios of government expenditure to 
G. N. P. both the numerator and denominator (measured in 
domestic currency) are averaged over the period chosen, i. e. 
the ratio of government expenditure to G. N. P. is calculated 
by'dividing the arithmetic average of government 
expenditure 
by the arithmetic average of G. N. P. for five years. 
But 
unfortunately we could not follow the same procedure as 
regards the real per capita G. N. P. of different countries 
because such data for several years are not readily available. 
Rosenstein-Rodan's data for real per capita G. N. P. used in 
this study refer to 1961 alone. The spread of real per capita 
G. N. P. in the cross-section, however, being extremely large, 
the cardinal ratings of per capita income is not likely 
to 
be significantly affected; for this reason the additional 
extra effort required to calculate real per capita G. N. P. for 
several years did not seem worthwhile. 
(iv) The Choice of Sample of Countries 
A set of countries are excluded from the cross-section 
because of various reasons given below. 
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The "Communist" countries are excluded from the-study 
for the obvious reason of-non-comparability of concepts 
used. It is an extremely difficult task to deduce the 
"non-Marxist" measures from the "Marxist" measures of 
government expenditure and national product., -The net material 
product estimates which are available for some communist 
countries-cannot-easily be reconciled-with-G. N. P. stimates 
used for other countries. The Marxist-concept, -of "material", 
production excludes many services, e. g. public administration, 
defence, banking-and insurance, education, -: health etc. ', which 
are included in, G. N. P.. estimates..: "-Besides different methods 
are used by-different communist countries to estimate net 
material product. Again, even-if net material product is 
somehow adjusted for those services and variations in-the 
methods adopted by different , countries,,: the-comparison}of.. 
G. N. P. -between the. "Marxist": and "non-Marxist" countries is 
meaningless because "prices" or factor costs, in- the 
former are 1argely administered'(ones) whereas'in the 
latter they are largely determined by market mechanism. - 
Differences in political idealogies between these two 
different groups of-countries are so great that.. the government 
expenditures of one cannot be rightly compared-with another. 
To include both categories of countries in: our. sam , would 
make it heterogeneous to such a degree as to'make'the test'-of 
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any hypothesis highly unreliable. We should therefore 
consider the "communist" and "non-communist" countries as 
two different "universes" or "populations". Our sample is 
drawn from the latter. 
The other countries excluded fall into one or more of 
the following categories: - '''` 
(a) Non-self Igoverning countries or colonies. 
(b) Countries which are to a great extent fiscally-dependent. 
(c) Small countries aä regards the size of population. 
(d) Countries for which necessary data (i. e. government 
expenditure, G. N. P. änd'rea. Z per capita G. N P. )'were 
not readily available. 
Arguments in favour of`excluding these countries are 
given in detail by Dr. Mesmer in Chapter 2 of his unpublished 
thesis; some of his arguments for such exclusion, however, 
could be questioned. Briefly, it is argued that "one of 
the fundamental requirements of state-hood, a government free 
from external control, is "sent" in case of (a) and experience 
in case of India and Indonesia seems to suggest that transition 
from colonial status to independent status produces`"changes 
in the amount and pattern of public expenditures, because of 
which non-self government areas are to be excluded. But the 
important questions which need to be answered before we-, 
decide in favour of, or against, the exclusion of such areas 
are: - 
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(1) Is freedom from 'external control' the most important 
decisive factor? 
(2) Does a de jure external control produce results 
differing significantly from those of a de facto 
external control by larger states? 
We do not know the answers. Dr. Mesmer assumes the 
answer is 'yes' for the above mentioned questions and 
therefore thinks that the non-self governing areas must be 
excluded. But the answers in 'no' are also not very unlikely. 
It is possible that the level (and possibly also the pattern, 
except for defence and foreign relations) of government 
expenditure may not change simply because of transition from 
colonial status to independent status. The financial support 
from the metropolitan country during colonial status is 
usually substituted by foreign aid after independence. It 
is not necessary that experience of India should be repeated 
by other colonies after independence, with different political, 
social and economic environment, and also, to say that the 
changed level and pattern of expenditure in India is due to 
independence, is only a speculation because the other 
circumstances are no longer the same. Besides, de facto 
external control may have almost the same effect on government 
expenditure that de jure control produced. Then where would 
one draw the dividing line? There is thus no clear cut case 
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for an exclusion of non-self governing areas. It. would 
of-course be highly interesting to compare the results 
obtained by inclusion of such areas with the, results 
obtained after exclusion, which may provide some answers 
about the effects of de. jure external control.. However, the 
available data and time did not permit us to do separate 
statistical exercises.: Mainly on practical grounds,. (i. ee 
the non-availability of.. the. necessary. data_for non-self,, 
governing areas), they, are, excluded -from our study. 
1. 
. 
ý,, Fiscally, dependent-states,, e. g. Laos, Jordan, South, 
Korea, 
China/TaiwansSouth_Vietnam, where foreign public-aid-constitutes 
a large. -proportion of public expenditure, are excluded, 
because such aid obviously influences the level and, pattern 
of public expenditure. Small countries, e. g. the Vatican, 
Monaco,. 
-Luxembourg, Kuwait -etc.,: are excluded 
because of their 
small size. 
1. There is only one exception, i. e. British Guiana is 
included in our study. But its inclusion would not 
affect the result because as can be noticed from the 
chart the point 30 representing British Guiana's 
government expenditure as a share of G. N. P. with 
relation to real per capita income lies almost on the 
regression curve. 
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The exclusion of the above-mentioned countries has 
the advantage of making the units chosen in the sample to 
some extent homogeneous, because the sample now includes 
countries which are largely politically and fiscally 
independent and are above a minimum size as regards their 
population. This homogeneity aspect is very important for 
the validity of testing the significance of a hypothesis. 
Even after such exclusions, either because of non- 
comparability of concepts or non-availability of data, the 
number of countries chosen for cross-section study is quite 
large. The sample of countries chosen is large in terms of 
country and population coverage. The total number of 
countries included in our sample is 53. It includes a fair 
number of countries from each continent, and countries at 
different levels of economic development. 
IV. The Statistical Technique 
For the study of the relationship between government 
expenditure as a share of G. N. P. and real per capita income, 
a polynomial regression function of the third degree, i. e. 
y=a+ bx + cx2 + dx3 is used where x and y denote the logs'. 
of real per capita income and government expenditure as a 
share of G. N. P. respectively. The log. values are used in 
our regression analysis mainly because of our interest in 
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studying the rate of change of government expenditure as a 
share of G. N. P. with relation to the rate of change of real 
per capita income. 
Why is a polynomial regression function of third degree 
used instead of a linear function or any other function? 
There are various reasons for using such'a function. First, " 
such a function is suitable for providing some"answer to all 
the questions asked in Section II, especially to the questions: 
is the rate of change of G/Y (G and Y denotes government 
expenditure and G. N. P. respectively) with relation to the 
rate of change in real per capita income a constant/decreasing/ 
increasing function over all the different ranges of income? 
Or-is it. an increasing function. for some ranges of income, 
but a decreasing function for'other levels of income? 'If' 
a straight line is the appropriate function, which'on a 
double logarithmic scale shows a constant rate of change, 
in our polynomial function b will be positive and c and d 
would become zero. If a second degree curve showing either 
the diminishing or increasing rate of change is the appropriate 
one, d in our regression function would become zero. But if 
the rate of change is an increasing function for some ranges 
of income but a decreasing function'for other levels of income, 
none of the constants, viz., b, c, d, will become zero. 
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Second, as is shown in the next section, it is not only the 
total variance explained by our fitted third degree curve, 
which is highly significant; but the additional variance 
explained by such a function is also highly significant, thus 
providing justification for its use. Third, the regression 
curve fitted with such a polynomial function not only provides 
a better fit, it is also acceptable on the analytical grounds 
given in Chapter V. Fourth, although our function is quite 
a complicated one, yet it is not too complex for analytical 
purposes; it is quite a familiar function used by economists 
for depicting various economic phenomena e. g. the diminishing 
return phenomena is usually shown by such a function. 
V. Statistical Observations and Hypotheses 
In the chart No. 1 we measure the x variable, i. e. the 
logarithms of real per capita G. N. P. (or Log. Yc), on the 
horizontal axis and the y variable, i. e. the logarithm of 
government expenditure as a share of G. N. P. (or Log. G/Y), 
on the vertical axis and we plot a point for each pair of 
x and y values. For each country included in our sample we 
have a pair of values of the variables x and y (i. e. log. G/y 
and log. Yc) which is represented by plotting a point on the 
scatter diagram. As our sample includes 53 countries, there 
are 53 such points on the scatter diagram, the numbering of 
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such points corresponding to the respective numbers given 
to different countries included in our sample. Such numbers 
and the data of G/y and Yc for countries included in our 
sample are to be found in the table A. l in Appendix A. 
The scatter diagram in the chart suggests some relationhip 
between G/y and Yc. A further inspection of the scatter 
diagram would suggest a curvilinear relationship (i. e. a 
curve concave downwards); our regression analysis with a 
polynomial regression function (y =a+ bx + cx + dx3) 
provides further support to the relationship suggested by 
the scatter diagram. 
Cur regression equation is 
y=0.2267 + 0.065x + 0.286x2 --o. o6ix3 
and the curve in the chart represents computed-values from 
that equation. 
The computed correlation coefficient or index of 
correlation is 0.783; the coefficient of determination is 
0.614, i. e. 61.4 per-cent of variability of G/y is explained 
by our regression equation. 
By an'application of the analysis of variance technique 
we tried to ascertain (1) whether the non-linear coefficient 
of determination is significantly larger than a coefficient 
based upon a curve of lower order and (2) whether the non- 
linear coefficient is significantly greater than zero. 
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The F test (or the equivalent t test) showed that the 
use of the additional constants explained a significantly 
larger amount of variation (at 5% level of significance). 
The use of our polynomial regression function, as shown in 
chapter V, is also supported on analytical grounds. The use 
of the F test also showed that the non-linear coefficient 
significantly exceeds zero, the probability of its being zero 
being much less than 0.001.1 
It may be pointed out that the point at which the 
diminishing rate of increase starts is the point of inflection 
in the curve, i. e. where the change in slope is zero. 
By setting d2Y = 0, we have X=1.57, 
dX2 
Anti-log. of 1.57 = 37.1 (dollars) 
On the basis of our regression function, an increasing 
rate of increase of G/Y with relation to the rate of increase 
of real per capita GNP is likely for countries with extremely 
low level of income. 
1. The formulae for such tests of significance can be found 
in any standard text book on applied statistics, which 
discusses polynomial regression. See, e. g. Frederick 
E. Croxton and Dudley J. Cowden, Applied General Statistics, 
second edition, Sir Isaac Pitman & Sons'Ltd., London, 1962, 
pages 726-730. The tests of significance are, however, 
based on the usual assumptions in a regression analysis, i. e., 
(a) The universe, from which, the sample is chosen is 
very large. 
(b) The sample includes homogeneous units. (c) For given X's the Y's are normally distributed about 
the regression function with a standard deviation which 
is the same for all X's, i. e. the deviation or error 
is normally distributed about a zero mean with given 
standard deviation. 
68. 
Similarly by setting 
dY = 0, we have X=3.243 (disregarding negative value dX of X) 
Anti-log. of X 1750. 
The Chart indicates that a maximum for G/Y is reached 
when X=1? 50 dollars, beyond which G/Y diminishes. 
Moreover, from the scatter diagram, it is also apparent 
that the geographical location of a country could be an 
important factor in influencing the level of public expenditure. 
It can be noticed that the Latin-American countries are 
usually below the regression curve, whereas the African and 
Asian countries are usually above that curve. The explanation 
for the importance of geographical location will also be 
given in chapter V. 
The regression equation and the fitted curve show a 
11 diminishing rate of increase of G/y with relation to the rate 
of increase of real per capita income for the range of 
actually observed real per'capita income. The equation 
would show an increasing rate of increase of G/y for a very 
low level of income (i. e. below 037). But as the countries 
with such low levels of income either do not exist now or 
are extremely few, the fitted curve relevant for analytical 
purposes is a curve showing a diminishing rate of increase 
of G/y with increasing level of per capita income. Any other 
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curve fitted to such data, we think, would show a similar 
tendency; because the flattening out of a curve, especially 
for the high-income countries, is pretty obvious from the 
scatter diagram. 
Thus, the answer to the specific questions asked in 
Section II, as provided by our statistical observations are: - 
(1) There is a highly significant correlation 
between government expenditure as a share 
of G. N. P. and the real per capita income. 
(2) The average relationship is that of a 
diminishing rate of increase of G/y with 
relation to the rate of increase of real per 
capita income (increasing rate of increase 
of G/y may occur only for countries with 
extremely low level of income. ) 
Our main hypothesis, supported by statistical observations, 
therefore, is that government expenditure as a share of G. N. P. 
increases at a diminishing rate with an increasing level of 
economic development, the analytical reasons for which will 
be discussed in Chapter V. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
PUBLIC I(PENDITURE AND ECONOMIC GRO1TH - 
A TIME-SERIES APPROACH 
I Introduction 
In this chapter, a statistical analysis of the growth and 
time-pattern of public expenditure with relation to economic growth 
is attempted for different countries. Our primary concern, however, 
is to study the time-pattern of such a growth of public expenditure; 
or, specifically, to examine, whether social upheavals, such as war, 
affect the level and/or rate of growth of public expenditure with 
relation to, that of per capita income. Professors Peacock and Wiseman's 
"displacement effect" hypothesis in this area, deduced from their 
statistical observations of the behaviour of British public 
expenditure (which was discussed in chapter IIt, will be tested for 
a number of countries, not only with regard to the World Wars but 
also with regard to the Great Depression which could be considered 
a major social upheaval in the case of some countries. We have 
attempted to make some quantitative measurement of that 'effect'. 
In addition to the verification of their 'displacement effect' 
hypothesis, which refers only to the shift in the level of government 
expenditure with relation to economic growth, we investigate also 
the effect, if any, of a social upheaval on the rate of growth of 
government expenditure with relation to economic growth. Some 
statistical tests of significance of such shifts and/or changes in 
the rate of growth of government expenditure are made with a view to 
examining whether they are statistically significant so as to associate 
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them with the respective social upheaval. 
In section II of this chapter the objectives of our time-series 
approach are stated in the form of specific questions which we are 
interested in answering. Section III is concerned with the 
statistical procedure and measures (viz., definition of government 
expenditure, elimination of the "price and population effects", 
exclusion of the war-related expenditures, per capita income at 
constant prices, choice of countries); and some of the related 
conceptual and statistical difficulties are also discussed in that 
section. The statistical tables and the sources of thorn tables 
used in our time-series analysis are given in Appendix B. Section 
IV describes the statistical tochniques (i. e. the division of the 
time-period into sub-periods, choice of regression function, 
measurement and tests of significance of the shift in the level 
and change in the rate of growth of government expenditure with 
relation to economic growth) used in the study. _ 
Section V provides 
the answers to the specific questions asked in section II in the case 
of each country included in our time-series approach (viz., U. K., 
Germany, U. S. A., Canada, Sweden), with regard to the effect of 
social upheaval on the level and rate of growth of government 
expenditure with relation to economic growth. The necessary 
adjustments to the available statistical data in order to ensure 
comparability over time and between countries, the divergencies, if 
any, from our definitions in the case of each country, and the 
similarities or dissimilarities observed between different countries 
are also noted in this section. Finally, a summary of the statistical 
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observations and the hypotheses suggested is provided in the last 
section of this chapter. 
II Objectives 
The main objective of our time-series studies, as stated above, 
is to examine whether social upheavals such as war affect the level 
and/or rate of growth of government expenditure with relation to 
economic growth. 
Specific questions which we are interested in answering, are 
the following: 
(1) Is a major social upheaval (such as a world war, and also 
The Great Depression in the case of some countries) 
associated with a shift in the level of government 
expenditure with relation to economic growth? To put 
that question in a different form, is a social upheaval 
associated with a shift in, the regression function of Gc 
(i. e. per capita total government expenditure other than 
for war-related government expenditure at constant prices) 
on Yc (i. e. per capita G. N. P. at constant prices)? 
1 
(2) If such a shift is observed, is that shift , 
statistically 
significant so as to associate it with the respective 
social upheaval? 
 
(3) Is a social upheaval associated with a change in the rate of 
growth of government expenditure with relation to that of per 
capita income? In other words, is an. upheaval associated with 
a change in the slope of the regression curve of Gc on Yc? 
1 We discuss in the next section of this chapter why G and Y are 
chosen for the sake of our analysis, instead of total government 
expenditure and G. N. P. at current prices. 
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(ýF) If a change in such a rate of growth of public expenditure 
is observed, is that change statistically significant so 
as to associate it with the respective social upheaval? 
In our time-series studies in section V, in äddition to 
providing some answers to the above mentioned questions, we will 
also point out the similarities (or dissimilarities) observed 
between different countries as regards the growth and time-pattern 
of public expenditure with relation to economic growth. 
III Statistical Procedure and Measures 
(i) Definition of government expenditure 
There is no single definition of the government sector or 
expenditure which can claim universal acceptance. As pointed out 
in chapter III, various different statistical measures are suggested 
and/or adopted by different economists, depending upon the objective 
of a study and also on the availability of data. We do not intend 
to describe those various measures or to discuss the conceptual 
problems connected with different concepts, which have been debated 
in the literature of recent years. Some of such measures anq the 
main elements of controversy (e. g. about the inclusion or exclusion 
of transfer payments) are, however, discussed briefly in chapter III. 
The concept of total government expenditure for our time-series 
studies is that of the British study by Professors Peacock and 
Wiseman, which conforms basically with that used by Central 
Statistical Office of the United Kingdom, as found in the National 
Income and Expenditure Blue Books. The concept used in the 
National Accounts of the different countries, in most cases, is also 
very similar to their definition. 
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The conceptual, problems connected with the definition of 
government, expenditure adopted in our study are discussed in detail 
in the study by Professors Peacock and Wiseman. In general terms, 
however, government expenditure should include expenditure of all 
levels of government, i. e. of central and local governments in the 
case of a unitary state and also of governments of regions (i. e. 
state-or province) in the case of a federal state. It should also 
include the expenditures of, closely associated agencies, such as 
social insurance schemes financed by compulsory contributions from 
employees and/or employers, which may not be amenable to the same 
budgetary control as other expenditures and whose transactions may 
be recorded in the extra-budgetary accounts. The essential 
characteristic of such agencies is that their services, like other 
services included in the budget, are not sold in the market and are 
financed mainly by compulsory contributions which are similar to 
taxes. It is, therefore, considered necessary that their expenditure 
should also be included for the measurement of total government 
expenditure. The total expenditure, however, should be taken net of 
internal transactions between the different levels of government and 
the associated agencies, and of transactions between the different 
departments of the same government, so that no duplication of 
expenditures or double-counting occurs. Again, when specific fees 
are paid for certain non-commercial government särvices (such as 
school fees and fees paid for health service), they should be deducted 
from the corresponding government expenditure. The total government 
expenditure is, therefore, defined as net of such specific fees. 
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The fees which are paid for services which the government alone can 
provide, e. g., passport fees and all kinds of legal fees are, however, 
treated as taxes, and are, therefore, not deducted. The social 
insurance contributions also, as mentioned before, could be treated 
as taxes; and are, therefore, not deducted. In the case of some 
countries, as shown later in section V, it has not been possible to 
exclude the above-mentioned specific receipts because of the lack of 
necessary statistical information. Besides, the government purchases 
of goods and services are usually recorded at market prices and thus 
include taxes on expenditure which the government pays to itself. 
It has also not been possible to exclude this tax element from the 
expenditure series computed for different countries included in our 
time-series study. 
The definition of government expenditure adopted for our time- 
series studies includes not only the purchases of goods and services 
but also the transfers and subsidies, such inclusion being con 
, cant 
with the definition adopted in our cross-section approach. The 
controversy as regards their inclusion or exclusion and the particular 
reasons for our choice of inclusion are already given in chapter III, 
section II. To repeat, transfers and subsidies, like the purchase 
of goods and services, are normally financed by taxes. Both sorts 
of expenditures are determined not by the market but by political 
decisions made through the political process and are often policy 
alternatives to achieve a specific end. Therefore, we choose to 
include transfers and subsidies also for our measure of total govern- 
ment expenditure. 
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Following the social accounting conventions, the expenditure of 
public corporations such as railways are not included. The essential 
characteristic of public undertakings is that their services or 
products are sold in the market; and, therefore, are likely to be 
much more affected by market criteria than by the categories of 
public expenditure mentioned above. From an economic point of view, 
their activities are basically of the same nature as those of private 
enterprises; both being usually guided to a large extent by commercial 
considerations. The most satisfactory procedure, therefore, would 
be to exclude 'production expenditures' completely from our measure- 
ment of total government-expenditure. It is, however, not possible 
in practice to exclude all forms of trading activities of the 
different levels of government. Usually, certain trading services, 
such as Post Office, which are financially dependent on government, 
are included in the government accounts; whereas other public 
enterprises, which are not so dependent but otherwise little different 
in economic character, are excluded from the government sector. 
The compromise made for such trading activities, following the social 
accounting conventions, is that current expenditures of those trading 
services are considered as self-liquidating and thus are not included, 
but capital expenditures are included. For public corporations and 
other public enterprises whose transactions are not included in 
government accounts, both current and capital expenditures are excluded 
for our measurement of tötal government expenditure. 
For the sake of comparability over time and between different 
countries, computation of government expenditure for different countries 
Text cut off in original 
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procedure for their elimination. 
In order to eliminate price changes or to obtain the series of 
'real' government expenditure (and also real G. N. P. ), estimates at 
current prices need to be deflated by an appropriate price index. 
Several problems, conceptual and statistical, arise in this 
connection. First, there are general problems of index numbers, 
which will not be discussed here. Some of these general problems 
(e. g. the choice of weights, difficulties due to change of quality 
or introduction of new commodities because of change in taste, and 
need or technology over time) are pointed out in our cross-section 
approach while discussing the problems of international comparisons 
of income which, at least as far as the conceptual ones are concerned, 
were shown to be no different from the problems involved in comparison 
over time. Another set of problems arises because of the lack of 
market valuations for goods and services provided by a government. 
Usually such goods and services (almost all the goods and services, 
and expenditures . which are included in our definition of government 
expenditure) are not sold in the market either because the "exclusion 
principle" 
1 does not apply to them or because of the socio-political 
considerations such as redistributive considerations. We consider 
in the next paragraph the various methods considered by different 
economists and statisticians for the deflation of current estimates 
of government purchases of goods and services. 
1 See R. A. Musgrave, The Theory of Public Finance, Chapter I, 
op. cit. 
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One possibility is to regard government as a unitary being in 
the Pigovian sense, with tastes and preferences like other beings; 
and thus the prices paid by government in purchasing goods and 
services may be considered to represent its marginal utilities. 
An index of prices paid for such goods and services by the 
government could-then be, used to obtain the 'real' output consumed 
by government. But many would not accept an organic conception of 
state and even if one accepts this view of government, crude 
assumptions have to be made as regards the quality changes of the 
goods and services consumed by the unitary being. The second 
possibility is to regard government as a producer, so that the 
purchases of such goods and, services can be considered as inputs 
used to produce government output. But then, how can one translate 
the current estimates of government inputs into the real government 
output values? The problems arise not only with regard to the 
construction of price index of government inputs, which is usually 
not available in a country, but also because one has to make some 
crude assumptions about the change in productivity of such inputs 
over time (because it is impossible to measure such productivity 
change), if the purpose is to derive the "real" government output 
series. The third method suggested is to measure the real government 
output by the volume of services rendered. In this method, the 
obvious difficulties are in defining the unit in terms of which the 
volume of each service is to be measured and also in allowing for 
quality changes. Another possibility is to value government services 
with the valuation placed on llcomparable1f services by the private 
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sector. As Professors Peacock and Wiseman point out in their study, 
"this would call for some arbitrary assumptions (e. g. about what 
constitutes a "comparable" service), and would also entail enough 
statistical labour and discussion for another treatise"r. 
1 
The method adopted for each time-series study, in order to 
eliminate the effects of price changes, is, however, chosen on the 
grounds of statistical expediency. Wherever possible, different 
components of government expenditure were deflated separately by 
appropriate price indexes and then the deflated components were 
added to obtain the total at constant prices. For example,, as 
discussed later, in the case of Canada and the United Kingdom, current 
and capital expenditures of government were deflated by separate 
price indexes for current goods and services and for capital goods 
respectively. The transfer payments and subsidies were deflated by 
an index of prices of consumers' goods and services. The use of 
separate indexes obviates, to some extent, the difficulties associated 
with the change in composition of government expenditure compared 
with that of national product. Even this refinement was not 
possible in the case of all countries and a single index (i. e. 
whole-sale price index or an index implied in the current and constant 
price estimates of national product) was used due to the lack of 
statistical'information. 
2 
1 Peacock and Wiseman, op. cit., page 11. 
2 As'pointed out by Peacock and 'Wiseman, "the construction of any 
separate price index for government expenditure presents difficult 
statistical problems, and the computation and the use of more than 
one such index, would in our judgement have added more to 
complexity than to enlightenment", ibid. page 8. 
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The statistical method used for computation of real estimates 
has its obvious limitations. The deflation of current estimates of 
government expenditure by an index of prices of private output 
assumes almost identical productivity changes in both the private 
and public sector. The difference in productivity changes in the 
public and private sector, so far as it is due to the change over 
time in composition of government output compared with that of 
national output, could be taken into account in the calculation of 
real estimates fdr--both, if the appropriate-separate price indexes 
for different components of government expenditure and national 
product could-be computed in sufficient detail. Although, as 
mentioned above, `-separate price indexes were used for different 
components in the case of some countries, they cannot be considered 
sufficiently detailed as regards the number of, main components and 
the sub components into which the main components were divided for 
deflation; and therefore the differences in the productivity 
changes in the public and private sectors, even due to the factor 
mentioned above, is hardly taken into account. It has been pointed 
out by several economists that productivity in the government sector 
is rising at a slower rate than in the private sector. This is so 
because the public sector is characterised mostly by the service 
industries where the rate of increase'of productivity is usually less 
than that of manufacturing or even of agriculture. It is impossible 
to establish any numerical value for this productivity'lag in the 
government sector. Therefore no adjustment will be made for such a 
productivity discrepancy-in our calculation of "real" estimates. 
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The importance of 'productivity lag' for our statistical observation 
and hypothesis is, however, discussed later in chapter V. 
The elimination of the effects of population change also 
raises complex problems. ' The relationship between population 
changes and government expenditure is highly complex and uncertain. 
Population changes usually comprise not only"of changes in total 
numbers but also-of-changes in the compositionRof population (such 
as old age pensioners or children as a percentage of total population), 
both of which are'likely to affect government expenditure. -Many 
kinds of government' expenditures are likely to be affected by the 
number of persons in particular groups, whose needs such expenditures 
are designed to'meet. However, the influences of population change, 
so far as it'is due to change in total numbers, could be eliminated 
by computing our series on an average per capita basis. Although 
the per capita estimates do not eliminate the effects of changes in 
the 'composition of population, a quantitative' measurement of which 
has not been possible, our, analysis. will be based on per capita 
estimates, which assumes in the absence, of any better alternative that 
either the composition of population has not changed or that such 
changes (if any) have not affected significantly per capita estimates. 
(iii) Exclusion of War-related Expenditures 
For the testing of the displacement effect, 1 ypothesis it is 
also necessary that the expenditures that resulted directly from the 
Aalars should be eliminated. The expenditures which can be considered 
as the direct consequences of war, continuing in-peace-time are: 
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national debt interest, war pensions, war damage compensations, 
reparation payments, and so on. The possibility that the displace- 
ment effect is solely due to such 'accidental' expenditures generated 
by war can be eliminated by studying the behaviour of government 
expenditure other than for war-related expenditure. If our study 
of the residual government expenditure still shows a "displacement 
effect", it then could be considered the result of the influence 
1 
of the social upheaval on government behaviour. 
Following the same analytical procedure, the Great Depression- 
related expenditure should also be excluded for a country (e. g. the 
United States and Canada) for which the Depression is considered as 
a major social upheaval which influenced the time-pattern of public 
expenditure in that country. The high expenditure during the 
Depression was financed to a large extent by deficit financing. 
By excluding interest payments on national debt, considered as war- 
related expenditure, we are, however, excluding also the Great 
Depression-related debt commitments which continued after the recovery. 
1 Following Peacock-Wiseman we have not included peace-time defence 
expenditure in the category of war-related expenditure. The 
defence expenditure is not eliminated because, to quote Peacock 
and Wiseman, "peace-time defence expenditure clearly does not 
lie as completely outside the influences that affect expenditures 
of other types as do war-time military expenditure and other 
war-related expenditures. .... like all other expenditure, 
defence spending requires the raising of revenues, and the 
governments of many countries (including Britain) are answerable 
to the electorate for defence spending. .... peace-time 
expenditure on defence constitutes a part of the total tax 
burden that the community is called on to bear. From this 
point of view defence expenditure is no different from any other 
expenditure, it is the total that is of prime importance to a_ 
government. ..... it is probable, therefore, that in eliminating 
all defence expenditures we are eliminating altogether too much 
if we want the residual to reflect what government expenditure 
"would have been" in the absence of such spending', Ibid., p. 
60-61. 
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(iv) Per Capita Income at Constant Prices 
For the measurement of real per capita income, which is usually 
accepted as a , measure of economic growth 
(and was accepted also in 
the cross-section approach), the first problem arises with regard 
to the choice of a measure of national income aggregate. Second, 
the 'population and price. effectsI, as, in the case of government 
expenditure, ýhave somehow., to be eliminated. 
As regards the choice of a measure of national income aggregate, 
we would prefer. gross national product at market prices for the sake 
of consistency with our cross-section approach, where such a measure 
was chosen; and also because of the specific reasons for our choice 
of that measure, given in chapter III. The gross national product 
is. preferred to net national product mainly on practical grounds, 
since capital depreciation cannot be measured directly. Besides, 
since government expenditure is computed gross of depreciation of 
the public capital stock, it . would, also be appropriate 
to choose 
gross national product for the sake of logical consistency. Again, 
since government purchases of. go ods and services are computed at 
market prices, -. the national income aggregate selected should also 
be at market prices rather than at factor cost in order to maintain 
logical consistency. If the indirect tax content could be excluded 
from the public. expenditure;.. then, the gross national product at 
factor. cost could be regarded an equally good measure from the point 
of view of logical consistency. But, as already noted in sub-section 
(i), since it has not been possible to exclude taxes on such expendi- 
ture which the government pays to itself, the gross national product 
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at market prices is to be preferred. 
1 
Out choice of a measure of national income aggregate for 
individual countries included in the time-series study is, however, 
based on the grounds of statistical expediency. For two countries, 
namely the United States and Canada, we could select the series of 
G. N. P. at märket prices. The series of G. N. P. at factor cost is 
selected for the United Kingdom änd Germany and the G. D. P. at market 
prices is chosen for Sweden in the absence of any other better 
alternative series. 
From these series, as for that of government expenditure, the 
'population'and'price effects' have to be eliminated in order to 
obtain the seriesof real per capita income. We have already dis- 
cussed some of the problems connected with the deflation of government 
purchases of goods and services, which equally apply for the com- 
putation of G. N. P. series at constant prices because government 
purchase is one of'the main components of national product. The 
general problems of index numbers arise for deflation of private 
output. However, as is shoim in section V the series at constant 
prices, for all countries except Sweden, are obtain from official 
or other publications, which'had been computed by deflating different 
components by separate price indexes. In the case of Sweden, a 
single index, i. e, the general wholesale price index was used for the 
deflation of G. D. F. series at, the current market price. The adjust- 
ment for 'population' effect' is tobe made, as in the case of govern- 
ment expenditure series, by-computing such series on an average per 
1 For other reasons in favour-of a choice of G. N. P. at"market 
prices, see chapter III, Section III. 
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capita basis. 
(v) Choice of Countries 
The analysis based on time-series studies necessarily limited 
us to a small number of countries for which historical data on a 
comparable basis is readily available. The number of countries 
included is U. K., Germany, U. S. A., Canada and Sweden. In the case 
of the-first two countries, world wars are considered to be the 
major social upheaval. As discussed in section V, in the case of 
Canada and the United States, in addition to the wars, the Great 
Depression was also a major social upheaval. Sweden is an 
isolated 
case among our studies, -which neither took a direct part in war nor 
was affected severely by the-Great' Depression. Thus, although our 
sample as regards the number of countries is a small one, still it 
enables us to examine not only the effects of wars but also the effect 
of the Great Depression in the case of some countries. War and 
Depression are two different types of social upheaval and their 
'displacement effects', as is shown in Chapter V, would require a 
different interpretation. 4 The inclusion of-Sweden in our 
time-series 
study helps us to examine the effects-of war, 'if any, on the time- 
pattern of public expenditure for a country which did not participate 
in war. However, because of the small number of countries included 
in our time-series analysis, even if we notice some general or 
common factors influencing the growth and-time-pattern of public 
expenditure, extreme caution is needed as regards any generalisation 
of their applicability to other countries because of political and 
social differences and differences, in economic development. 
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IV Statistical Technique 
(i) Division of the Time-period into sub-periods. 
After the necessary statistical series, namely the series of 
per capita total government expenditure at constant prices (excluding 
war-related expenditure) and that of per capita G. N. P. at constant 
prices had been obtained for as many years as possible, we found 
it necessary to divide the whole time-period for each country, into 
different sub-periods depending on the occurrence of major social 
upheaval in the case of each country during the whole time-period. 
For example, in the case of the United Kingdom, as shown later in 
section V (i), the whole time-period, i. e. 1890-1962, is divided 
into three sub-periods, viz., (1) the First dar period (2) inter-war 
period (3) post Second War period, because the world wars are 
considered the only major social upheaval during that time-period. 
In the case of the United States (and also Canada), the inter-war 
period, i. e. 1923-1939 is divided further into two sub-periods, viz., 
1923-1929 and 1931-1939, because the Great Depression is considered 
as a major social upheaval. The reasons for this are given in the 
next section. Such a division of the whole period into sub-periods 
was found necessary for the following reasons: 
(1) It facilitates our analysis of the effects, if any, of the 
corresponding social upheaval on the level and/or rate of 
growth of government expenditure with relation to economic 
growth. As is shown below, a separate regression function 
for government expenditure is fitted for each sub-period; 
and the difference between such regression functions fitted 
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for different periods and the statistical tests of such 
differences provide some answers to the questions stated 
in section II. 
(2) It is not possible to find any simple mathematical function 
to which the data for the whole period would conform because 
of the irregularities in the secular growth of public 
expenditure through time., In. each of these different 
periods, public expenditures have behaved with more 
regularities-than for the period as a whole. 
(ii) Choice of Regression Function. 
The next problem is the choiceof a simple mathematical function 
so as to obtain, the regression curve of G on Y., a and Y cccc 
denote per capita total. government expenditure (excluding war-related 
expenditure) at constant prices, and per capita G. N. P. at. constant 
prices, respectively., We need a regression function which not 
only provides a "good" fit, for the. data, but.. also helps us provide 
some answers to the questions asked. in section II. Besides, on 
the grounds of simplicity, it should betas uncomplicated as,, possible 
so as to-facilitate the statistical computations and analysis. 
On the above mentioned grounds, we chose a double logarithmic 
function of the form: 
Log Go = Log a+ b_Log Yo, 
which is fitted for the different sub-periods into which the whole- 
time period for each individual., country is divided. 
Such. a double logarithmic function seemed to fit better than a 
simple linear function. Besides it provides us with a measure of 
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the rate of growth of government expenditure with relatiön to that of 
Yc: The constant b provides that measure. As is discussed below, 
by examining the differences between such regression functions fitted 
for different periods, we are able to provide some measure of the shift 
in the level`(or the displacement effect of Peacock and Wiseman) and 
the change in the rate of growth of-government expenditure with 
relation to economic growth, if any, associated with a social upheaval. 
(iii) Measurement and Tests of the significance of the shift in the 
level and change in the rate of growth of government expenditure 
with relation to economic growth 
As stated in the preceding section', a double logarithmic 
regression function is'-fitted for each sub-period-(the whole time- 
period being divided'into'different sub-periods depending on the 
occurrenceof major social upheavals), so that a regression equation 
of Gc on Yc is obtained for each sub-period. Then, for a measurement 
of the increase in government expenditure due to a shift, if any, 
in the regression line of GC on ''Y c associated 
with a social upheaval, 
the following statistical metho=d is used. -' The level of government 
expenditure in the year immediately after the shift is calculated 
with reference to the regression»'equation''for the sub-period prior 
to the social upheaval. This is then 'subtracted from the level of 
expenditure calculated with reference to the regression equation 
for. the. sub-period. in which that year lies. For example, in order 
to measure the increase' in government' expenditure due to sitcli a 
shift after the second war in the case of the U. K., the-level of 
expenditure in 1947 is calculated with reference to the regression 
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equation for the inter-war period, which is subtracted from the 
level of expenditure calculated with reference to the regression 
equation for the post second war period. The anti-log of the 
difference provides a measurement of the percentage increase in 
government expenditure after such a shift took place. For a 
measurement of the change in the rate of growth of Gc with relation 
to Yc, the difference in the slopes of the regression functions for 
the two sub-periods (corresponding to the periods before and after 
the 'shift') is measured. 
Now the important question is: could such shifts and changes 
in the slopes of the regression function of Gc on Yc arise simply 
because of sampling error? Or, are they significant enough to be 
associated with the-respective social upheaval? 
In order to answer this question, wegwill test the two null 
hypotheses: 
(1) a social upheaval is not associated with such positive shifts; 
(2) a change in the rate of growth of Gc with relation to that of 
Yc is not associated with the social upheaval; 
for each major social upheaval, during the time-period under study 
in the case of each country included in, our time-series analysis-' 
To test the significance of a shift or to test our null hypothesis 
No. 1, we used the following formula, 
I, -am. indebted to Mr. R. A. Cooper for suggesting the formulae 
for tests of significance of such shifts and change in slope 
of the regression line of GC on Yc, and also for many other 
suggestions and comments. 
91. 
tl _ 
shift with v= N1 -2 degrees of freedom, 
s 
where 
1_ 
s 
s2 1+N +( +1 
)2 
1_ 
ý. 'lXi Xis 
And, as regards the test of significance of a change in the 
rate of growth of Qc with relation to that of Yc, or to test our 
null hypothesis No. 2, we used the formula: 
t 
b1 b2 
1+1 
ZE(x 
_-x 1)2 
E(xk-3k) 
2 
N1+ N2 --T 
EýYi 
7yi 
)2 + E(Yk - ylk)2 
The other symbols denote: 
yi}2 
N1 
-2 
y. = an observed value of log Gc during a particular period, i 
e. g., in the pre-first world war period, if we are 
testing the null hypothesis for the first war. 
y7'- =a value of log G as calculated from the regression 1c 
equation of Gc on Y for that period. 
C 
yk = an observed value of Log Gc after the shift (i. e. during 
the inter-war period when there is no further sub-division 
of that period). 
yyk =a value of Log GC as calculated from the regression 
equation for the sub-period after the shift (i. e" inter- 
war period). 
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Ný = number of observations for the sub-period prior to the 
social upheaval. (i. e. pre first war period). 
N2 = number of observations for the period after the shift 
(during the inter-war period in this case). 
xi = an observed value of Log Yo during that period (i. e. pre 
first war period). 
xk = an observed value of: Log Yc after the shift (i. e. in 
the inter-war period in this case). 
XN+1 the observed value of Log YC immediately after the shift. 
xi. = Ex 
N1 
yk Exk 
N2 
bý = the rate of growth of Gc with relation to that of Yc 
before the war. 
b2 = the rate of growth of G with relation to Yc after the 
war. 
By referring to the t table with N1 -2 degrees of freedom 
for 
the No. 1 hypothesis and N1 + N2 -4 degrees of freedom for 
the 
second hypothesis we ascertain the probability of getting a value 
as great as or greater than the calculated value. If P is less 
than 0.05 for each calculated value, we regard the shift and change 
in slope as significant. If P is less than 0.01, they are highly 
significant. In these cases our null hypothesis are very unlikely 
and we reject them. The observed shift and/or change in the slope 
of regression function of Gc on Y. are then considered significant 
enough to suggest that such a shift and/or change in the rate of 
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growth of GC with relation to Yc is associated with the social 
upheaval. 
The important limitation of our statistical tests is that they 
are based on the assumption of an independent normal distribution 
of 'residual'. The assumption is highly doubtful in the case of a 
tinge-series analysis. The statistical tests of significance 
applied in our cross-section analysis in chapter III, are also 
based on such an assumption. Although it is conventional to accept 
that assumption as a necessary part of analytical procedure in a 
cross-section approach, it is a doubtful assumption for cross-section 
analysis too. For example, in our, cross-section analysis in chapter 
III we tested certain income hypotheses. But, besides income, 
there are several factors, namely social, political, geographical 
location, etc., which may influence systematically public expenditure. 
The systematic influence of geographical location, however, was 
apparent from the scatter diagram given in chapter III. Thus, the 
assumption of independent normal distribution. of. 'residuals' is 
doubtful also in the cross-section approach. The difference as 
regards the validity, or rather invalidity, of such an assumption 
in a cross-section and a time-series lies only in degree. Some 
care, however, has been taken in our time-series analysis in this 
respect, an attempt being made to eliminate the influences of two 
important trend factors - inamely population and price changes - on 
our variables. 
It may, however, be pointed out that recently some complicated 
and sophisticated tests have been devised for testing the independence 
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1, 
of 'residuals' in time-series regression models; and if such tests 
show that the 'residuals' are not independent, instead of applying 
simple least-squares method, alternative complicated estimating 
procedures are to be adopted. 
1 
The small size of our sample (i. e. the number of pairs of 
observations of Gc and Yc for each time-period being small, equal 
to five or four for the pre-first world wax period and also for 
the inter-war periods for some countries), and the inadequacies of 
our data prohibited us from applying further sophisticated and 
complicated statistical techniques. 
2 The consequences of applying 
the least squares formulae are that although we obtained unbiased 
estimators, their sampling variances are likely to be underestimated. 
Our statistical technique in this respect is imperfect. However, 
See for example, J. Johnston, Econometric Methods, chapter VII, 
McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1963, for a summary of Durbin-Watson 
d test, and also some alternative tests devised by other 
econometricians for testing the independence of 'residuals' in 
time-series regressions, and also for the estimation methods 
when such residuals are not independent. 
2 The number of degrees of freedom with reference to which the t 
tests described above can be made is related to the size of the 
samples. For the test of significance of a shift it is N-2, 
and for that of a change in slope it is N+N-4. Thus when 
the size of the sample or number of pairs1of observations of GC 
and Y is equal to five for each of the two consecutive periods, 
the number of degrees of freedom for the test of significance of 
a shift is equal to 3 and for that of a change in slope of 
regression function it is 6. The suggested sophisticated 
technique, with reference to which a new set of transformed 
variables are to be computed each time until a random set of 
residuals results, reduces further the number of pairs of 
observations and also, therefore, the number of degrees of 
freedom, by the number of times the estimating procedure is 
carried out until the 'residuals' are independent. The reduced 
number of degrees of freedom would either be too small for any 
possible tests or even if a test is possible, that test would not 
lead to a positive conclusion. 
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our observation, as shown later in section V, of a shift in the 
level and change in the rate of growth of GC with relation to Yc, 
associated with each major social upheaval'in the case of each country 
included in bur time-series analysis (which are also found to be 
highly significant although on the basis of our imperfect testing 
procedure), leads to a strong presumption that such shifts and changes 
in slopes are associated with major social upheavals. 
V Government Expenditure and Economic Growth - Time-series Studies 
(i) The United Kingdom' 
For an analysis of the growth of public expenditure with 
relation to economic growth in the case of the United Kingdom, the 
necessary statistical series for the period 1890-1955 are taken from 
the study of "The Growth of Public Expenditure in the United 
Kingdom" by Professors Peacock and Wiseman. 
' We have, however, 
extended the time-period up to the year 1962, on the basis of the 
same concepts and statistical procedure. 
The conceptual and statistical difficulties and also the 
computational procedure involved in the computation of those series 
are discussed in great detail in Chapter I and the Appendix of their 
study, a discussion of which, therefore, is not intended here. In 
general terms, however, total public expenditure figures include the 
expenditures of the central government, the national insurance fund, 
1 Alan T. Peacock and Jack Wiseman, The Growth of Public Expenditure 
in the United Kingdom, op. cit. 
964, 
and the local authorities of the U. K. All intra-governmental 
transactions are excluded, so that no duplication of expenditures 
occurs. The expenditures of the public corporations such as the 
Airways Corporations, and the Electricity Authorities are not 
included; but the capital expenditures of certain trading services 
of the central and local governments, such as the Post Office in the 
case of the former, and the electricity and gas sercices before 
nationalization in the case of the latter, which are financially 
dependent on government, are included. The current expenditure of 
those services is considered as self-liquidating and, therefore, is 
not included. From such total expenditure figures the war-related 
expenditures, viz., interest on national debt, war pensions, war 
damage compensation, release leave pay and war gratuities are excluded 
for the sake of our analysis of the effects of war on the time-pattern 
of public expenditure. 
Further adjustment to total expenditure figures consists of the 
elimination of the 'population and price effects'. The price effect 
is eliminated by deflating the different components of total public 
expenditure by separate appropriate price indexes. Government 
current expenditure on goods and services, transfers and subsidies, 
and the very small change in stock, were deflated by an index of 
prices of consumer, ' goods and services. A separate price index 
was used for the deflation of gross fixed capital formation by 
government. The deflated total public expenditure figures at 1900 
prices are divided by the corresponding population figures, so as 
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to eliminate the "population effect". 
The "price and population effects" are also eliminated from the 
series of G. N. P. at factor cost by taking the per capita G. N. P. at 
1900 prices for the whole period, i. e. 1890-1962. 
Although the time-period for our analysis of the'growth of 
public expenditure in the case of the United Kingdom refers to the 
period 1890-1962, some years from that period are excluded either 
because of the non-availability of data or for analytical reasons. 
For the years 1890-1913, the data were only collected at five 
yearly intervals up to 1910 (i. e. for 1890,1895,1900,1905,1910) 
and for 1913. The missing years in between them are, therefore, 
excluded. The war years are excluded because such years could be 
regarded as abnormal from the view point of the growth of public 
expenditure. These years are also excluded in the study by 
Professors Peacock and Wiseman. If the exclusion of the war years 
is justified because those were the years of social upheaval for 
which growth of public expenditure cannot be considered normal, the 
years before and after the wars also may not be considered normal 
years in the case of the United Kingdom. It is, of course, a matter 
of judgement to decide which years are abnormal years. Looking 
at the size of our sample, i. e. the number of years for which data 
is collected, it is not possible to exclude many years because 
otherwise the sample would become too small for any statistical 
analysis. Therefore, we excluded only the years immediately before 
the wars, i. e. 1913 and 1938, and after the wars, i. e. 1920-1922 and 
1946. Several years after the First World War are excluded because 
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the data for 1918-1920 was not collected and also the G. N. P. data 
for the years 1920-1923 were only crude backward estimates gained 
by the simple device of interpolation. 
1 We chose 1923 onwards 
because the data is more reliable and also because the public 
expenditure seemed to behave with more regularity than in the previous 
years. 
Thus, for the pre-First World War Period, our data refers to the 
1 
period 1890-19/0, collected at five yearly intervals. For the 
inter-war period, we chose the years 1923-1937.2 The post Second 
World War Period refers to 1947-1962. For the regression analysis 
of government expenditure with relation to economic growth, a double 
logarithmic function of the form Log Gc= Log a+b Log Yc is fitted 
for each different period. As is shown in chart number B. 1, the 
logarithms of per capita total government expenditure less war- 
related expenditure at 1900 prices (i. e. Log GC ) are measured on the 
Y axis and the logarithms of per capita G. N. P. at 1900 prices 
(i. e. Log Yc) are measured on the X axis on a natural scale. Each 
dot in the chart shows the combination of Log Gc and Log Yc with 
respect to one of the years 1890-1962.3 
For 1914-1923, "We have compiled very rough estimates by 
interpolation using as our guide the changes in national 
income at constant prices .... These estimate figures are 
not very reliable, and we show them for the relevant peace- 
time years in Table A-2 only, for the purposes of broad 
comparison". Quoted from Peacock and Wisemans' study, OP- 
cit., Appendix, page 154. 
2 From the inter-war period, we have excluded the years 1931 and 
1932 also, the reasons for which are given in the next paragraph. 
3 For the necessary data, see our tables No. B. 1 and B. 2 in the 
Appendix. 
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to Yc to be associated with the Great Depression. However, as was 
pointed out above, the two years 1931 and 1932 were the years in 
which percentage decline in real per capita income and also the 
percentage of people unemployed were the highest. 
1 The total 
government expenditure during those years was also relatively high 
because of the enormous expenditures for unemployment benefit and 
the provision of poor relief. Those years, therefore, relative 
to the other years during our inter-war period, cannot be considered 
normal years. We have excluded, therefore, the years 1931 and 1932 
from our regression analysis because their inclusion would otherwise 
distort seriously the regression function, based on the simple least- 
square fit. 
For the different` periods, we found three different regression 
equations of G on Y, = viz., 
Log Go = -6.856 + 4.568 Log Yo (1) 
Log Gc - -2.617 + 2.087 Log Yc (2) 
Log Gc = -0.795 + 1.182 Log Yc (3) 
for the pre First War, inter-tirar and post Second tar periods 
respectively. 
They differ from each other not only with respect to the 
intercepts but also with regard to the slope (regression coefficient 
of tic on Yc which denotes the rate of change of QC with relation 
to that of Y. c 
1 See Peacock and Wiseman, op. cit., Table A-4 page 158 for 
percentages of unemployment in different years. 
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Professors Peacock and Wiseman, in their study, explain the 
time-pattern of the growth of public expenditure with reference to 
the "displacement effect" of war, only in terms of the shift of such 
a function for different periods. We found that such shifts 
occurred; but also that after each war the slope of the regression 
line of Gc on Yc diminished; or in other words the rate of change 
of government expenditure with relation to economic growth diminished. 
A shift in the regression function of Gc on Yc occurred after 
both World Wars', -but such a shift was greater after 
the Second World 
Jar than it was after the First War. After the Second War the 
shift accounts for about a 72.8% rise in government expenditure, but 
only a 27.0% rise after the First War. But after each war, the 
rate of growth of government expenditure with relation to per capita 
income diminished relative to that of the pre war rate. It diminished 
from the pre-First War rate of 4.568 to 2.087 after the First World 
War. Nevertheless, it was still much higher than unity so that 
government expenditures as apercentage of G. N. P. went on increasing 
during the inter war period. But after the Second World War it 
diminished from the rate of 2.087 to 1.182. Government expenditure 
as a percentage of G. N. P., therefore, had been almost constant during 
the post-Second lar period. 
Now the question is: are these shifts and changes in the rate 
of grovrth of Gc with relation to Yc significant enough to be 
associated with the world wars? Or, could they not arise simply 
because of sampling errors? 
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We proceed to test the two null hypotheses, viz., that 
(1) either the First War or the Second War is not associated 
vtith such positive shifts. 
(2) A change in the rate of growth of government expenditure 
with relation to economic growth is not associated with 
either of these wars. 
By the statistical tests of significance, described in the 
section IV (iii) of this chapter, both these hypotheses are found 
to be very unlikely, and we reject them. Hypothesis No. 1 is 
rejected at much less than 1 per cent level of significance for 
both the First and Second World Wars. The positive shifts are 
highly significant in suggesting that the shifts in the regression 
function of G on Y occurred after each war. The second null cc 
hypothesis is also rejected at much less than 1 per cent level of 
significance. The negative change in the rate of growth of 
government expenditure with relation to economic growth after each 
war is highly, significant in suggesting that this change occurred 
after each war in the case of the U. K. 
(ii) Germany 
The statistical data necessary for our analysis of the growth 
of public expenditure with relation to economic growth in the case 
of Germany is taken from the study of "The Growth of Public 
Expenditure in Germany since the Unification' by Mrs. Suphan Andic 
and Dr. Jindrich Veverka. 
1 Because of the territorial changes after 
1 Mrs. Andic and Dr. Jindrich Veverka, The Growth of Public 
. Expenditure in Germany since the Unification. Finanzarchiv, 
January 1964. 
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the First and Second World Wars in the case of Germany, the statistical 
estimates refer to different geographical areas during different time- 
periods. The estimates until the First World War refer to the old 
German Reich, and the inter-war estimates refer to the reduced 
territory which existed after that war. The post Second Var estimates 
cover only the German Federal Republic, excluding Berlin and the Saar 
because of the lack of statistical sources. 
The definitions and the general statistical procedure adopted for 
the estimation of the necessary statistical data are basically those 
of the study by Professors Peacock and Wiseman. The conceptual and 
statistical difficulties arising out of the particular circumstances 
specific to Germany, and also the computational procedures and the 
sources of the estimates are discussed in some detail in the main 
text and the statistical appendix of their paper. The major specific 
difficulties, and the adjustments made, which relate particularly to 
the statistical series used in our study are, however, mentioned very 
briefly below. 
For the computation of the total public expenditure series for 
the period 1881-1958, the expenditures of all the levels of government, 
i. e. the government of the Reich (Bund), those of the States (Länder) 
and the local authorities (Gemeinden and GemeideresleUnde), are 
included. The transfers between different public authorities and 
between the different accounts of the same public authorities are 
excluded so as to avoid double counting. The estimates until 1913, 
however, include some double counting because although the non- 
specific transfers between the central and state governments have 
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been excluded, the adjustment was not carried out for the "small 
amounts' of specific grants. Second, the estimates prior to 1913 
also include a "considerable amount" of current expenditure on 
trading services, which according to our definition of government 
expenditure should have been excluded. As pointed out by Zdrs. Andic 
and Dr. Veverka, "the items could be removed with great effort, if 
at all". Prior to 1913, the accounts of the public enterprises, 
such as railways and postal services, were not separated from the 
budgets of the public authorities. Such enterprises became autonomous 
after the First World War and their accounts no longer appeared in the 
budgets of the public authorities. The authors of the German study, 
however, nade some estimates of the capital expenditures of these 
trading enterprises for the period prior to 1913 and their 'adjusted' 
estimates of government expenditures for that time-period exclude the 
capital expenditures by such enterprises. Such 'adjusted' estimates 
seem to "reflect better the long-term trend" and therefore were 
adopted by them. In the absence of any other better available 
alternative series, we have decided to use the 'adjusted' one for the 
period prior to 1913.1 Third, during the Nazi government, many of 
its functions were carried out through several non-governmental 
The estimates of government expenditure exclude the capital 
expenditures of the trading-services which remained under the 
direct responsibility of the public authorities, because only 
the net balance of expenditure and revenue on both current and 
capital accounts is included in the Financial Statistics. The 
post Second War estimates include the net balance of current and 
total expenditures of-the trading services. 
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organisations such as Arbeitsfront, Winterhilfe and others. They 
are not included in the estimate of total public expenditure, "the 
only group of non-governmental character included in the semi-public 
bodies administering the German social insurance". 
' Therefore, the 
size of the public sector is underestimated for the Hitler regime. 
Such underestimation also arises because of the exclusion of the 
trading enterprises which were dominated by non-commercial considera- 
tions such as defence requirements, especially during the Nazi 
Government. Lastly, the comparability over time is affected due 
to the territorial changes after the First and Second World Wars. 
After the First War, Germany lost about 1p of its territory and 
consequently about 11% of its population and 8%, of its G. N. P. The 
losses after the Second War were even more severe, amounting to 544' 
of the territory and the consequent loss of about 1+I% of the 
population and 41% of the G. N. P. Such changes are most likely to 
affect the level and'composition of government expenditure. In 
the absence of any other better alternative, itis assumed that per 
capita estimates of government expenditure were not affected by such 
territorial and accompanying changes. ' Such an assumption has its 
obvious limitations. 'The lower average per capita income and 
population density, the greater dependence on agriculture in the 
lost territory and also other differences between the lost and the 
Ibid., page 228, "Otto Nathan estimated the revenue of these 
non-governmental organisations in 1938 at no less than 1O of 
total government revenue", Ibid., footnote 2, page 173" See 
Otto Nathan, Nazi War Finance and Banking N. B. E. R., New York, 
1944. 
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remaining territories of Germany can hardly leave the average per 
capita estimates unaffected. But, because of the cost-element, 
and the absence of the necessary data to analyse the effects of such 
changes on the per capita estimates, it was assumed that the 
territorial changes have not affected the per capita estimates. 
Our analysis is based on such per capita estimates computed by 
Mrs. Andic and Dr. Veverka; and, therefore, suffers from all the 
above mentioned limitations. 
Further adjustments to such per capita estimates of government 
expenditure are made in order to eliminate the "price effect". 
In addition to the general conceptual difficulties encountered 
in 
the deflation of current estimates of government expenditure so as 
to obtain the real amounts (due to the absence of a market valuation 
of government services and the general problems of index numbers), 
the statistical difficulties were due to the lack of appropriate 
indices by which different components of government expenditure could 1 
be deflated. Therefore, instead of using separate indices for 
different components, as was done in the case of the United Kingdom, 
a single index. was used for such deflation. For the period prior 
to 1925, the index used is an unweighted geometric average of the 
index of wholesale prices and an-index of retail prices (both for 
limited number of commodities, with foodstuffs predominating); and 
after that date the index used is that implicit in the official 
estimates of national product at current and constant prices. The 
deflation of current estimates of government expenditure by such 
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indices assumes almost identical productivity changes in both the 
private and public sector. 
1 The war-related expenditure such as 
interest on national debt, war-related social assistance, and 
war damage compensation including reparation are also excluded 
before obtaining our final estimates of real per capita total 
government expenditure. 
The other important series necessary for our analysis is 
that of real per capita G. N. P., which is also taken from Mrs. Andic's 
and Dr. Veverka's study. For the computation of their series, the 
official estimates of G. N. P. were taken for the period after 1925; 
but'for the period prior to that date, in the absence of official 
estimates, the-series-given by-Hoffman and MUller was taken, 
2 
after 
some adjustments for capital depreciation being made to their net 
national product estimates. 
Our analysis is restricted by the availability of government 
expenditure and G. N. P. data. For the pre-First War period, such 
data is available only for five years, with major gaps in between 
these years. We have data ohly for the years 1881,1891,1901, 
1907 and 1913. Such a small sample reduces "reliability" or 
increases "sampling error" to such an extent that in some cases, 
as shown below, no positive conclusion seems possible. 
For a discussion of the "productivity lag" in the public sector 
and its probable effect on the secular growth of public 
expenditure in Germany see 11rs. Andic and Dr. Veverka, op. cit., 
page 177-179. 
11 
2 W. G. Hoffman and J. H. Muller, Das deutsche volkseinkommen 
1851-1957, Tdbin en, 1959. For the adjustments made to their 
series of net national product see Mrs. Andic and Dr. Veverka, 
op. cit., Appendix page 226. 
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For the post-Second liar period data is available for 1950-1958. 
The data is not available for 1946-1950 and therefore such years 
are excluded. 
1 It may however, be pointed out that the immediate 
post war years were characterised by low per capita income and 
monetary instability, which one may consider as an indirect con- 
sequence of the war. But by 1950, although the per capita income 
was about 88% of the pre-war level, the recovery had already started 
with monetary reform in June 1948. 
The great difficulties, however, arise as regards the analysis 
of public expenditure during the inter-war period, which was a period 
of-almost continuous disturbances. As was pointed out by Mrs. Andic 
and Dr. Veverka in their study, 'the period of unrest was not limited 
to the actual war years but continued throughout from the outbreak 
of the First World War until the close of the Second World War. 
Gutar Stolper described those years as the "period of disasters", 
conveying clearly its unifying tendency to slip nearer and nearer 
to atotal collapse. It would be interesting to separate the 
effects of Iazi ideology from other growth factors present in the 
1930's. Even if this were conceptually possible, the available 
statistical material would not permit such an analysis'. 
The immediate post-First War'years, like the years immediately 
after the Second War, were years of monetary instability and very low 
1 We have not extended the series to later years. This is so 
because although the statistical Appendix of JNJrs. Andic's and 
Dr. Veverka's study provides some description of the computation 
procedures and the sources of estimates, as pointed out by them, 
"it is not exhaustive, and the reader could not reconstruct the 
estimates for himself. ", page 223. Besides it seems highly 
unlikely that the extension of the series to two or three years 
would change our statistical findings significant. 
2 Mrs. Andic and Dr. Veverka, op. cit., p. 190. 
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per capita income, and could be regarded as the indirect consequences 
of the war. The estimates of government expenditures prior to 1925, 
however, are not available, and, therefore, such years are to be 
excluded from our analysis. The first estimate of government 
expenditure after the First War is that of 1925. By 1925, although 
the per capita income was still about one sixth under the 1913 level, 
the economy was well ahead on its way to recovery "in response to the 
monetary stability and the agreement Ripon the reparation payments 
of 192411.1 The per capita income was rising during the period 1925- 
1928. In 1929 also it was only marginally lower than in 1928, and 
government expenditure also continued to rise during the period 1925- 
1929. Such a rise in per capita income was checked by the Great 
Depression; rather, it declined by about 22 per cent between the 
years 1928 and 1932. Rapid recovery, however, started from 1933 
and by 1938 the real per capita'income reached a level never 
experienced before. The"adverse effects of the Great Depression, 
though not to be considered as severe as those suffered by the 
American or Canadian economy, where the real per capita income never 
reached the level of 1929 in any of the years during the thirties, 
were more serious than those suffered by the British Economy, where 
the decline of such incomes was almost ?;; in 1932 in comparison to 
the level reached in 1929 and the recovery to that level was also much 
quicker than in the case of Germany. As one may guess from our 
scatter diagram given in chart No. 2, possibly a shift in the 
I Ibid., page 191. 
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regression function of Gc on Yc is associated with the Great 
Depression in the case of Germany. However, this is unlikely to 
be as great as that, shown later, in the case of the United States 
or Canada. Unfortunately it has not been possible to examine the 
effects of the Great Depression on the time pattern of public 
expenditure because of the reasons given below. Although rough 
estimates of total public expenditures during the Hitler regime 
since 1933 are available in the study by Mrs. Andic and Dr. Veverka, 
such estimates are seriously underestimated because, as already 
stated, many of the functions of the Nazi government were carried 
out through non-governmental organisations which were not included 
for the purpose of their estimation. The exclusion of trading 
enterprises which were dominated by non-commercial considerations 
especially during the Nazi government also gives rise to under- 
estimation. Besides, even such rough estimates could not be 
adjusted for the war-related expenditures because data for such 
expenditures is not available for the years since 1933. Such 
expenditures, we think, were of great importance during the Hitler 
regime. Therefore, for the sake of comparability with different 
time periods within the same country and with other countries we had 
to exclude the period 1933-1938. For the three years of the Great 
Depression before the Hitler regime, i. e. 1930-1932, a separate 
regression analysis was not considered worth attempting, the number 
of pairs of observations of government expenditure and per capita 
income being too small. Thus, for the inter-war period, we are left 
with public expenditure and G. N. P. data for only five years, i. e. 
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1925-1929 and our analysis is restricted to this limited number of 
years for the inter-war period. 
After such necessary data being obtained, for the three 
different periods considered by us (see Tables B. 8-9 in the Appendix), 
we fitted a double logarithmic function for each different period 
of the same form, i. e. Log Gc = Log a+b Log Yc. As shown in 
Chart 2, the logarithms of per capita government expenditure less 
war-related expenditure at 1900 prices, i. e. Log 9, are measured c 
on the X axis on a natural scale. 
For the three different periods, we found three different 
regression equations of Go on Yo, viz., 
1881-1913: Log Gc 
1925-1929: Log Gc 
1950-1958: Log Gc 
-3.885 + 2.084 Log Yc 
(1) 
-3.530 + 2.025 Log Yo 
(2) 
-0.854 + 1.132 Log Yc 
(3) 
They differ from each other not only with respect to the 
intercepts but also with regard to the slope which denotes the 
rate of change of G. with relation to Yc. 
The difference between the ist and 2nd regression equations 
could be attributed to the consequences of the First World War, which 
was the major social upheaval in between those two different periods. 
We cannot, however, say that the difference between the 2nd and 3rd 
regression equations was due to the Second War. In between those 
periods to which 2nd and 3rd regression equations-, relate, the Great 
Depression, the Hitler regime, and the Second World War all con- 
secutively exerted their influence as major social upheavals; and 
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it is not possible to isolate the effects of one from those of the 
others. AU we can say is that the difference in the 2nd and 3rd 
regression equations may be due to the combined effect of the Great 
Depression, the Hitler regime, and the 2nd World War, i. e. the social 
upheavals of the thirties and the Second World War. 
As shown in chart No. 2, we find that the shifts in the 
regression function of Gc on Yc occurred after the social upheavals 
in the case of Germany as well. The shift gfter the First War 
increased government expenditures with relation to economic growth 
by about 54.75'. The second shift which occurred after the social 
upheavals of the thirties and the Second World War increased govern- 
rent expenditure further by about 24. y, ß. Thus we notice, both in 
the U. K. and Germany, and also in other countries, as will be shown 
later, shifts in government expenditures with relation to economic 
growth after the major social upheavals. 
Again, as it happened in the U. K., we find that after the social 
upheavals the rate of growth of Gc with relation to Ya also diminished 
in the case of Germany. It diminished after the First War from 2.08 
to 2.02 and after the social upheavals of the thirties and the Second 
World War it diminished from 2.02 to 1.13. It is interesting to 
observe almost the same rate of growth of G with relation to Yc c 
in both countries during the inter-war period and also the post 
Second War period considered by us. For the U. K. the rate was 2.087 
for the inter-war period and was 1.182 during the post-Second War 
period; in the case of Germany too our statistical findings show 
almost the same rates for the above mentioned periods. 
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For Germany also, we attempted the same sort of tests of 
significance for the positive shifts and the negative changes in 
slopes which occurred after the major social upheavals. The 
problem which we faced for such tests was the small size of the 
samples with which we are left for the inter-war period and the pre 
First War period, for each of which the number of pairs of 
observations of Gc and Yc was only five. 
However, even with such small samples, our first null hypothesis 
that the positive shifts did not occur after the major social upheavals 
was rejected at a level of significance of 15ß and 5, for the first 
and second social upheavals respectively. The shifts are large 
enough for the positive hypothesis, that social upheavals exert up- 
ward pressure on Government expenditure, not to be refuted. To 
this extent we may have a degree of confidence in the hypothesis. 
As regards the second null hypothesis that a change in the rate 
of growth of Gc with relation to Yc is not associated with such 
upheavals, the hypothesis is again rejected at a level of significance 
of 1% so far as the social upheaval of the thirties and the Second 
world "liar is concerned, the rate of growth of government expenditure 
being diminished by about half after these upheavals. But, because 
the change after the First War is quite small, i. e. from 2.08 to 
2.02, and the samples are so small that the number of degrees of 
freedom (i. e. N1 +N2-4- 6), with reference to which such a test 
can be made, is very small, we cannot reach any significant con- 
clusion. This however, cannot be construed as an acceptance of the 
null hypothesis. 
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The main difficulty, as already pointed out, is due to the 
small size of the sample for the inter-war period. If the inter- 
war period is excluded altogether, as a period of political and 
economic instability and major upheavals, and a comparison is made 
between the pre-First Kaiar and the post-Second War periods, we find 
that the positive shifts and the negative change in the slope in 
the regression function of Gc on Yc are both significant at the 1% 
level of significance. 
(iii) The United States 
The first step in our analysis of the growth of public 
expenditure in the case of the United States is the computation of 
continuous total government expenditure series for as many years as 
possible. This may seem an easy task in view of the recent 
publication of several studies concerned mainly with some aspects of 
the secular growth of the public sector in the United States. 
1 
But the real problem arises because of the requirement of not only 
comparability over time but also between different countries. The 
Government expenditure, as defined in any of those studies, does not 
agree completely with our definition outlined in section', and, 
therefore, the purpose of comparability between different countries 
cannot be achieved if our analysis is to be pursued on the basis of 
expenditure series given in any of those studies, unless several 
1 See, for example, Solomon Fabricant and Robert E. Lipsey, The 
Trend of Government Activity in the United States since 1900, 
N. B. E. R., New York 1952; M. Slade Kendrick, A Century and a 
Half of Federal Expenditures, N. B. E. R. 1955 John M. Firestone, 
Federal Receipts and Expenditures During Business Cycles, 
1879-1958, N. B. E. R. 1960; Morris A. Copeland, Trends in 
Government Financing NN. B. E. R. 1961. 
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The methodology adopted for the computation of total government 
expenditure is first to estimate expenditure of federal government 
(including that of trust accounts) and that of state and local 
governments separately and then to combine them together to obtain 
the estimation of total government expenditure. Several adjustments 
are, however, made to the census data so as to obtain a series of 
government expenditure which is conceptually, as far as possible, 
similar to our definition, so that the purpose of comparability 
within the countries is achieved to the highest possible degree. 
In the case of the federal government, expenditure data 
(including that of Trust Accounts), is taken from the Census publica- 
tion for the years 1932-1962; adjustments made, the reasons for 
which are given below. 
First, the item 'intergovernmental expenditure' which represents 
Federal Grants-in-aid to State and Local Governments is subtracted 
from the Federal Government total expenditure given in the Census 
publication, so as to avoid duplication of expenditures. The 
expenditures financed by such Federal Grants-in-aid are, however, 
included in the State and Local Governments' expenditures. 
Second, we have also subtracted 50 per cent of the expenditures 
under the items "Non-Highway Transportation" and "Other and 
Unallocable direct general expenditureall, on the grounds that this 
represents a rough estimation of the expenditures of public corpora- 
tions and the current expenditures of certain trading services, which 
are included in the government expenditure as defined by the Bureau 
of the Census. To quote "Historical Summary of Governmental finances 
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in the United States", 1957, Census of Governments, "The Federal 
government has several business enterprises in the field of non- 
highway transportation. These include the Panama Canal Company, 
The Alaska Railroad, and the St. Lawrence Seaway Development 
Corporation. In addition, large Federal Expenditures are made 
for facilitating air transportation, subsidizing ship construction 
and merchant marine operations, improving navigation facilities, 
and such aids to water transportation as the Coast Guard and Coast 
and Geodetic Survey", (page 7). "Other commercial type operations 
of governments ..... port facilities, airports, housing projects, 
toll highways and the like ..... as well as all Federal Government 
agencies and activities, including its corporations and the U. S. 
Postal service, are treated as part of the general government sector. " 
(page 2). In our definition of government expenditure, expenditures 
of public corporations are not included.. The current expenditures of 
trading services are regarded as self-liquidating and, therefore, 
are also not included. But without'any'detailed information of such 
expenditures, which are included in government expenditure according 
to the definition of the Bureau of the Census, an estimate of 50 
per cent of "Non-Highway Transportation" plus "Other and Unallocable 
direct expenditure" is. only a rough approximation and is deducted 
from the Federal Government total expenditure given in the census 
publication for the purpose of comparability between different 
countries. 
The other adjustments consist of the conversion to calendar year 
estimates of fiscal year data and interpolation between biennial 
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estimates. The calendar year estimates are obtained by taking the 
arithmetic mean of the expenditures of two consecutive corresponding 
fiscal years (ending 30th June). The expenditures of the missing 
years until 1949 are obtained similarly by taking the arithmetic 
mean of the two consecutive biennial estimates. 
The same sort of adjustments are also made to Census Bureau 
estimates of State and Local government expenditures for the years 
1932-1962. In their case also we have subtracted 50 per cent of 
the items "Non-Highway Transportation", which at the state and local 
level includes "such services as canals, port and terminal facilities, 
airports, and off-street parking facilities", and "other and 
unallocable direct general expenditure" for the reasons already 
given above. We also considered it necessary for the purpose of 
comparability between different countries to exclude "utility and 
liquor stores expenditure" which "comprises all spending involved 
in provision and conduct of such undertakings, including acquisition 
of. facilities, current operation and the purchase of goods and 
services for resale, and interest on utility debt". 
2 The other 
adjustments, as in the case of federal government expenditure, consist 
of conversion of fiscal year estimates to calendar year estimates 
1 Historical Summary of Governmental Finances in the United 
States, 1957 Census of Governments, vol. IV, No. 3, U-5- 
Department of Commerce, Bureaus of the Census, page 7. 
2 Ibid., page 2. "For census reporting of government statistics, 
the term "utilities" relates only to water supply, electric 
°power, gas supply, and transit system owned and operated by 
local governments. The term "liquor stores" relates to such 
stores operated by 16 state governments and by local governments 
in a few states", page 2, ibid. 
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and interpolation between biennial estimates in order to obtain some 
estimate of expenditure for the missing years until 1949. 
Serious difficulties, however, are encountered with the 
extension before 1932 of such expenditure series. Before 1932 only 
four estimates of total public expenditure, namely those of the years 
1902,1913,1922, and 1927, are available in the census publications; 
and, as mentioned above, the secondary sources can be used for the 
missing years only if the quantitative importance of conceptual 
differences is found to be negligible. In the case of expenditure 
of state and local governments, the only series! of annual estimates, 
which goes back to 1910, is that of Professor Copeland. But in 
view of the roughness of the basic data, the estimates until 1928 are 
given as three-year moving averages. Besides, comparing the two 
series post-1932, we find that Copeland's concept is much wider than 
ours, his objective being to study total Government Financing. In 
view of the above-mentioned facts, instead of relying on his series 
for the years 1929,1930 and 1931, we have used the National Income 
concept data for the state and local governments expenditureq for 
which the quantitative importance of conceptual difference did not 
seem significant. For the years 1922 and 1927, the adjusted census 
data of state and local governments expenditure are taken. For 
the missing years (namely 1923,1921+, 1925,1926 and 1928), we have 
decided to rely on straight line interpolations, on a semi-log graph, 
between the available adjusted census benchmarks, the assumption 
being that the rate of growth of state and local expenditures between 
those benchmark years has been constant. Although such an assumption 
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does not seem highly unrealistic for a short-period of four years, 
the reliability of estimates based on such assumption diminishes as 
the time-period lengthens. Therefore, it was not considered proper 
to obtain estimates for the missing 10 years before the First War, 
i. e. 1902-1913 on the basis of straight line interpolation between 
the only two available estimates for that time-period. Our 
expenditure series for state and local governments, therefore, is 
restricted to the time-period 1922-1962. 
In the case of federal government expenditure, however, several 
expenditure series for the years before 1932, computed-by several 
economists and statisticians, namely Fabricant and Lipsey, Kendrick, 
Firestone, Copeland, are available in the recent N. B. E. R. publica- 
tions. A comparison of the available series with our adjusted 
census series for the years for which the census data is available 
shows that those of Fabricant and Lipsey, and Kendrick are the 
closest to the adjusted census estimates. 
1 And it is very difficult 
to choose the one which is closer. For some years, Kendrick 
estimates are the closest, whereas for other years the Fabricant 
and Lipsey series is the closest, to the adjusted census estimates. 
Therefore, although the decision as regards the choice of any one 
of these two series is an arbitrary one, yet because for the eight 
years from 1932, the Fabricant and Lipsey series is the closest of 
the two, the series of Federal Expenditures given by Fabricant and 
Such comparison was made by Mr. Claude Germain with the help 
of several charts and our observation is based on those charts 
and the typescript paper prepared by him, which provides a 
description of the charts. Such comparison led Mr. Germain 
to choose the series of Federal Expenditures given by Fabricant 
and Lipsey for the years before 1932. 
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Lipsey was chosen for the years before 1932, i. e. for 1922-1932, as 
our expenditure series for state and local governments goes back 
only to 1922. For our purpose, the important omissions from their 
series are expenditures on Trust Accounts and interest payments on 
Federal debts. But the ommission of expenditures on Trust Accounts 
becomes quantitatively important only after the Second World 1Jar, 
especially since 1952; and, therefore, this ommission is not likely 
to impair comparability over time and or between different countries. 
The interest payments on federal debts, however, are excluded even 
for other years in our final analysis, because we consider such 
expenditure as 'zwar-relatedtl. 
1 
For the purpose of our analysis the series of total expenditure, 
obtained by combining the expenditures of Federal, and State and 
Local governments, is to be adjusted further for 'war-related' 
expenditures which comprise of interest payments on federal debt 
and other war-related expenditure, such as war pensions and war 
damage compensations. In the case of the United States, the interest 
payments on the federal debt (after being adjusted for calendar year 
estimates) are subtracted from our total expenditure figures; but 
it was not possible to make any such adjustment for other war-related 
expenditures such as war pensions as was made for U. K., and Germany 
(and also for Canada as will appear later), because of the lack of 
readily available data for such expenditures. However, it is the 
In the case of United States a substantial amount of interest 
payments may also be regarded as 'Great Depression-related', 
because of the financing of high expenditure during the Great 
Depression by Federal Loans. As is discussed later, the Great 
Depression can also be regarded as a major social upheaval, which 
influenced the tide-pattern of public expenditure in the case of 
the U. S. and, therefore, 'Great Depression-related' expenditure 
should also be excluded for the proper analysis of its influence 
__ on 
American public expenditure. 
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interest payment on the national debt, which has been found to be 
the quantitatively important item relative to other items in the 
'war-related' expenditure category in the case of other countries; 
and therefore, the effect of the omission of other war-related 
expenditures, in the case of U. S. A., on our comparative analysis is 
likely to be negligible. 
Such current estimates of total public expenditure are also 
adjusted in order to eliminate the 'population and price effects'. 
The 'population effect' is eliminated, as before, by obtaining the 
respective per capita estimates. Jith regard to the elimination 
of the "price effect" or the deflation of the current estimates of 
government expenditures so as to obtain the estimates at constant 
prices, the statistical difficulties specific to the United States 
arise due to the lack of appropriate price indexes by which the 
different components of government expenditures should be deflated. 
Therefore, as in the case of Germany, a single index was used for 
deflation. For the whole period, the index used is that implicit 
in the estimates of the national product at current and constant 
1929 prices, computed by dividing the current price series of G. N. P. 
by the constant prices. Such deflation, therefore, assumes almost 
the same productivity increases in both the private and public sector. 
With regard to the G. N. P. series, the other important series 
necessary for our analysis, we have chosen the series based on 
Department of Commerce concept, which is basically no different from 
that used for obtaining such a series for other countries included 
in this study. Gross national product according to that concept; 
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as for other countries, "comprises the purchase of goods and services 
by consumers and government, gross private domestic investment 
(including the change in business inventories) and net foreign 
investment. " 
For the years 1929-1961, the current dollar estimates are the 
official estimates prepared by the Department of Commerce. For the 
years prior to 1929, the underlying estimates are those of Simon 
Kuznets, but they have been adjusted to the Department of Commerce 
concept by John Kendrick. 
2 The difference between Ku2, nets' series 
and the Department of Commerce series arises mainly because of the 
conceptual differences. In Kuznets' series, those government 
expenditures which are considered by him not to take the form of 
services to consumers or capital formation, and the imputed value of 
unpaid services of financial intermediaries, are omitted as components 
of gross national product, because such expenditures are treated as 
yielding intermediate services. We do not intend-to go into the 
controversy of whether such services constitute the final product or 
should be treated as intermediate services. Our choice of the 
Department of Commerce estimates, in preference to those of Simon 
Kuznets, is based on the grounds of comparability between different 
countries. Because the Department of Commerce concept is the 
conventional one, and our G. N. P. series for other countries are based 
basically on the same concept, we have chosen the estimates prepared 
1 Historical Statistics of the United States, Colonial Times to 1957, 
U. S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, 1961, p. 132- 
2 See Simon Kuznets, Capital in the American Economy: Its Formation 
and Financing, N. B. E. R. New York, for his estimates of G. N. P. and 
Jo. n W. Kendrick, Productivity Trends in the United States, N. B. E. R. 
New York, 1961, for the adjustments of those estimates to the same 
conceptual basis as the commerce figures. 
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by the Department of Commerce and, for the years prior to 1929, the 
estimates that have been adjusted to the same conceptual basis as 
the commerce figures. 
The current price series of G. N. P. is, however, adjusted for the 
"population and price effects". Such effects are eliminated, as 
before, by obtaining the per capita constant dollar estimates. 
Our constant dollar estimates at 1929 prices for the period prior 
to 1955 are those prepared by Kendrick, after adjusting those of 
Simon Kuznets to the Department of Commerce concept. The estimates 
for the period 1956-1961 at 1929 dollars are prepared by us from the 
G. N. P. series at 1954 dollars for that period, after the necessary 
adjustments by splicing the index implicit in the latter series to 
that implicit in series prior to 1955 at 1929 dollars. 
After the series necessary for analysis being obtained 
(see 
Tables B. 12-17), the whole time-period, i. e. 1923-1961, is divided 
into three periods, viz., (a) 199-3-1929, (b) 1931-1939 and (c) 1947- 
1961. And the double logarithmic regression function, i. e. Log 
Gc = Log a+b Log Yc is fitted for each different period with a view 
to examining the effects of major social upheavals (which are considered 
to be the Great Depression, for the reasons given below, and the 
second World War during our time-period in the case of U. S. A. ) on 
the time-pattern of public expenditures. Our analysis, in other 
words, is intended to show whether a shift in the level and/or a 
change in the rate of growth of Gc with relation to Y is associated 
c 
with each of the two major social upheavals, Yc being the per capita 
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G. N. P. at constant market prices and Gc being the per capita total 
government expenditure. In Chart No. 3, the Log Gc and Log Yc are 
measured on the Y and X axes respectively on a natural scale, and 
each dot in the chart shows the combination of Log GC and Log Yc 
with respect to some one of the years 1923-1961. 
In the case of the United States also, as for U. K. and Germany, 
the Second World War was a major social upheaval, during which 
government expenditure increased enormously because of the expenditures 
on the war in which the United States actively participated. 
Besides the Second World War, the Great Depression is also usually 
considered to be a major social upheaval in American economic 
history during our time-period. As is apparent from Chart No. 3, 
and the corresponding Tables No. B13 given in the appendix, the real 
per capita income started falling from 1929, and within two years 
it declined to a level which was even lower than that of 1923, the 
first years of our time-period. It declined further during the 
next two 
years_, and, 
in 1933, the real per capita income was lower 
than that reached more than twenty-five years ago. The real per 
capita income of 1933, i. e. 0590, was smaller than that of 1906, 
i. e. %625.1 Although the recovery started from 1934, yet the real 
per capita income never reached the level of 1929 in any of the years 
Such d decline in real per capita income during the thirties, when 
the productivity of labour was much higher than that during the 
pre-First War period, implies mass unemployment. As is shown by 
several American economic historians, the scale of unemployment 
experienced by American economy during the thirties, especially 
in 1932-1934, has never, before or afterwards, been experienced. 
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prior to the Second World War. Because of the reasons stated 
above, the Great Depression is considered to be a major social 
upheaval in the case of U. S. A., and the inter-war period is divided 
into two sub-periods, viz., 1923-1929, and 1931-1939 and a separate 
regression function is fitted for each period so that the effect 
of the Great Depression on the time-pattern of public expenditure can 
be studied. Chart No. 3, with its scattered points for different 
years also suggests an upward shift in the level and a decrease in 
the rate of growth of Gc with relation to YC associated with the 
Great Depression, which is examined further by our regression analysis 
and statistical tests. 
Thus the whole time-period (1923-1961), as already stated, is 
divided into three periods, viz., 1923-1929,1931-1939,1947-1961; 
and when a separate double logarithmic regression function 
(log Gc = 
Log 
'a 
+, b Log Yc) is fitted for each period, the following regression 
equations of aG on Yo are obtained: 
1 
It may be mentioned that the conversion to calendar years 
estimates of government expenditures for the fiscal years 1922- 
1962 reduces the series by one year from each end, so that our 
series of public expenditure for calendar years is for the 
time- 
period 1923-1961. The other series necessary for our analysis, 
therefore, are also taken for the time-period 1923-1961. The 
war years and the years immediately after the war, i. e. 1940- 
1946 are excluded from our analysis for the same reasons as 
in the case of the United Kingdom. For the analysis of Great 
Depression, we have excluded only the year 1930, because, as is 
apparent from the chart, although the Depression started in 
1930, it took some time before the attitude towards public 
expenditure could change, which enabled G with relation to Y 
to reach a new and higher plateau (see our analytical explanation 
of a shift after Great Depression in Chapter V). Contrary to 
the usual view that the New Deal was the major step towards 
increased government spending, our chart and Table No. B. 17 
show that public expenditure had reached a new and higher plateau 
long before the New Deal, that is in 1931. 
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(1) 1923 - 1929: Log Go 
(2) 1931 - 1939: Log Gc 
(3) 1947 - 1961: Log Go 
-3.7164 + 1.9322 Log Yc 
-0.0502 + 0.7426 Log Yc 
-4.5608 + 2.2704 Log Yc 
They are different from each other not only with regard to the 
intercepts but also with regard to the slope which shows the rate of 
change of Gc with relation to Yc. 
Thus, as in the case of other countries which took an active 
part in the Second War, a shift in the regression function of Gc on 
Yc occurred after the Second 'Jar in the case of United States. Such 
a shift increased the per capita total government expenditure with 
relation to per capita real income by about 31.6,. The shift, 
however, was smaller than that in the case of U. K., where the shift 
accounts for about a 72.8rß increase in G with relation to Y, 
Cc 
after the war. The shift, which is of greater importance for the 
time-pattern of American public expenditure, is associated with the 
Great, Depression, which accounts for about 136% to 70% increase in 
Gc with relation to Yc. 
1 And, when the test of significance, 
described in Section IV (iii), is applied to the positive shifts 
associated with the two major social upheavals, namely the Great 
Measurement of the per cent increase in G with relation to Yc 
on account of the shift associated with tfle Great Depression 
varies with the year chosen from the period 1931-1939" If 
such increase is measured with reference to 1931, the year in 
which public expenditures had already reached a new and higher 
plateau, the shift accounts for about a 104.2ö increase. But, 
if the increase is measured with reference to the year 1934, 
the first year in which real per capita income showed an increase 
over the preceding year during the thirties (the real per capita 
income in 1934, however, was smaller than that of 1931), the 
shift accounts for about 136. y, &'-increase. For 1937, the year 
in which the real per capita income reached a level only marginally 
lower than that of 1929 but higher than that of any other year 
during the twenties, the shift accounts for a 69. äS increase. 
Such variation arises because our regression functions differ 
also with regard to the slope. 
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Depression and the Second World War, the null hypothesis that either 
of these upheavals did not give rise to any upward shifts was rejected 
at less than 1 level of significance. The positive shifts are 
highly significant to suggest: 
(i) A: shift in the level of Gc with relation to Yc occurred 
I after the Second World War. 
(ii) Such a shift is also associated with the Great Depression 
in the case of the United States, which, as already shown, 
was severely affected by that upheaval. 
Again, we find that the rate of growth of Gc with relation to 
that of Yc changed after such shifts associated with the Great 
Depression and 'the Second World War. it diminished from the rate 
of 1.93 to 0.74 after the shift associated with the Great Depression. 
It became less than unity and therefore government expenditure as a 
percentage of G. N. P. -'had been decreasing during the thirties. It 
may be mentioned'Fhere that Adolph Wagner's "Law's of Increasing State 
Activity, according to which government expenditure must increase 
at a faster rate than that of national output, does not hold good 
in this case. 
1 But such rate of growth of government expenditure, in 
contrast to that observed in the U. K., increased from the rate of 
0.74 to 2.27 after the Second World War in the case of the United 
States, so that the government expenditure as a percentage of G. N. P. 
have been increasing during the post Second War period. Although it 
is tempting to provide the plausible explanations for this contrasting 
For a discussion of Wagner's Law, see Professors Peacock and 
Wiseman, The Growth of Public Expenditure in the United Kingdom, 
op. cit., page 16-20, and Mrs. S. Andic and Dr. J. Veverka's 
op. cit., Section V. 
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feature of the British and American public expenditure, this chapter 
being mainly concerned with statistical observations, we had to post- 
pone our explanations for this and also for other observations for the 
next chapter with a view of keeping them separate. 
The statistical test for significance of the observed changes 
in the rate of growth of Gc with relation to that of Yc associated 
with the Great Depression and the Second World War, however, was 
applied and the null hypothesis that no change in such rate of growth 
of government expenditure is associated with either of those social 
upheavals is rejected at 2% level of significance and at much less 
than 1 per cent level of significance for the Great Depression and 
Second WorldiWar respectively. The observed changes in the rate of 
growth of Gc with relation to that of Yc are, therefore, significant 
enough to suggest: 
(1) the rate of growth of Gc with relation to that Yc 
diminished after the shift associated with the Great 
Depression. 
(2) the rate of growth of government expenditure increased 
after the shift associated with the second World tar in 
the case of the United States. 
(iv) Canada 
The statistical series necessary for our analysis of the growth 
of public expenditure in the case of Canada are taken from 'Historical 
Statistics of Canada', 1965.1 The sources for the government 
1 Historical Statistics of Canada, edited by M. C. Urquhart and 
K. A. H. Buckley, The Macmillan Company of Canada Ltd., Toronto, 
1965. 
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expenditure series taken from that publication were the "National 
Accounts: Income and Expenditure" for various years published by 
the Dominion Bureau of Statistics. The concept of government 
expenditure used by D. B. S. is basically the same as that outlined 
in the Section ITI(i). The total public expenditure figures include 
the expenditures of all governments namely federal, provincial and 
municipal. Intra-governmental transfer payments and subsidies are 
excluded from them. The expenditures of government commercial enter- 
prises are, in general, also not included. The Post Office, however, 
is considered to be a "trading activity" and therefore the capital 
outlays on post office buildings, facilities and equipment are 
included. The current expenditures of the Post office, which may 
be regarded as self-liquidating are not included. Similarly, in 
the case of government-owned buildings, the cost of construction of 
such building is also included. The expenditures of extra-budgetary 
funds and agencies which are not, set up on a commercial basis such 
as Unemployment Insurance Commission, the old aid security fund and 
the workmen's compensation boards are included. However, when 
specific fees are paid for certain government non-commercial services 
such as fees paid to federal and provincial hospital, they are 
deducted from the corresponding government expenditure. 
1 Such 
For a detailed account of the different items included or 
excluded from the concept of government expenditure adopted by 
D. B. S. see Historical. Statistics of Canada page 120-121 and 
124 and also D. B. S. National Accounts, 1926-1956,1962. 
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public expenditure data, however, is not available for the years 
prior to, -1926, which are therefore excluded from our study. 
The war-related expenditure, viz., interest payments on 
federal debt, world war pensions and war veterans' allowance are 
excluded for the sake of our analysis of the effects of the social 
upheavals on the time-pattern of public expenditure. 
Further adjustments to such expenditure figures are made in 
order to eliminate the "price and population effects". For the 
purpose of deflation of current estimates, different components of 
government expenditure were deflated, separately and then the 
deflated components were added to obtain the total constant dollar 
estimates. The total government expenditure is divided into two 
main components namely 
(1) expenditure on goods and services (current and capital) 
(2) Transfer payments plus subsidies. 
For the first main component, the deflated estimates in constant 
19+9 dollars are taken from the "Historical Statistics of Canada". 
To quote from that publication, "the individual subcomponents of the 
expenditure categories .... were deflated in rather fine detail by, 
for the most part, I, aspeyres-type price indexes .... government ..... 
capital formation were deflated in considerable but somewhat less 
In the case of Canada too, a substantial part of interest 
payment can be regarded as 'Great Depression-related' because 
high expenditures during the Great Depression were 
financed to 
a great extent by deficit financing. The Great Depression, as 
in the case of the United States, Th . regarded as a 
major social 
upheaval for the reasons given later; and, therefore, Depression- 
related expenditure, i. e. the interest payments on federal debt 
incurred during the Depression, should also be excluded; which, 
however, are eliminated by excluding interest payment on federal 
debt for the whole period, i. e. 1926-1960. 
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detail. " The deflated subcomponents in each group were then 
added to obtain the 
component, i. e. for 
For the second main 
subsidies after the 
expenditures, a sin! 
constant dollar estimate for the first main 
government expenditure on goods and services. 
2 
component, i. e. the transfer payments and 
exclusion of the above-mentioned war-related 
; le index, i. e. the consumer Price Index, 1926 
to 1960 (1949 = 100) was used for the deflation. 
3 The constant 
dollar estimate for total government expenditure for each year, 
obtained by adding such estimates of its main components, is divided 
by the population figure for the corresponding year in order to 
obtain-the real per capita government expenditure. 
The other important series necessary for our analysis, viz., 
the series of G. N. P. (= Gross National Expenditure) in constant 
dollars, for the time-period 1926-1960, is also taken from the 
Historical Statistics of Canada. 
1 Ibid., page 122. 
The per capita estimates are 
2 For a detailed discussion of the deflation procedure see, 
Historical Statistics of Canada, op. cit., page 122. 
3 Such expenditures in the case of the U. K. -were also deflated 
by Consumer Price Index. See Professors Peacock and Wiseman, 
op. cit., Appendix, page 158. The Consumer Price Index, 1926 
and 1960, (1949 = 100) for Canada is given in Table B. 22 in 
the Appendix B. 
For a description of the concepts and methods of calculation 
followed for computing the G. N. P. series at current and at 
constant prices see Historical Statistics of Canada, op. cit. 
Chapter F., National Income and Wealth, pages 131-138. 
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then computed by dividing the above-mentioned series by the population 
series for that time-period. 
The statistical series, necessary for our analysis, being 
computed, the whole time-period, i. e. 1926-1960, is divided into 
three periods, viz., (a) 1926-1929, (b) 1931-1939 and (c) 1947-1960; 
and a double logarithmic function (Log GC = Log a+b Log Yc) is 
fitted for each different period with a view to examining the effects 
of major social upheavals on the time-pattern of public expenditure 
in Canada. The major social upheavals, as in the case of the United 
States, are considered to be the Great Depression, for the reasons 
given below, and the Second World War during our time-period. 
The Second World War (as for the United Kingdom, Germany, and 
the United States) was also a major social upheaval in the case of 
Canada during which there was an enormous increase in total public 
expenditure because of the expenditures of the war in which Canada 
also actively participated. Besides the Second World War, the 
Great Depression, as in the case of the United States, was a major 
social upheaval for the Canadian economy. As can be noticed from 
Chart No. 4 and the corresponding Table No. B. 19 given in the 
Appendi the decline in real per capita income started since 1928. 
In 1929, however, it was only marginally lower than in 1928, i. e. 
0903.5 as against %918.9. By 1931 it declined to a level which was 
lower than that of 1926, the first year for which such data is 
available. The decline continued and in 1933 the real per capita 
income was about 3% lower than in 1928. Although we do not possess 
the unemployment data to illustrate its effect on employment, such 
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i 
declines in real per capita income during the thirties, when the 
productivity of labour can reasonably be assumed to be higher than in 
the earlier period because of the technological innovations and the 
increase in capital investment per unit of labour, imply mass 
unemployment. The recovery, however, started from 1934, though 
the real per capita income did not reach the level of 1929 (or, 1928) 
in any of the years during the thirties. In the above-mentioned 
respects, there is a close parallel between Canada and the United 
States. (Several other similarities between the two countries will 
be apparent from our later discussion). And thus we have considered 
the Great Depression as a major social upheaval in the case of Canada 
too. The inter-war period, therefore, is divided into two sub- 
periods, viz., 1926-1929, and 1931-1939 and a separate regression 
function is fitted for each period in order to analyse the effects 
of the Great Depression on the tine-pattern. of public expenditure. 
Our whole time is thus divided into three periods, viz., 1926- 
1929,1931-1939,1947-1960 and the following regression equations of 
G on Y are obtained. 
1 
cc 
(1) 1926 - 1929: Log Gc =- . 953 + 1.027 Log Yc 
(2) 1931 - 1939: Log GC = 1.070 + 0.382 Log Yc 
(3) 1947 - 1960: Log Gc 5.824 + 2.654 Log Yc 
The war-years and the years immediately after the war, i. e. 
1940-1946, as in the case of other countries, are excluded. 
For an analysis of the effects of the Great Depression, we 
have excluded, as in the case of the United States, the year 
1930. For the reasons of such exclusion, see footnote, No. 
page $26. 
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They differ from each other not only with regard to the inter- 
ýý 
cept but also with regard to the slope which denotes the rate of 
change of Gc with relation to Yc. 
Thus, a shift in the regression function of G0 on Yc occurred 
after the Second War in the case of Canada as well, and this 
accounts for about a 33.9'% increase in Government expenditure with 
relation to economic growth. The shift is not significantly 
different from that which occurred in the United States after the 
Second War, where such a shift accounts for about 31.6% increase 
in GC with relation to Y. The shift which is of greater 
importance, as in the case of the United States, we find to be 
associated with the Great Depression, which accounts for about 
605-' to kZ,. increase in Gc with relation to Yc. 
1 
In the case of Canada also, we attempted the same sort of 
test of significance for the positive shift associated with the 
Second World War and the Great Depression. Even with a very small 
number of pairs of observations of Gc and Yc for the period prior 
to the Great Depression, (N = 4), the null hypothesis that either 
of these upheavals did not give rise to any upward shifts was 
Such % increase on account of the shift associated with the 
Great Depression, as in the case of the United States, varies 
with the year chosen from the period 1931-1939, because the 
regression functions differ also with regard to the slope. 
With reference to the year 1931, the year in which a new and 
higher plateau was already reached by government expenditure, 
the shift accounts for about 50. ßs increase. For the year 
1934, the first year in which real per capita income increased 
over the preceding year during the thirties (although the real 
income was smaller than that of 1931), the shift accounts for 
about 600, ß increase. For 1937, the year in which real per 
capita income was higher than that of 1926, the first year of 
our time-period, but was still lower than that of 1928, 
the 
shift accounts for about 42% increase in GC with relation 
to Yc" 
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rejected at a much less than 1% level of significance. The 
positive shifts are, therefore, highly significant in that they 
suggest that (1) a shift in the level of Go with relation to Yo 
occurred after the Second War, and (2) such a shift is also 
associated with the Great Depression in the case of Canada. 
Again, as it happened in the United States, we find that the 
rate of growth Gc with relation to Yc diminished after the shift 
associated with the Great Depression. It diminished from the 
rate of 1.03 to 0.38. It became less than unity in the case of 
Canada as well and therefore government expenditure as a percentage 
of G. N. P. had been decreasing during the thirties. This is 
another instance which provides evidence against Wagner's "Law" 
of increasing State Activity. 
The similarities between the two countries (the United States 
and Canada) can: also be noticed as regards the observed rate of 
growth of G with relation to Y after the Second World War. In 
CC 
the case of Canada, too, the rate increased from the rate of 0.38 
to 2.65. In both countries it was greater than two in the post- 
Second War period. Are the above mentioned similarities purely 
accidental? What other explanations could be offered otherwise? 
We do not think that the similarities are due to the "chance" 
factor. We will give what we hope are plausible explanations for 
this in the next chapter. 
The statistical test for significance of the observed changes 
in the rate of growth of government expenditure, described in the 
section IV (iii) was made. The null hypothesis that no change in 
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such rate of growth of government expenditure occurred after the 
Second War is rejected at much less than 1% level of significance. 
The observed increase in such rate is, therefore, highly significant, 
suggesting that such a rate increased after the shift associated 
with Second `War. For the decrease in such rate associated with 
the Great Depression, the corresponding null hypothesis, however, 
could be rejected only at about 7N level of significance. The 
increased sampling error and, therefore, the increased level of 
significance is mainly because of the very small number of the 
pairs of observations of Gc and Yc for the period prior to the 
Great Depression (N = 4). It seems, however, highly unlikely 
that the rate of growth of government expenditure could be as 
small as 0.38, which implies a continuous decline in government 
expenditure as a percentage of G. N. P., for the period prior to 
the Great Depression and after the First War. In spite of the 
limitations due to the very small size of our sample for the time- 
period prior to the Great Depression, the level of significance for 
the rejection of the null hypothesis is observed to be less than 10 
per cent. The plausible conclusion, therefore, seems to be that 
the rate of growth of Gc with relation to that of Y diminished c 
after the shift associated with the Great Depression in the case of 
Canada as well. 
(v) Sweden 
The public expenditure data is taken from the "Den Offentliga 
Sektorns expansions" (The expansion of the public sector) by 
138. 
1111 1 Erik Hook. The expenditure figures include expenditures of the 
central government and a', so those of the local authorities, the 
basic data being taken from the government's budget reports and 
the reports of municipal finances. Such figures exclude all 
antra-governmental payments, so that no duplication of expenditures 
occur. The expenditures on public utilities such as state 
railways, telegraph administration, municipal gas works, ports, 
etc., are not included in the total public expenditure figures. 
In order to ensure comparability over time, a few adjustments 
ritt in the expenditure data were made by Dr. Hook. Such adjustments 
in the expenditure figures given in the budgetary reports were 
considered necessary mainly because of the changes in accounting 
techniques over time. For example, in the earlier years, receipts 
for certain services were deducted from the corresponding 
expenditure item and the expenditure figures given in the budgetary 
reports were net of receipts for those services. But in the 
later years, because of the "growing use of gross value's", gross 
expenditure was taken up on the expenditure side, while receipts 
were accounted for on the income side. 
2 For the purpose of 
comparability over time, the expenditure figures given in the 
budgetary reports were adjusted so as to represent gross expenditure. 
Secondly, in the earlier years, expenditure on road maintenance 
were financed by special local funds; and, therefore, were not 
lilt 
1 Erik Hook, Den Offentliga Sektorns expansion, En Studie av de 
offentliga civiia utgifternas utveckling wren 1913-156. 
Alniqvist and Wiksell, Stockholm, 1962. 
2 Ibid. p. 594. For a discussion of statistical difficulties and 
particuýar adjustments made for specific expenditures, see 
Erik Hook's book. 
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included in either the central government or municipal accounts. 
The adjusted figures include such expenditures financed by special 
funds. Some other minor adjustments were made, e. g., because of 
the 'successive transformation of the pension system', 'stopping 
of the practise of payment in kind and better cost accounting for 
the utilization of public buildings', etc. 
1 
For the purpose of comparability over time, our analysis of 
the growth and time-pattern of public expenditure in Sweden is 
based on such "adjusted" expenditure figures. The purpose of 
comparability with other countries is also served better by the 
adjusted figures. This is so mainly because of the inclusion of 
the expenditures for road maintenance financed by special local 
funds in the adjusted series. As Dr. Ho"o"k points out, "of strong 
importance are the adjustments made in expenditure on roads. " For 
example, for the pre-war year of 1938, adjustments caused a raising 
of 9.0 per cent, with road expenditures accounting for 6.6 per cent 
of this and the remaining adjustments only 2.4 per cent. "2 The 
expenditure financed by special funds, such as national insurance 
fund, in the case of U. K., as mentioned earlier, should be 
included in the definition of public expenditure. The exclusion 
of expenditure financed by special local funds which are "numerically 
impressive" in the case of Sweden, and the inclusion of expenditure 
financed by special funds in case of other countries, would impair 
comparability with other countries. Although we would prefer the 
1 Ibid. page 549. 
2' Ibid. page 551. 
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expenditure series net of "specific" receipts to the series of 
gross expenditures, the specific receipts seem to be quantitatively 
unimportant, and therefore could be neglected due to the statistical 
difficulties of obtaining the necessary data for such specific 
receipts. 
The total public expenditure figures in the case of Sweden 
suffer also from another minor drawback. In the case of the 
municipal governments, the fiscal and calendar year coincided during 
the whole period included in our study. In the case of the central 
government also the fiscal and calendar year coincided until 1922; 
but since 1923, the fiscal years runs from the ist July till 30th 
June. For this inconsistency due to the difference in calendar 
and fiscal year in the case of the central government since 1923, 
no adjustment was possible because the figures taken from Dr. Höök's 
study are only biennial estimates. But as he points out, "even 
if the expenditure-stream for the particular year is not, thereby, 
treated with the highest order of accuracy, the long-run-development 
picture is not disturbed to any great extent. "' 
Such expenditure figures are only available since 1913 as 
biennial estimates until 1958 in his study. As the data is not 
readily available for the pre-First War period (except for 1913), 
and the expenditures in war years are completely disregarded in'the 
case of the other countries because such years are regarded as 
"abnormal" years, our analysis is restricted to the inter-war period, 
1 Ibid., page 549. 
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i. e. 1920-1938, and the post-Second War period, i. e. 1946-1958.1 
Even though Sweden did not take part directly in the world wars, 
one can hardly think that such wars did not affect the Swedish 
economy. 
As regards the choice of a measure of national income aggregate, 
the gross Domestic Product at market prices is selected in the 
case of Sweden. Although we would prefer the G. N. P. series to 
that of G. D. P. for the purpose of comparability within countries, 
the G. N. P. data is not readily available for the earlier years. 
The difference between G. D. P. (which does not include net factor 
income from abroad) and G. N. P., however, is very small in the case 
of Sweden in the post-war period. For example, in 1948 and 1958, 
the difference amounts to . 025% and . 008; of G. D. P. respectively. 
On the basis of last fifteen years' estimates, one would presume 
that the net factor income from abroad was also quantitatively 
unimportant in the inter-war period. 
From the series of total government expenditure and of Gross 
Domestic Product, the "price effect" is to be eliminated by the 
deflation of the different components of each series by the 
separate appropriate price indexes. The statistical difficulties 
As in the case of West Germany, we did not attempt to extend 
the expenditure series to later years. Such extension would 
require not only search into several budget reports of the 
central government and the reports of municipal finances but 
also enormous other information so as to derive the 'adjusted' 
expenditure estimates, the cost element of which did not make 
it worthwhile. It does not seem at all likely that the 
extension of series to two or three later years would change 
our statistical findings significantly. 
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encountered in this respect were due to the lack of appropriate 
indices; and, therefore, a single index was used for the deflation 
of each series. The index used is the general wholesale price 
index, which covers a large variety of goods such as consumer goods, 
-industrial and agricultural raw materials, machines and transport 
=equipment. Because of 
its wide coverage, the deflated estimates 
obtained by multiplying our money series by this index would show 
better the "real" change in our series than if some other available 
=single index, e. g., consumer price index, had been used. The 
I 
deflation of both the government expenditure and G. D. P. series by 
a common index, however, assumes that the composition of government 
! expenditure and that of G. D. P. are the same, which is not likely. 
In the absence of any better alternative, our analysis if based 
on such "real" estimates for each series, after adjustment being 
'mäde also for the "population effect" by computing each series on 
average per capita basis. 
The whole period, i. e. 1920-1958, is divided into two periods, 
'viz., (a) Inter-war period, i. e. 1920-1938 and (b) Post Second liar 
period, i. e. 19+6-1958, and a double logarithmic function of the 
same form, i. e. Log GC = Log a+b Log Yc is fitted for each 
'different period in order to examine whether a shift in the level 
and/or a change in the rate of growth of G0 with relation to Yc 
occurred after Second World War in the case of Sweden. As before, 
T' is per capita income (G. D. P. at market price) at constant prices c 
and, GC is per capita total government expenditure at constant 
prices. As shown in the chart No. 5, the logarithms of G. are 
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measured on the Y axis and the logarithms of Yo are measured on 
the X axis on a natural scale. Each dot in the chart shows the 
combination of Log Gc and Log Yc with respect to some one of the 
years 1920-1958. 
In the case of Sweden, by looking at the per capita income 
data, the Great Depression does not appear to be a major social 
upheaval. The real per capita income for each year during the 
thirties was higher than that of any year during the twenties. 
The rate of increase of real per capita income during the thirties 
was almost the same-aa that during the period 1922-1928. The 
real per-capita biennial estimate of income for each year during 
the thirties is higher than the estimate of this for any previous 
year, except the year 1932, for which such estimates are only 
marginally (3.4w) lower than that of 1930. (See Table B. 26 and 
chart No. 5). Our scatter diagram also as is shown in chart No. 5, 
does not suggest any change in the level and/or rate of growth of 
Gc with relation to Yo to be associated with Great Depression, 
which does not appear to be a major social upheaval in the case 
of Sweden so far as its effects on per capita income is concerned. 
Because of the above-mentioned reasons, no further division of 
our period and no separate regression analysis for the thirties, as 
was done in the case of Canada and U. S. A., where the Great Depression 
appeared as a , major social upheaval, was considered necessary. 
Although Sweden did not take direct part in the war, it could not 
completely isolate herself from the effects of war, when war was 
fought so near to her territory. The government expenditure, though, 
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did not rise to the extent that it did in those countries which 
were directly involved in the war (e. g. U. K., U. S. A., W. Germany 
and Canada among our case studies), it was higher during the war- 
years than the level reached in any previous year, (see chart 5), 
and we consider below whether a shift in the level and/or change 
in the rate of growth of GG with relation to YG occurred after the 
Second World War in the case of Sweden. 
The whole period, i. e. 1920-1958, as already mentioned, is 
divided into two periods, viz., inter-war period, i. e. 1920-1938 and 
post Second War period, i. e. 1946-1958 and a separate double 
logarithniic regression function is fitted for each period. We get 
the following two regression equations of Go on Yo: 
(1) 1920- 1938: Log Go =-1.778 + 1.331 Log Yo 
(2) 1946 - 1958: Log Go =-4.028 + 2.063 Log Yo 
They, as in the case of other countries included in our sample, 
differ from each other not only with regard to the intercept but 
also with regard to the slope, which shows the rate of change 
of GC with respect to Yc. 
A shift in the regression line of Gc on Yc occurred after 
the Second World War in the case of Sweden as well. But the shift 
in the case of Sweden which did not take direct part in the war was 
much smaller than in the case of other countries, e. g., U. K., U. S. A., 
Germany and Canada, which were directly involved in the war. The 
shift after the Second filar in the case of Sweden increased govern- 
ment expenditure with relation to economic growth by about 7.6%, 
whereas in the case of U. K., Canada and U. S. A. this shift accounts 
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for about a 72.8%, 33.9% and 31.6; increase respectively. And, 
when the same sort of test of significance is applied for the 
positive shift after the Second Idar in the case of Sweden, it 
cannot be considered statistically significant, even at a level 
of significance of lc%. Therefore, the only plausible conclusion 
we can reach is, that either no such shift occurred after the 
Second War in the case of Sweden (the observed shift being too 
small to reject the null hypothesis) or the shift, if any, was 
too small to exert any significant impact on the time-pattern of 
government expenditure in the case of Sweden. 
But, as it happened in the United States and Canada, we find 
that after the Second War the rate of growth of per capita total 
government expenditure in relation to that of per capita income 
increased significantly in the case of Sweden. It increased 
from the inter-war rate of 1.33 to 2.06 after the Second War 
(i. e., the increase in such rate was about 55%). By the 
statistical test of significance, described in the section IV 
(iii), the null hypothesis that the Second War did not change 
the rate of growth of government expenditure with relation to 
economic growth is rejected at a5 per cent level of significance. 
The increase in this rate seems significant enough for the positive 
hypothesis that an increase in the rate of Gc with relation to that 
of Yc occurred after. the Second War in the case of Sweden. 
VI Summary of Statistical Observations and Hypothesis. 
(1) A shift in the level of government expenditure with 
relation to per capita income (or the displacement effect) after 
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war (first and/or second) is observed in the case of each country 
included in our time-series analysis. By our statistical test 
of significance the null hypothesis that such a shift is not 
associated with war is found to be very unlikely in the case of 
each country except Sweden. The observed positive shifts are 
highly significant to suggest that a positive shift in the 
regression function of Gc on Yc (or the displacement effect of 
war, which refers to the shift of such function) occurred after 
each war (first and/or second) in the case of each country except 
Sweden. In the case of Sweden, which did not take part in the 
war, the plausible conclusion we could reach is that either no such 
shift occurred (the observed shift being too small for the null 
hypothesis to be rejected) or the shift, if any, was too small to 
exert any significant impact on the time-pattern of public 
expenditure. 
(2) Such a shift is also observed to be associated with the 
Great Depression in the case of the United States and Canada, 
which were most affected (in terms of the lowering of the per 
capita income and also possibly as regards the percentage people 
unemployed) by that social upheaval. By the same statistical 
test of significance, the corresponding null hypothesis that such 
a shift is not associated with the Great Depression either in the 
United States or in Canada, is found to be very unlikely, and, 
therefore, was rejected. The observed shifts'are highly significant 
in indicating that a shift in the regression function of Gc on Yc 
(or the 'displacement effect') is associated also with the Great 
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Depression in the case of the United States and Canada, which were 
severely affected by that upheaval. 
(3) A change in the rate of growth of Gc with relation to 
that of Yc is observed to be associated with major social upheavals 
in the case of each country included in our time-series study. 
By our statistical test of significance, the null hypothesis that 
a change in the rate of growth of government expenditure is not 
associated with either of those social upheavals is found to be 
very unlikely. lie therefore rejected the null hypothesis. 
The observed changes in the rate of growth of GC are highly 
significant in suggesting that they are associated with the social 
upheavals in the case of each country. 
No generalization, however, can be made with regard to the 
direction of change in the rate of growth of G,. It diminished 
c 
after the shifts associated with world wars in the case of the 
United Kingdom. It diminished also in the case of Germany after 
the shifts associated with the first war and the social upheavals 
of the thirties and the second world war. In the case of the 
United States and Canada too, the change in the rate was in the 
negative direction after the shifts associated with the Great 
Depression. But the rate of growth of Gc increased after the 
second war in the case of Sweden, which did not participate in 
the war and where no 'significant' shift in level of government 
expenditure occurred. It also increased after the second war 
in the case of the United States and Canada. 
(4) With regard to the similarities observed between different 
1k8. 
countries with respect to the growth and time-pattern of public 
expenditure with relation to economic growth, they are more pronounced 
between the countries which are Meographically close to each other. 
In both the U. K. and Germany, not only did shifts in the 
level of government expenditure occur after the social upheavals, 
but also the rate of growth of Gc with relation to Yc diminished 
after such shifts. We observe also almost the same rate of growth 
of Gc with 'relation to Y in both countries during the inter-war 
period and also for the post second war period, considered by us. 
The similarities between the North American countries namely 
the United States and Canada are observed in many respects. In 
both countries, in contrast with others, we observe a shift in the 
level of government expenditure, associated with the Great 
Depression, which is of greater importance quantitatively than 
the shift associated with the second war in both Canada and U. S. A. 
For both countries the rate of growth of Gc with relation to that 
of YC diminished to a rate less than unity after the shift 
associated with the Great Depression. Such a rate of growth 
of government expenditure in contrast to that observed in Germany 
and the United Kingdom increased in both Canada and the United 
States after the shift associated with the second world war, and 
has been more than two in the post second war period. 
The plausible analytical explanations of our statistical findängs" 
and the hypothesis are discussed in the next chapter, in which we 
also discuss the compatability of such findings and hypotheses 
obtained from a time-series approach as against those obtained 
from a cross-section approach. 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
EXPLANATIONS, COMPATIBILITIES AND SOME COMMENTS UPON THE 
RESEARCH. 
In the two preceding chapters, we arrived at two sets of 
statistical observations and hypotheses from two different 
approaches, viz., cross-section and time-series approaches. 
_In 
this final chapter, in section I. and II., we attempt to 
provide some explanations for our statistical findings 
concerning the behaviour of public expenditure. The 
explanations offered are those which seem plausible on a, priori 
, 
grounds. Wherever possible, we provide also some justifications 
on empirical. grounds, although the speculative nature of such 
explanations cannot be denied. Besides, they are not the only 
possible explanations. It may be possible to pick out other 
explanations which could equally satisfactorily or unsatisfactorily 
explain such statistical findings. 
Furthermore, as our statistical-analysis was pursued on 
the basis of two different approaches, we discuss in section III 
whether the statistical findings of, and technique employed by, 
one approach are compatible with those'of the other approach. 
The plausible reasons for the differences in statistical 
findings for different countries included in time-series 
approach'are, however, discussed in section II. Finally, in 
section IV, in the light of the limitations and usefulness of 
our study, some comments upon the possibilities of future 
research are given. 
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I. Plausible Explanations for the Statistical Observations 
and Hypotheses from the Cross-section Approach. 
In, chapter III, the statistical observation from our cross- 
section approach suggests the income hypothesis that government 
expenditure as a share of G. N. P. increases with a diminishing 
rate with the increasing level of economic development. It 
was also apparent from the scatter diagram given in chart No. 1 
that the geographical, location of a country, also could-be an 
important factor influencing the level of public expenditure.. 
We discuss below in subsection (i) several plausible explanations 
for a diminishing rate, of. increase of G/Y with relation to that 
of Yc.. The explanations for the importance of geographical 
location are dealt with briefly in subsection (ii). -, - 
(i) Explanations for a diminishing rate of increase . 
of G /Y with relation to the rate of increase of Yc: - 
(a) Hypothesis concerning the gap between the 'desirable' 
level of public expenditure and the 'tolerable burden' 
of taxation. 
As was discussed in chapter II, section II, Peacock and 
Wiseman point out in their study that there is likely to be a 
gap between the people's ideas about the "desirable" level of 
public expenditure and the "tolerable burden" of taxation, 
because of the tendency to underestimate the "burden" and to 
over-estimate the "desirable" level of public expenditure on 
the part of an individual; but their main hypothesis is that 
people's ideas about the tolerable burden of taxation determine 
largely what the level of public expenditure will be. 
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It was argued in-that chapter 
, 
that the concept of the 
tolerable. burden of taxation provides some explanation of. the 
time pattern of public. expenditure, when the shifts in the 
level of public expenditure are associated with some social 
upheaval like war-during which people get-accustomed to a 
higher burden oftaxation, which continues even after such an 
upheaval. is over.. But if such a shift is associated with 
severe depression (such a shift is associated with, the Great 
Depression in the case of the United States and Canada), during 
which-. time taxes tend to be. reduced, then it cannot be said 
that such . a. shift occurred 
because people got accustomed to a 
higher burden, of taxation.,., The shift may occur not because 
people have become accustomed. to the high level of, taxation 
during depression, but because of the increase in the gap 
between the 'desirable level' of.,,, public, expenditure and the 
'tolerable burden' of taxation. We will discuss in some 
detail the, possible reasons for an increase in this gap in 
section II (i), while. providing, plausible explanations for a 
'shift' associated with Great Depression in the 
, 
case of the 
United States and Canada. It may,, however, be. sufficient to 
state that if people's attitude towards public expenditure 
changes,, many 'new' expenditures which were, previously not 
considered-, to be very desirable become highly desirable, and 
this increases such a gap. An increase in this gap, however, 
permits the acceptance of new taxes and the consequent increase 
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in the tolerable burden and a decrease in this gap. 
Our hypothesis, therefore, is that if the gap between 
the desirable level of public expenditure and the tolerable 
burden of taxation increases, a government would attempt to 
decrease the gap by increasing the rate of growth of 
government expenditure and if the gap decreases a government 
has less incentive to raise finance necessary to maintain 
the previous rate of growth of public expenditure. 
Now the question is whether the gap becomes larger or 
smaller with increasing real per capita income. If the gap 
increases, this would suggest an increasing rate of growth 
of government expenditure and if the gap diminishes it 
would suggest a diminishing rate of growth of government 
expenditure. 
It is not possible to give any objective measurement 
of such subjective concepts; still one may consider the 
important factors which largely determine the 'tolerable 
burden' and the 'desirable level' of public expenditure at a 
particular time for different countries. The 'tolerable 
burden' is influenced by various economic, political and social 
factors; the level of real, per capita income or G. N. P., 
however, is one of the most relevant factors which determines 
the tolerable burden. The notions about the 'desirable level' 
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of public expenditure are determined to a large extent 
independently of those of the tolerable burden. Such 
notions about the desirable level of public expenditure, e. g. 
education, health, roads, etc. to be provided by a government 
are largely determined by people's notions of a "good" 
government and by the standard of public services provided 
in other countries. 
The gap between the 'tolerable burden' and the 
'desirable level' would be much larger in an underdeveloped 
country than in a developed economy. The reasons are that 
the 'tolerable burden' in a developed economy would be much 
larger than in an underdeveloped country because of the vast 
difference in real per capita income; but the difference 
between the 'desirable level' of public expenditure in those 
countries would not be so great, such a 'desirable level' being 
determined to a great extent by the standard of public 
services provided in the developed countries themselves. Thus, 
the 'demonstration effect' is very prominent in this respect. 
It seems plausible therefore that such a gap narrows down with 
an increasing level of economic development; which therefore 
suggests, as already pointed out, a diminishing rate of 
increase of G/y with an increasing level of income. 
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(b) A hypothesis concerning the 'incidence'. 
The hypothesis that with an increasing level of income 
and G/y the percentage of people compelled to bear tax 
incidence increases and/or the incidence of increase in 
tax revenue as a percentage of national output is likely 
to be relatively heavier on those on whom it had been 
hitherto lighter, together with the hypothesis of the 
maximisation of length of life for a governments provides 
support for a diminishing rate of increase of G/y with 
relation to the rate of increase of real per capita income. 
When public expenditure as a proportion of G. N. P. is 
a small proportion, as we notice in the case of less developed 
countries, the percentage of people who are brought into the 
tax net is usually relatively smaller than the similar 
percentage in a developed economy. In the case of the direct 
taxes such as income taxes and death and asset duties, the 
percentage of people who pay these is very small. As observed 
by Martin and Lewis, in their study, it is not only the low- 
income class, but also the whole of "middle-class", who are 
practically exempt from income taxes in the less developed 
1. See Anthony Downs, An Economic Theory of Democracy, 
,., Harper and 
Brothers, New York, 1957, for a discussion 
of the vote maximisation hypothesis. 
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countries. In a country,, like, India or Nigeria,, as the,, 
above mentioned , authors point out, 
"the man earning £200a year 
usually,. escapes altogether", but.. '! a, man earning . 200 a , year 
is 
extremely, well of f-in . comparison with. 
the average income-of- 
the population, which_, is only about £60 a. yearper person 
gainfully occupied., Even the 0100 a, year man Is definitely.,... 
middle class", and a -cut., above . his neighbours"., 
This could be due to various. reasons.. , 
Firstly, on , 
the 
grounds of administrative efficiency, the, collection: of small 
sums from large numbers of. persons may, not be feasible, 
especially when a,, majority., of these are self-employed (either., 
in agriculture or small. cottage industries,, or-the distributive 
trade) which makes it difficult to assess. their income. On. -- 
administrative grounds,. therefore, exemption level has=to be- 
fixed-, at.. a. high:. level,... which exempts virtually the whole of the 
"middle class". ' Secondly, a large, percentage of peopleti have an-. 
income even below 'subsistence' level-and-the middle, -class 
(with an income of about X100) is also so close to , subsistence 
that it is extremely difficult to persuade, people with such an 
income to tolerate direct taxes like income tax. The levy of 
incöme tax on such people=is also probably avoided to ensure the 
continuance of the incentives to work hard and save. Thus the 
1. Martin and'Lewis, op. -cit. ', page-223'. 
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percentage of people paying income taxes is usually much 
smaller than in a developed country. 
1 The same is true for 
death and asset duties, because of the high exemption limits 
and the possession of wealth beyond that exemption limit by 
only a few. As far as indirect taxes such as excise duties 
and sales tax are concerned, a large percentage of people 
comparatively bear very little incidence. This is so because 
of the existence of large non-monetized sectors especially 
in rural areas in an underdeveloped country like India. 
2 
A large percentage of production and consumption in the rural 
sector, where the majority of the people in a less developed 
country lives, usually takes place outside the money economy. 
The goods are either consumed by the producers themselves or 
given as wages in kind by them to the, labourers, or exchanged 
for barter. The indirect taxes such as sales or excise tax 
1. 
2. 
"In the U. K. the number of people paying income tax is 
equal to just over 30 per cent of the population. In the 
U. S. A., where the allowances are greater, and where the 
gainfully occupied are relatively fewer, the number paying 
income tax equals 25 per cent of the population. The 
percentage in Jamaica is 2.1, in Trinidad 1.8, in British 
Guiana 1.4 and in Ceylon 0.611, quoted from Martin and Lewis, 
op. cit., p. 223. For other less developed countries such 
percentages are likely to be very low for the reasons given 
in the text. 
In India, "for the economy as a whole, 37 per cent of total 
consumer expenditure is represented by imputed value. ... 
the extent of the non-monetised sector, as indicated by the 
percentage of imputed value to total expenditure is considerably 
higher in the rural sector than in the urban. ... 
k5 per cent 
of total consumption in the rural sector is non-cash, only 
10 per cent of urban expenditure is of this category, even this 
much of imputed value in the urban sector is mainly attributed 
to towns with population belog 15,000 which are semi-rural in 
living conditions and organisations of production", quoted from Report of the Taxation Enquiry Commission, 1953-54, Vol. 1, 
Ministry of Finance, oyemm# a. _. naa! es... _65-66.. _. _.. _-_.. -- 
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practically cannot be collected on the goods of the non- 
monetized sector. Therefore, a large percentage of people 
living in rural areas virtually bears very little of the 
incidence of such taxes. 
But, with an increasing level of economic development, 
urbanization änd Gay, the percentage of people who are 
brought under the tax net increases and the 'incidence' of 
the increase in tax revenue as a share G. N. P. is likely to 
be relatively higher on those who either escaped tax burden 
or on whom it had been hitherto lower. This is likely for 
various reasons. Firstly, it may happen because of the 
probable disincentive effects on saving and investment and 
the work of a further increase in tax rates for those who 
are already bearing a comparatively'heävier tax "burden". 
This needs to be avoided in order tö promote economic growth, 
one of the fundamental objectives of less developed 
countries. 
Secondly, very high taxation ön'a particular group of people 
is likely to arouse strong opposition and political pressure 
against such taxation through various means, e. g. by organising 
into pressure groups, the importance of which, in moulding 
public policies -will be discussed later in explanation (e). 
Thirdly, with the increasing level of economic development 
(without any substantial" change iný income distribution), and 
the higher efficiency in tax administration, it becomes 
easier 
to increase the percentage of people paying income tax. 
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Because, with increasing level of per capita income, the 
percentage of people earning incomes beyond the exemption 
level, assuming no change in the exemption limit, tends to 
increase. Besides the small scale scattered character of 
production tends to change in favour of larger units which 
facilitates efficient tax collection and makes evasion 
difficult. With higher efficiency in tax collection, exemption 
levels could probably also be lowered, which may further 
increase the percentage of people paying income tax. Furthermore, 
with increasing urb4ation and monetization of the economy 
the "incidence" of sales and excise taxes tends to be borne 
also by people who either completely escaped such taxes or 
who on whom the 'burden' of such taxes was comparatively 
slight. Thus, due to various reasons, it is likely that with 
the increasing level of income and the consequent development 
in efficiency in tax administration, urbanization and 
monetization of the economy the percentage of people who are 
forced to bear the 'incidence' of different taxes increases, 
and/or the incidence of increase in G/y is likely to be 
relatively higher on those on whom it had been hitherto lower. 
Inthe less developed countries where public expenditure 
as a proportion of G. N. P. is small, it is always in the 
interest of an overwhelming majority of voters to vote for - 
rapid increases of'public expenditure because the taxes needed 
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to finance such expenditure will not usually come out of 
their pockets and a government, in its interest of 
maximising the length of its life, will usually pursue 
policies of rapid increase in government expenditure. But 
as the ratio G/y increases, the taxes needed to finance an 
increase in G/y, start to hit some of the other groups of 
people which escaped taxation (or on whom the "burden" of 
taxation was comparatively slight) when the ratio was 
relatively small. Thus some of the groups which supported 
a rapid increase in G/y when such ratio was small would not 
support that rate of increase because then they would have to 
finance that increase. Therefore, as G/y increases, the people 
supporting the previous rate of increase of G/y decreases. 
The opposition and probably the disincentive effects being 
stronger, a government in its self-interest of maximising 
its length of its life would not pursue the previous rate of 
increase in G/y. Therefore, the rate of increase of G/y is 
likely to diminish with increasing G/y (or with increasing 
real per capita income which is shown to be associated with 
increasing G/y). 
(c) Difficulties encountered in finding; new efficient 
sources of taxation and methods of tax collection, 
or to increase the rates of taxation on the existing 
sources. 
With the increasing level of income and G/y, the rates of 
taxation increase, the sources of taxation expand and methods 
of tax collection improve, in order to be able to finance the 
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higher level of G/y. But the higher the rates of taxation, 
the greater is the exploitation of possible sources of 
taxation and adoption of efficient methods of tax collection, 
and the greater are the difficulties encountered by a 
government in increasing the rates of taxation on the existing 
sources and/or finding new efficient sources of taxation 
and methods of tax collection. Thus with the increasing 
level of income and government expenditure, it becomes 
increasingly difficult for a government to finance the 
previous rate of increase of G/y, which therefore also 
suggests the hypothesis of a diminishing rate of increase of 
G/y with relation to the rate of increase of real per capita 
income. 
(d) The Productivity Lag and relative decline in 
income of public servants. 
I- Itris pointed out by several. econornists that productivity 
in the government sector is rising at a-slower rate than in 
the private sector. For, example,, Kuznet's and-Clark's studies 
on sectoral productivity suggest that the rate of increase 
,, of 
'productivity' in service industries is less than that of 
manufacturing or even of agriculture; and because the public 
sector is characterised mostly by the former rather than the 
latter types of activities, the presumption is that the 
productivity in the public sector rises at a slower rate than 
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in. the private sector. An increasing share of government 
expenditure is G. N. P., measured either at market value and/or 
money costs, therefore, would result with increasing. real per 
capita income (or increasing average productivity). 
' If. 
a 
necessary adjustment could be made for the 'productivity lag', 
i. e. if both government expenditure and G. N. P., are measured in 
real quantities of goods and services, the increasing share of.. 
government expenditure in G. N. P. would be slowed down relatively. 
It is practically impossible to measure such 'productivity' 
lags, and therefore we have made no adjustment for such lags. 
But the presumption that the 'productivity lag' leads to an 
increasing share of government expenditure in G. N. P., with 
increasing real per capita income., depends basically upon, two 
assumptions; firstly, that the percentageyof population 
required for public services varies directly with output; and 
secondly, that public servants are paid on average the same as other 
people, or the ratio of average income of public servants to that 
of. other_people remains constant (or increases). 
1. See Jeffery G. Williamson, "Public Expenditure and Revenue: 
An International Comparison", op. cit., page 46, and 
S. Andic and J. Veverka, "The Growth of Public Expenditure 
in Germany since the Unification", op. cit. 
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There is no obvious reason to assume that the percentage 
of-population required for different public services varies 
directly with real per,, capita income. For example, in the case 
of administration (police and justice) it is not necessary 
for the percentage of people required for such services to vary 
directly with the increasing level of income. With regard to 
education, even under the assumption that it is a "superior" 
good, the percentage of population employed as teachers need not 
vary because 'better and more' education could be provided by 
other means, i. e. better libraries, teaching by T. V. and films, 
etc., without increasing the percentage of people employed in 
teaching. Besides with increasing real per capita income and 
higher expectation of life, the ratio of children to population 
is, likely to be smaller in the developed countries than in the 
developing economies. Thus, even the ratio of children to 
teachers could decrease with a constant percentage of people 
employed in teaching; therefore, whatever we may assume about 
the.. 'productivity lag' in the government sector, if the percentage 
of people employed in, public services remains constant and if 
the ratio of the average income of public servants to that of 
other people does not increase, the government expenditure as 
a percentage of G. N. P. would not increase. 
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Secondly, even-if the percentage of people employed in 
government services increases (either because of the productivity 
lag, or because of the 'superior' nature of such services or, ybecause 
of some other reasons), 
aas 
has. been the case in: many countries 
(mostly for, such services as maintaining roads or even in 
education and health), it may not increase government's share 
in G. N. P. if the. public servants' income declines in relation 
to that of other people. In underdeveloped or semi-developed 
countries the relative difference between the average income 
of public servants and that of other people, is usually greater than 
that found indeveloped countries., The relative difference is 
extremely,, high in cases of, 
_highly, 
paid personnel in administration, 
and also in the case of engineers and scientists because of the 
great scarcity of, _such people with 
the necessary skill, 
qualification and_experience...,, In, most underdeveloped countries, 
e. g. Sudan, Nigeria, even an elementary school teacher or a clerk 
of subordinate grade, as, pointed out, by Martin and Lewis in 
their study, earn two to , three, times more than an average 
farmer. 
India is, an.. exception because of-her vast surplus of Arts 
graduates in relation to the jobs, available. Whereas, in the 
developed countries, e. g. in, U. K., such people in public services 
earn an income not very different from that of an average 
industrial worker or, farmer. 
1. See for instance, Moses Abramovitz and Vera Eliasberg, The 
Growth of Public Employment in Great Britain, op. cit. 
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But with the increasing level of economic development, and 
the concomitant spread of education and skill, the people who 
could perform those services increases, and as the relative 
scarcity of such people diminishes, the relative inequality of 
income between public and private or self-employers tends to 
diminish. 
However, usually the percentage increase of people in public 
services is not completely offset by a relative decline in 
income of public' servants and therefore G/y may rise. 
Nevertheless, 
there is a strong presumption that the 'productivity lag' in the 
government sector increases at a diminishing rate (or even 
diminishes) with rising levels of income, because of the increasing 
use of technological innovations in the public expenditure field, 
e. g. the use of expensive computers seems to be increasing in 
the government sector at a faster rate than in the private sector. 
Secondly, the relative decline in income of public servants 
seems to proceed at a faster rate with the increasing level of 
economic development. The ratio of the'real per capita income 
of underdeveloped countries (e. g. Tanganyika, Sudan and Nigeria, 
whose real per capita incomes are about $99, $120 and 
%134 
respectively) to that of semi-developed countries (e. g. Malaya, 
Greece, Spain, Italy whose real per capita incomes are 
$552.4, 
0613.0,0514,0897 respectively)' is about i "s 6 and the ratio 
of the real per capita income-of semi-developed countries to that 
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of developed countries (e. g. U. K., 'France, Belgium, Sweden, 
Canada, U. S. A., etc. ) is about l21. The ratio of relative 
difference between the average 'income of public servants 'änd "tl e 
average income of other people for underdeveloped countries to 
that of semi-developed 'countries could`be 3: 2, whereas the ratio 
of such a relative' difference for semi=developed countries to"' 
in that of developed ones may be"abö mpa üt 2 1.25. By"corg 
such"ratios (i. e. 'for real per capita-iicomand för'the relative 
difference between'"average income-of public servants and"that 
of other people) we notice that the relative difference in'real 
per capita income between semi-developed and underdeveloped 
countries is about five to six times; but'the relative decline 
in 
average income of public servants is only about 50 per cent; 
whereas the relative difference between real per capita income ' 
between developed and semi-developed countries is only about two 
and ahalf times, but the relative decline 
in average income of 
public servants is about 60%. There could be large margins 
of 
eIrror in these estimates; however, these margins are not likely 
to be so great as to falsify our hypothesis that the relative 
decline in income of public servants proceeds at a faster rate with 
increasing level of economic development. 
Thirdly', the ' pröductivity 1 ä. g' in th"e' gövernment sector is 
relevant only for government 4purchases of 'goods Land services. In 
case of transfer jyments by a government, purchases of goods and 
services are usually left to the individual's choice; and there is 
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no obvious reason to assume that: persons receiving 'transfers' 
spend such money on goods and services, for which productivity 
increases at a slower rate. Transfer payments, -as a percentage of 
total=government expenditure, however, seem to increase with 
increasing levels of-per-capita-income, -which-is evident from 
different case-studies. Or, the purchase of'goods and services 
as. a. percentage of total government expenditure decreases with 
increasing per capita income. Therefore, the proportion of 
total government expenditure'for'which"the concept of 'productivity 
lag' is relevant diminishes with increasing levels of economic 
development. 
The varioüs`rea. sons given above, i. `e.. a diminishing rate of, 
increase of the 'productivity lag', the relative decline in 
income of public servants, increasing share of transfer payments 
in total public expenditure with increasing level of per capita 
income, give strong support to our hypothesis of a diminishing 
rate of increase of G/y in relation to the rate of increase of 
real per capita income. 
(e) The effects of urbanisation' and industrialisation. 
Economic growth or rising real percapita income is usually 
associated with a transfer of labour force from primary industries 
(agriculture, fishing, forestry) to tertiary industries (transport 
and communication, commerce, etc. ) with the related movement of 
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people from rural to urban areas. 
' Urbanisation, however, 
seems to-increase at a diminishing rate (increasing rate of 
increase is likely for very low-income countries) with an 
increasing level of economic development. 
2 
What are the possible effects of urbanisation on the size of 
public expenditure? It may affect government expenditure in various 
ways` 
1. Dr. Mesmer in his study, op. cit., has in fact used the share 
of male labour force in primary and tertiary industries and 
the share of population living in cities of 20,000 or more 
as his measures of economic growth. As we already mentioned 
in chapter III, section I, we do not think that such shares 
can"be substituted for the usually accepted measure of economic 
growth, i. e. real per capita income. We thick, however, that 
there is a high correlation between such shares and level of 
economic. development. . 
2. 
. 
Kinsley Davis in his article, "The Origin and Growth of 
Urbanisation in the World", The American Journal of Sociology, 
LX. March 1955, points out "a diminution in the rate of 
urbanisation in the other industrial countries has been noted, 
_a 
diminution that is being compensated by an increase in 
the rate of urbanisation'. ' Mrs. Andic and Dr. Veverka in 
their study of 'Growth of Public Expenditure in Germany', 
op. cit., also point out "there is a strong presumption that 
the influence of these permanent factors (i. e. urbanisation 
and productivity lag) diminishes once a certain level of 
income has been. achieved., Urbanisation tends to slow down 
in the latter phases of industrial expansion, and even the 
'productivity lag' may diminish as the-total weight of services, 
both private and public, in total output increases" page 19). 
yý_ýýý .ý 
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First, the need for certain government expenditures, 
e. g. water, street lighting, police for traffic control, 
sewage supply, public parks, transport and communications, 
etc., to meet the particular needs of urban life, increases 
with urbanisation. Therefore, government expenditure for such 
services is likely to increase, and this will also affect the 
absolute level of total public expenditure. 
- Second,, industrialisation and urbanisation tend to break 
down the joint family system as well as dissolve many voluntary 
rural, organisations. The joint family system (also, in some 
cases, voluntary organisations in villages through mutual 
co-operation) provides a sort of informal social security for old 
age, sickness or unemployment. The redistribution of income 
, within the. family for contingent needs due to sickness or 
, unemployment, or, for permanent needs due to old age or other 
causes of. incapacity to work, or a lower capacity to earn than 
other,, members of the family, or to even out to some extent the 
difference in the earning capacity-of, an individual during his 
life time (e. g. person earns less during the training period 
and more afterwards),, reduces the need for a redistribution of 
income for such purposes through fiscal means. As industrial- 
isation and urbanisation tend to. break down the joint family 
system,. and. also__tend to dissolve voluntary welfare organisation 
of villages,, the formal sociäl-security system provided through 
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fiscal system takes the place of the disappearing informal 
social security of joint family and rural organisations. The 
redistribution of income through fiscal means for contingent 
or permanent needs or to even out differences in earnings over 
life takes the place of the disappearing redistribution of 
income within the family for such purposes, so that the 
'economic status' of an individual is preserved. 
' This again 
would increase the level of public expenditure. One may, 
however, argue that the breaking down of the joint family does 
not necessarily create the need for public provision of such 
services. Some of these services, e. g. old age pensions, 
unemployment or sickness benefits, could as well be provided 
by market. mechanism through private insurance schemes. We do 
not deny, this possibility, but complete reliance on market 
mechanism. seems less, likely both because of the objective of 
communal responsibility for such service assumed by a society 
and because the opportunity costs of private provision as 
compared to the public provision of such services may be 
considered too high. 
Third, greater political influence of urban population, 
as opposed to rural population, could also be a factor in 
influencing the level (and also pattern) of government expenditure. 
1. See Mrs. Andic and Dr. Veverka, op. cit., page 221. 
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Industrial and urban areas provide better scope and opportunities 
for organisation of'pre'ssure groups, trade-unions, and other 
groups whose preferences are weighted at a higher rate by a 
government than the rate at which the preferences of the other 
voters-are weighted. The preferences of the interest groups 
receive greater weight, because such groups may mould public 
opinion through persuasion or public demonstrations or 
agitations. In an uncertain world with imperfect knowledge 
many voters are usually not informed about the facts necessary 
for their voting decisions and therefore could be influenced 
in their voting decisions by persuasion through propaganda 
campaigns or through public demonstrations, just as consumers 
' with"' imperfect knowledge could be persuaded-to buy a certain 
product through general advertisment. 
1 
Therefore, a government in its self interest of maximisation 
of its length of life would not like to dissatisfy the prominent 
interest groups. The activities of interest groups, however, 
are motivated'by'the desire to derive some discriminatory 
benefits for themselves, through government policies. 
The 
conferring of special benefits by a government usually involves 
the spending of more public . monies. 
for specific purposes 
financed by some general taxation. In non-democratic countries 
the influence of interest groups on government policies is 
1. See Anthony Downs, An Economic Theory of Democracy, 
op. cit., part II, chapters 5 and 6. 
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likely to be even greater; in the absence of the right to vote, 
the organised group could only communicate and assert their 
preferences. Thus the increasing activities of interest-groups, 
with increasing urbanisation, usually lead to increasing levels 
of public expenditures. 
We have discussed above the different reasons why urbanisation 
is likely to increase the level of government expenditure. 
Dr. Mesmer's simple correlation exercise, as pointed out in 
chapter II, Section I, shows a high significant positive 
correlation between government expenditure as a percentage of 
G. N. P. and the degree of urbanisation; and it appears from his 
scatter diagram showing the relationship between G/y and the 
degree of urbanisation, that the rate of increase of G/y with 
relation to that of degree of urbanisation can at its extreme 
be constant, if not diminishing. As already mentioned, urban- 
isation seems to increase at a diminishing rate with increasing 
level of income. Therefore, our hypothesis of a diminishing 
rate of growth of G/y with an increasing level of income is 
highly likely. 
(f) Diminishing rate of growth of capital expenditures. 
The economic development of a country depends on various 
factors. Growth of real per capita income, as has been suggested 
by various growth theorists, depends upon various factors besides 
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Q 
capital, `i. e technological changes, supply of natural resources, 
entrepreneurial initiative, mobility of labour, fiscal and 
monetary policy pursued, political conditions, social 
institutions, '-rate of growth of population, etc. Nevertheless, 
it-is-usually accepted by the policy makers as well as by the 
economists' that capital formation is one of the most important 
determinants of economic growth. 
In an underdeveloped economy, voluntary saving and capital 
formation in the private sector would be much lower than they 
would be in a-developed economy, because of various reasons 
to be -discussed'below. 
Since the level of real per capita income in an underdeveloped 
economy is low; the margin of income which people would save 
after satisfying the minimum necessities of life is likely to 
be very low. As the propensity to save is very low, the amount 
of saving available for capital formation is, therefore, also 
extremely low. , , "-L, -°I 
1. "Capital is a necessary büt not sufficient condition of 
progress". R. Nurkse, Problems of Capital Formation in 
Underdeveloped Countries, Oxford, Basil Blackwell, 1955, 
page 1. 
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One may argue, however, that because of the existence of 
a greater inequality of income in underdeveloped countries, 
the volume of saving available for capital formation should 
be high. But usually most of the people belonging to the 
highest' income group earn their income from non-entrepreneurial 
sources, such as-rents earned by letting their land for 
cultivation by land-l'ess labourers, and interest gained by 
usuri6us money-lending to small agriculturists for the purpose 
of meeting their emergency consumption needs, e. g. due to 
marriage, ' religious festivals or due to natural calamity of 
flood"or drought, etc. The unearned income from rent and interest 
is disposed of to a considerable extent in conspicuous consumption 
and the rest, which'is saved, is invested to a considerable' 
extent in "unproductive" purposes, e. g. to increase the money- 
lending to small agriculturists for consumption needs, to invest 
further-in land by purchasing land from people who need to sell 
their land for emergency consumption needs, etc. 
In an underdeveloped'country, the industrial profits after 
tax-payments, constitute 'a much`lower'percentage of national 
income than in developed economies. A considerable proportion 
of such industrial profit is usually re-invested in the industry 
giving rise to this profit, or in some other productive investment. 
In-England, -forw-example, in the 19th Century, it was the 
increasing volume of industrial-profit in . the private sector, 
arising mainly from the= maintenance of low wage rates and from 
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the low taxation of profits (probably because the workers had 
very little political influence as the universal suffrage and 
trade unions were lacking) which played an important role in 
the formation of capital during the industrial revolution. 
The course of action taken by Britain in the 19th Century, 
however, is not possible because of the political consciousness 
and influence of low-income groups, nor would it be considered 
"desirable" by the policy makers of the underdeveloped countries. 
The accumulation of saving, as already noted, is very low 
is an underdeveloped country, and that alone does not create 
the most "productive" investment which promotes economic 
growth. The saving could be used for less "productive" 
investments, the rate of return (money or psychic) for which 
may be higher for the individual than the rate of return from 
more "productive" investments, because of the divergence of 
1 
social benefits from private benefits. 
As has already been discussed above, the savings of 
landlords and village money lenders are usually invested in 
"unproductive" investments or in investments for which the 
social marginal productivity is very low. Secondly, investment 
of saving in low "productive" investments takes place because 
of the lack of entrepreneurial initiative, know-how and skill. 
1. By 'productive investment' we mean investment where marginal 
social productivity is greater than zero, and the extent 
of productivity is measured by such a rate of marginal 
productivity. Unproductive investments are those for which 
such rate is less than zero. 
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Thirdly, the uncertain potentialities in an underdeveloped 
country make it extremely difficult to make reasonable 
estimates of the future costs and demand conditions. This, 
therefore, increases the borrower's risk and reduces the 
prospective yields of capital. Fourthly, the low incentive 
to invest is also due to thelack of external economies, 
e. g. lack of skilled workers, auxiliary industries, transport 
and communications, etc. The investment in social and 
economic overheads, which will create external economies and 
provide incentives to private enterprise, would not be 
undertaken by many individuals, because of the great divergence 
between social and private productivity. 
Thus, domestic voluntary saving in an underdeveloped 
country is very low and productive investments by the 
domestic private sector, which would promote rapid economic 
growth, is likely to be even lower. 
Besides, the inflow of foreign private capital, which 
would not be reflected in governments' budgets (and thus 
would not increase government expenditure as a share of 
G. N. P. ) to the developing economies has been relatively very 
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stagnant because of the various reasons. 
1 
It may be argued that the inflow of foreign private 
capital to the developing countries would be relatively high 
because of the availability of cheap labour and unexploited 
natural resources. Because of these factors it may be thought 
that capital-output ratio would be smaller in a developing 
economy than a similar ratio in a developed economy; and 
therefore capital would be attracted to the developing economies. 
1. "The unsatisfactory rate of growth of exports of less 
developed countries in recent years has been accompanied 
by a similar trend in the inflow of private long-term 
capital to these countries. For the post-war period as a 
whole, the inflow of such capital shows a clearly rising 
trend, it reached a peak in 1956-57 as a result of some 
extraordinary investment in the Venezuelan oil industry. 
If Venezuela is exluded (and also some countries in the 
overseas franc area for which data is not available) the 
annual rate of inflow of private long-term capital into 
less developed countries is slightly higher in 1961-62 
thanin. either 1956-57 or the five year period 1956-60, 
reaching a total of about $1.4 billion. While private 
long-term,. investment has not risen appreciably, there has 
been a very substantial increase in the inflows on 
.,,:, account of government grants and loans". The quotation 
comes from "The Annual Report of the International 
, 
Monetary Fund", as quoted in Mr.. D. Horwitz's article 
"Accelerated Growth and the Pattern of Government 
Expenditure". Mr. Horwitz also provides several reasons 
for such relatively small and stagnating flow of private 
-foreign capital to the developing economies. 
See 
D. Horwitz, "Accelerated Growth and Pattern of Government 
Expenditure! ', incorporated in Government Finance and 
Economic Development, edited by Alan T. Peacock and 
G. Hauser, O. E. C. D., Paris, 1965. 
._ý_ 
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But the economies due to the availability of , cheap. 
labour 
and/or unexploited natural resources may be more than 
outweighed by the lack of external economies, e. g. lack of 
transport and communication, auxiliary industries, skilled 
workers, technical facilities, etc. This, therefore, reduces 
the incentive to invest in the developing economies. Second, 
the risk of nationalisation of foreign industries, 
restrictions imposed-, on the repatriation of profits, political 
instability,, etc. further reduces incentives to invest in 
the developing countries. Third, the lack of developed 
money and capital markets and stock exchanges in the under- 
developed countries reduces the flow of private foreign 
capital to those countries.: Fourth, the. uncertain potentialities 
already. mentioned, also reduces the incentives to invest. 
Fifth, in the developed economies besides the existence of 
the above-mentioned. facilities in which the developing economies 
are. deficient,, various other factors provide incentives to 
invest in already industrialised countries. To mention a 
few,. the-. technological changes, e. g., the introduction of 
automation. whichrworks-in two directions, i. e. "(a) quicker 
obsolescence and a need for re-equipment of whole industries; 
and (b) a higher, unit. of, fixed capital per worker", 
1 
and the 
1. 'D. Horwitz,. op., cit., pages 63-64. 
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expanding ancliversified market due to increasing standards 
of living and population increases, have enormously 
increased the demand for capital. The fast growth in 
population even in the developed economies, with a few 
exceptions, also"increases the demand for capital equipment 
for its integration in the machinery of production. Whereas, 
the probable reduction in unequal distribution of 
income seems to decrease the share of income saved (the 
marginal propensity to save of higher income group is usually 
assumed to be higher than that of the lower income groups) and 
available for investment. All these different factors provide 
an incentive to invest in already developed countries and 
retard the flow of private foreign capital to the developing 
economies. 
As has been already said, it is Usually accepted by the 
policy'makers that capital formation is one of the most 
important determinants of economic growth and at the same 
time rapid economic growth is accepted as one of the main 
objectives to be achieved. But, as shown above, voluntary 
saving in an underdeveloped 'economy is likely to be very low 
and 'productive investments' which would promote rapid economic 
growth would`be even lower. The inflow of private foreign capital 
which would not be reflected in government budgets and 
expenditures, has been relatively very low and stagnant. Under 
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these circumstances, a government, in order to achieve high 
rate of capital formation, would resort on the one hand to 
the device of forced savings through different methods, and 
on the other hand would try to attract foreign aid (loan or 
grants) from governments of developed countries and/or 
international institutions, both of which would be reflected 
in the government budget and would increase government 
expenditure as a share of G. N. P. 
As regards the device of forced saving, ä government may 
adopt various methods, i. e. high taxation by the imposition 
of new taxes or increases in the rates of existing taxes, 
public borrowing at some positive rate of interest or zero 
rate of interest (i. e. deficit financing through new money 
creation), and direct physical controls. Each of these has 
its advantages and disadvantages. Usually a combination of 
these different methods is used, depending upon the circumstances 
and objective function to be maximised by the policy-makers. 
How should ä government choose a particular combination of 
such methods? Can a government succeed in providing 'more 
and better' capital investments? Do the problems due to 
the lack of enterprise, administrative ability, know-how and 
skill etc:, --make°the-government investment equally (or even 
more) inefficient? These questions are outside the scope of 
our study and no attempt, therefore, is being made to provide 
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answers to them. We intend simply to point out that the 
device o£ forced saving resorted to to achieve high capital 
formation usually raises government expenditures. 
Similarly, the questions regarding the optimum level and 
distribution of foreign aid to underdeveloped countries, are 
outside the scope of this study, and so we do not intend to 
discuss them. We intend simply to point out that the flow 
of governmental aid (loans or grants) from the developed 
countries and international institutions, e. g. I. B. R. D., to 
the underdeveloped countries has increased enormously in the 
last decade. 1 Such aid is usually channelled through the 
governments of developing countries, and therefore, increases 
their government budgets or expenditures. 
But with an increasing level of real per capita income 
some of the factors which are responsible for the very low 
level of domestic or foreign private capital formation, and 
which therefore necessitates the financing of capital expansion 
through fiscal means, become less and less significant. For 
example, with increasing real per capita income, voluntary 
saving is likely to increase unless one assumes that marginal 
propensity to consume is equal to or greater than one. With 
1. "The flow of governmental capital from the highly developed 
and industrialised countries under the aegis of Development 
Assistance Committee of O. E. C. D. to developing countries 
throughout the world rose from $3.2 billion in 1956 to 
06 billion in 1961, while private investment stagnated during 
the same period at some , $2.5 billion per annum. " Horwitz 
op. cit., page 63. 
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the increasing spread of education, the upper income groups' 
income from non-entrepreneurial sources, such as interest 
gained by money lending at a very high rate of interest to 
the small agriculturists or to other low-income groups to 
meet their emergency consumption needs, e. g. due to marriages 
or religious festivals, diminishes. With the spread of 
irrigation and flood-control projects, the money-lending to 
small agriculturists for the natural calamies of floods or 
drought also diminishes. The psychic rate of return on 
investments in land or gold ornaments, which usually provide 
'social status' in an underdeveloped country, seems to 
diminish with the increasing level of economic development 
and education. As the demand and rate of return on such very 
low 'productive investment' diminishes, inducement to invest 
in some more productive investment increases. To a large 
extent, know-how, skill and enterprise are increasing functions 
of the level of economic development and education. Increasing 
availabilities of external economies (e. g. transport and 
communication, auxiliary industries, skilled workers, etc. 
), 
developing money and capital markets and stock exchanges 
would provide an increasing incentive to private (domestic 
or foreign) investments, with the increasing level of real 
income. Thus, some of the factors which necessitate the 
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financing of capital expenditure through-fiscal means in an 
underdeveloped country become less and less significant; 
and, therefore, the incentive to a government for the public 
financing of some of the capital expenditures would diminish 
with increasing levels of economic development. Besides, 
foreign governmental aid as a proportion of G. N. P., which 
increases governmental expenditure, by and large seems to 
diminish with increasing real per capita income (though such 
aid depends largely on political factors). Furthermore, 
foreign aid-as a proportion of G. N. P. diminishes even if the 
per capita aid remains constant or even if it increases, if 
the rate of increase of such aid is lower than the rate of 
increase of per capita income. 
On both grounds, therefore, there is ä strong presumption 
that the räte'of growth of capital expenditures by a government 
is a decreasing function of the level of economic development, 
and, because of this, 'a diminishing rate of increase of G/y 
with relation to the rate of increase - of real per capita 
incöme-may" operate; 
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(g) "Private Opulence", and "Public Squalor". 
Professor Galbraith in his "The Affluent Society" observes 
the ever-increasing disparity between the flow of private and 
public goods and services with increasing affluence in the 
American economy, where "public poverty completed on the 
whole successfully, With , the stories of ever-increasing opulence 
in privately produced goods". 
1 Several fascinating examples 
, are given-to show.. how the supply of public-goods and services 
-.. has been neglected with-increasing private opulence. 
Professor Galbraith gives several reasons for distortions 
in 'social balance' - defined as 'a satisfactory relationship 
between the, supply of-privately produced goods and services 
and those of the state'. 
2 But the causes of I'social imbalance" 
viz., 'the truce-on equality and the tendency to inflation'3 
could apply not only to an affluent society but also equally 
well, to an underdeveloped economy with. very low-per capita 
income;, because of. which,., statements suchýas '... wealth 
in privately produced goods is, to a_marked degree, the cause 
1. J. K. Galbraith, The Affluent Society, Hanish Hamilton, 
"' Londöin l' June, 1961, page 196. 
2. Ibid., page 198. 
3. Ibid; page 203; 
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of crises in the supply of public services', and 'the 
inherent. tendency will always be for public services to fall 
behind private production'2 do not necessarily follow from 
his analysis of ', social. imbalance'. In what followes, we 
have rephrased some of his arguments and have added some 
others to. show that 'inherent tendency'. 
As has been already shown in our previous discussions, 
the public goods and services are usually different in nature 
from the private goods and services. The, private goods and 
services are. usually supplied on a quid pro quo basis and the 
transactions in the private sector are voluntary. But no such 
quid pro quo relationship= exists for most of the public goods 
and services because. Qf, the indivisible, nature of. the benefits 
provided by public expenditure, so that they are not subject to 
the 'exclusion principle'3and also because of the redistribution 
considerations. The payments. made by an individual to finance 
provision of public goods and services. are also usually 
compulsory, because no one would pay for such services 
voluntarily since his payment or non-payment would hardly affect 
the total provision of. public goods and services. 
1. Ibid., page 195. 
2. Ibid., page 203. 
3. R. A. Musgrave, The Theory of Public Finance, op. cit. 
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Thereföre, because of the quid pro quo relationship in 
the private sector, when an individual buys certain goods or 
services, he usually knows the costs and benefits of such 
transaction. He is also quite aware of the costs or taxes 
which heindividually pays for financing the provision of 
public goods and services, taxes being considered as a 
'burden' because of their compulsive nature, and because of 
the absence of a direct quid pro quo. People are well aware 
of the "direct" taxes paid by them; and even the "indirect" 
taxes cannot'be imposed-and collected without being noticed 
and felt by the people, although to some extent they may be 
'hidden'. Firstly, the producers and retailers'or wholesalers 
who collect such indirect taxes are fully aware of such taxes 
and they also beär'to some extent the "incidence"; and 
secondly, because the consumers, whezi charged higher prices 
for the taxed products, are being persuaa d'by the sellers in 
an attempt to justify the'fact'that increases in prices are 
due to such taxes, sobecoming aware öf'the existence and 
'burden' of such taxes. In'cöntrast to the costs and benefits 
of private transactions and taxes raised to finance public 
expenditure, of which people are to a large extent aware, they 
are usually quite ignorant of the'benefits, especially the 
remote and intangible ones, derived from such expenditure. 
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This is so, firstly because of the absence of a quid-pro- 
, quo relationship for public goods and services, and secondly 
because the opportunity cost in money or time of gathering 
. information-about benefits, especially the remote ones, of 
vast and. -complex-public expenditures is too high. 
1 Besides, 
whatever information they: gather about such. benefits are 
likely to be, discounted at a , very high rate, particularly where 
the remote. benefits are concerned. The information gathered 
is.; usually.. free and so is likely to be highly biased or 
-persuasive in character. The high probability of being 
-falsely 
informed, 
-and{also the uncertainty about 
the 
continuation of a, goyernment's policy (either because of the 
change of=a governing party or because of some other contingencies), 
the continuation. of"policy being necessary for the provision of 
some future. or remote benefits (e. g. -the recent scrapping of 
T. S. R. 2. by-labour. government in the U. K. ), lead to the 
people's heavy, discount of. remote benefits of government 
expenditures. A government therefore, in its self-interest of 
maximisation of-its life, would-neglect public expenditures as 
a whole and especially curtail those expenditures which provide 
remote benefits. 
2 
1. Anthony Downs, An'Economic Theory of Democracy, part II, and 
"Why the Government Budget is too small in a Democracy', 
World Politics, vol. XII, July 1960. 
2. See also Anthony Downs, "Why the Government Budget is too 
small in a Democracy', op. cit., and Andic and Veverka, 
op. cit. 
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This would-be. the case, with both developed and under- 
developed: economies. But with increasing levels of income, 
the increasing-role of advertisement in the private sector 
and the increasing. 'remoteness' of benefits from government 
expenditure, as are discussed below, would tend to slow down 
the rate of growth of government expenditure. 
In, an underdeveloped economy, private wants largely 
-consist, of wants for the minimum necessities of life, and to 
a large : extent such wants are. satisfied by goods. produced 
either at home or bartered-locally. In the non-monetized 
sector, advertisement has virtually no, role to-. play. In the 
monetized sector also,, the. goods which are vulnerable to 
-advertisement for sale are very few. Therefore, advertisement 
in the-private sector:, is negligible. But in a developed 
, economy, advertisement 
is, the basis of, mass production and 
,: sale. "Even., private goods which provide remote, benefits, or 
benefits over -a long.; period, are advertised in, such a way as 
to-. make their benefits appear immediate; their purchase also 
is facilitated by-highly advertised-hire-purchase systems. 
But no government, either in a developed or underdeveloped 
-economy, -could afford.. to. spend., its. revenue on advertising 
the 
benefits from public expenditures, because such advertisement 
would, lead to charges . of. wastage. of--public money. 
Nor can a 
aý _r 
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government, linlc the taxes with the benefits received because 
of the reasons already-stated. The increasing importance of 
advertisement for private,. goods. and services only, therefore, 
tends to slow down the growth of public expenditures in 
relation to the increasing level of income. 
Second,,, with-the. increasing level of real per capita 
income,, the, social and-economic structure grows more complex, 
mainly. -because: -of specialisation about the division of labour 
which also increases productivity-and per capita income.. But 
as pointed., out by Downs, as society . grows. more complex 
the 
"remoteness'!,, of benefits;, from public goods and services 
increases. To, quote. Downs,. 'this tendency is most obvious in 
international affairs...... it. becomes harder and harder for even 
experts to keep-well-informed on possible benefits to be gained 
from government policies, including those on the local scene, 
..... it also-makes each field of action more remote from the 
ken of the average man. ; 
Faced. -with a gigantic maze of 
government agencies, each . grappling. with 
incredibly intricate 
problems..,.... he wraps himself in n-a mantle of rational 
ignorance,, insulated from knowledge of. increasingly important 
remote benefits by the increasingly high cost of finding 
about them. "1; But, as already nentioned, it is in the self-interest 
1. A., Downs, -'"Why, the Government Budget is too Small 
in a 
Democracy", op. cit., pages 561-562. 
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of. a government to neglect especially those expenditures 
which provide remote benefits because people are usually 
ignorant about them. However, the taxes which would be 
required to finance the provision of "hidden" remote benefits 
cannot be hidden, and no one likes to pay taxes. Thus, as 
the remoteness of benefits of public goods and services tends 
to increase with increasing levels of economic development and 
with higher G/y, the relative growth of public expenditure with 
relation to that of per capita income tends to diminish. 
Therefore, the factors discussed above, i. e. the effects 
of, the increasing role of advertising and increasing remoteness 
of benefits of public expenditures, also provide strong 
support for our hypothesis of a diminishing rate of growth of 
G/y with an increasing level of real-per capita income. 
(ii) Explanations for the importance of geo-raph -cal 
location. 
From the scatter diagram of the cross-section data, given 
in chapter III, it is apparent that the geographical location 
of a country could influence the level of public expenditure. 
We observed that the Latin American countries are usually 
below the regression curve fitted in chart No. 1, whereas the 
Asian and African countries are usually above the curve. In 
our time-series approach too, the similarities, with respect 
to the growth and time pattern of public expenditure, between 
different countries are found to be more pronounced between 
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the countries which are geographically close to each other. 
(See chapter IV, section VI (4)). 
The explanation of the importance of geographical location 
seems to be that the "demonstration effect" is very strong 
amongst the neighbouring countries. A government's policies 
are likely to be more influenced by the policies pursued 
in the neighbouring countries than by the policies pursued 
by distant countries. The political attitude towards 
government expenditure could also be an important factor. The 
Asian and African countries probably are more 'socialistic' than 
the Latin-American countries, which again could be due to 
their "geographical location" and "demonstration effect". 
II. Plausible Explanations for the Statistical Observations 
and Hypotheses from Time-Series Approach. 
(i) Explanations for the 'shifts' in the 
expenditure associated with War and/o 
vernment 
the Great Depression 
In the last chapter, our statistical observations 
suggested a significant positive shift in the regression 
function of GC on Yc (or a 'displacement effect') associated 
with World War (18t and/or 2nd) in the case of each country 
included in our example which took direct part in War. Such 
a shift was also observed to be associated with the Great 
Depression in the case of the United States and Canada, which 
were most affected by that social upheaval. Now the question 
is: what could be the plausible explanations for such shifts? 
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As regards the shifts associated with the wars, 
Peacock's and Wiseman's explanation of the "displacement 
effect" (which relates to such shifts), based basically on 
the concept of the tolerable burden of taxation seems 
reasonable. We discussed the concept of the tolerable burden 
of taxation in some detail in Chapter II, Section II, and 
accepted that such a concept provides a plausible explanation 
for a 'shift', if that shift is associated with a social 
upheaval, such as war, during which people get accustomed to 
a higher burden of taxation which continues even after the 
disappearance of that upheaval. 
But as was argued in the above-mentioned chapter, and also 
emphasised in section I(i) of this chapter, the 'shift' 
associated with the Great Depression in the case of the United 
States and Canada cannot e explained by that concept. Taxes 
are rather cut down during severe depression and the concept 
of-the-tolerable-burden of taxation, in that case, would 
suggest a I'shift' in the downward, direction. 
It seems highly likely that the 'shift' associated with 
Great Depression occurred because. of the change in the 
attitude towards public expenditure. Many 'new' expenditures 
which were not considered very desirable became highly 
'desirable' due to the 'inspection process' generated by the 
Great Depression.. The deficiencies in the social services of 
which government and people were not conscious, were brought to 
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direct public notice. Besides, the adverse-effects of 
depression were not limited to a particular sector of the 
community but hit almost everybody. The Depression like 
the World Wars produced a feeling of community and thus 
encouraged expansion of the public sector which was accepted 
as a measure to cure, deficiency in aggregate demand and 
the consequent, mass unemployment. Thus, there were radical 
changes in the accepted ideas about the proper role of a 
government. 
Because of the shift in the attitude, towards public 
expenditures many 'new' expenditures especially in the field of 
welfare services, 
. 
subsides,. and assistance came to, be regarded 
by people and also by the government as highly desirable. A 
similar shift in the tolerable burden of taxation is unlikely 
to have-occurred during depression, the increased expenditure 
during depression being financed mostly by deficit financing. 
' 
1. See G. Colm and-N. Helzner, "The Structure of Government 
Revenue and Expenditure in Relation to the Economic Develop- 
ment of the United States", in L'Importance et la Structure 
des Recettes et des Depenses Publigues, International 
Institute of Public Finance, Brussels, 1960. The authors point 
out the importance of War and Great Depression for the time 
-pattern of growth of expenditure in the United States. Their 
explanation in this respect, is similar to ours. They state 
. 
that "the traditional-resistance to central government control 
has weakened only in times of war or serious depression. 
'Thus, government functions do not always respond gradually to 
the needs of an industrial and urban (suburban) society. An 
-increase in government activity or responsibility often 
depends on events happening which dramatise the need for such 
, measures and help to overcome traditional resistance", page 
60-61, quoted from Peacock and Wiseman, op. cit., page xxxi. 
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In other words, it may be said that there was a big 
increase in the existing gap between the 'desirable' level 
of public expenditure and 'tolerable' burden of taxation 
during the Depression, since ashift in the desirable level 
of public expenditure occurred without a corresponding 
shift in the tolerable burden of taxation. An-increase in 
this 'gap seems to have permitted the acceptance of new 
taxes and the consequent increase in the tolerable burden 
(and thus a decrease in-the 'gap') after-the Depression 
was over, which explains. partly the continuance of a level 
of. public expenditure higher than that prevalent before the 
Depression. Besides, debt financing also contributed to 
the prevalence of a higher level of public expenditure 
during the thirties in the case of the United States and 
Canada. 
Although Peacock's and Wiseman's explanation of the 
displacement effect of war is. basically founded on the 
concept of the tolerable burden of taxation, they also 
recognise the importance of other factors such as changes 
in the attitude towards public expenditure and technical 
innovations in the revenue-raising activities because of an 
'inspection effect' of war. It is argued that wars, by 
generating, an inspection process, have been the means of 
directing public attention to the deficiencies in public 
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services such as education and health, of which citizens 
as-well as government were formerly less conscious. Besides, 
war generates, community feeling which encourages expansion 
of the'public sector. Thus wars often change the attitude 
towards. public expenditure and many 'new' public expenditures 
(e. g'. National Health Service in the case of Britain during 
World, 'haar II)-become'highly desirable due to the inspection 
process. The same process, because of the urgent need to 
increase government revenues, produces improvement in tax 
administration and,, widens tax opportunities for a government 
(e. g, the pay-as-you-earn system of income tax and purchase 
tax were introduced during World War II in Britain). Such 
changes in the tax system improve the government's permanent 
revenue-raising potentialities. 
:y : Thus the, displacement effect"of, war (or a shift in the 
level of public expenditure with. relation to economic 
growth) couldthave'occurred due to various factors operating 
through both the revenue and expenditure side of the fiscal 
system. During war people accept new tax levels andmethods 
of raising tax revenues, formerly considered intolerable, 
and this acceptance remains, even after the upheaval has 
disappeared because people get accustomed to the new burden 
of taxation. Such a shift in peoples' ideas about tolerable 
burden of taxation provides opportunities for a government to 
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undertake-new expenditures which otherwise it would not 
dare to undertake.. But at. the same time, the consequence 
of, the, changes favourable attitudes towards public 
expenditures because of the. ''inspection process' generated 
by, war, could not be-neglected. The changed ideas about 
public expenditure undoubtedly facilitated the continuance 
of higher-post-war levels and new methods of taxation and 
thus the, higher levels of-public expenditure. 
Thus our explanations of, the displacement of effect of 
war are not incompatible, with those of. the displacement 
effect of the Great Depression. 
1 The forces operating 
through the revenue and expenditure side of the fiscal 
system are basically the same in both cases. The difference 
lies only in degree., A shift in people's ideas about 
tolerable burden of_taxation is possibly of greater significance 
for a displacement. effect of war; but at the same time as 
shown above, the changed favourable-attitude towards public 
1. It may also be said that, as in the case of Duesenberry's 
consumption functions-there is a 'ratchet effect' 
operating also for the behaviour of public expenditure. 
(See J. S.. Duesenberry: Income, saving and the Theo 
of Consumer Behaviour, Harvard University Press, 191f9). 
Once the government expenditure is shifted to a 
higher level, due to whatever reasons (such as 
; war and/or 
Depression), it never comes back to the 
previous level. This 'ratchet effect' could be due to 
the reasons such as habituation to new tax levels and/or 
changed favourable attitude towards public expenditure. 
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expenditure'due"to an irispect'ion'process generated by 
war cannot be ignored. 'IFor the displacement effect of 
the Great Depression a shift in people's ideas about the 
desirable level of public expenditure, because of the 
inspection process generated by Depression, could be 
considered of greater significance, but 'as' argued'in 
chapter II, section II, the implementation of such ideas 
was possible, ' because of the feasibility of incurring 
higher'expenditures without increasing the total 'burden' 
of financing such expenditures. 'Ä substäritial'part of 
total financing was mit by `debt -financing, the 'burden' or 
opportunity cost-of which may be cönsidered'almost zero' 
during the period of severe depression. 'Thus, by expanding 
the concept of the tolerable burden so' as to include not 
only that of taxes but also that of'other methods of 
financing, it can be maintained that the public expenditures 
are determined largely by the bürden 6f finäribing such 
expenditures. 
In the previous paragraphs; 'Our possible explanations of 
au c3isplacement-effect are founded basically on a priori 
grounds. We provide below some justification for our 
explanation on empirical grounds. 
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Recently, Eva Mueller has tried to measure people's 
attitudes towards government expenditures and taxes on the 
basis of several sample surveys, in each of which a nation- 
wide cross-section of households in the United States was 
selected forýinterview. 
1, Her sample surveys, like any 
others, have obvious limitations (such as sampling errors, 
the answers received being influenced by the wordings of 
the questions, etc. ) Her findings are confined to the 
attitude of American citizens only which makes it difficult 
to draw clear cut conclusions about the attitudes of 
peoples of other countries with different political, social 
and economic structures. Nevertheless, it m ay be pointed 
out here that her empirical findings (although strictly 
speaking limited to the attitudes of, American households) 
provide some support to the analytical explanations given 
above. 
First, it is shown by her empirical investigation that' 
people. usually have favourable attitude towards government 
expenditure. A substantially large'majority of people like 
1. See Eva Mueller, Public-Attitude toward Fiscal Program, 
Quarterly Journal of Economics, May 1963, pages 210-235. 
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to have higher government expenditure. 
1 
Although there is a strong desire for the extention 
of government expenditure for a number of government 
activites, only a small minority of the people interviewed 
would like to tolerate additional taxes. The coexistence 
` 
of favourable attitudes-'- oward additional expenditures with 
the dislike of additional taxes has been recently verified 
in Germany and Sweden too by Gunter Schmolders. 
3 
1. "To- quote Eva Mueller, 'The'enquiry began by'handing 
respondants a card showing a list of eleven "things 
on which the government spends money". ...... only 6 per cent of the people interviewed did not think that 
any of the governiment programs enumdrated should be 
enlarged. Sixteen per cent checked the answer "more" 
only once or twice, about half checked it three to six 
times, and a fourth checked it seven times or more. 
.... * these distributions of answers clearly point to 
widespread support for many government programs'. 
Page 213-214, op. cit. 
2. The explanation-that each--, citizen would prefer less' 
spending for some government programs in order to allow 
greater spending for others, in which he is interested, 
is contradicted by Eva Mueller's findings, which show 
. 
(Table II of her study) that for "only three out of 
fourteen major government programs is there a sizeable 
group of people who advocate a reduction in spending, 
while for the remaining eleven programs the group 
favouring increased spendingýis much larger than the 
group favouring out-backs. " 
3. See Gunter Schmolders, Da s`Irrationale"in der Offentlichen 
Finanzwertschaft (Hamburg: Rowohlt, 1960, ) quoted 
from footnote 2 on page 223 of Eva Mueller's study, op. cit. 
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Thus, as argued above, a gap usually exists between 
the people's notions about the 'desirable' level of public 
expenditure and the 'tolerable' burden of taxation. 
Secondly,, it was argued above that the displacement 
effect of war was mainly due to the acceptance of the new 
higher tax levels of war-time even after the disappearance 
of the upheaval because people got accustomed to the new 
burdens of taxation. Eva Mueller's empirical findings provide 
support for this view. She states that the prevailing levels 
of taxes in the United States could be due to 'habituation'. 
Her empirical observation runs as follows: 'Congress enacted 
a tax increase in September 1950. Although this increase 
was occasioned by war, 40 per cent of the people were of 
the opinion in June 1951 that taxes should be reduced, and 
another 40 per cent argued that no further increases should 
be made. Most significantly, about 60 per cent explained 
spontaneously in 1951 that 'taxes already are high". This 
figure stands in sharp contrast to the 20 per cent who 
gave a similar response in 1961'. It is shown that such 
habituation exists also for the prevailing levels of debts, 
although. dislike for an increase in deficits exists as well. 
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Thirdly, our a priori arguments suggested that a 
separation between people's, ideas about the 'tolerable' 
burden of taxation and the desirable level of public 
expenditure cannot always be made. People's ideas about 
the 'tolerable, ' burden are , 
determined partly by their_, views 
about the,, 'desirability' of public expenditures. Eva Mueller's 
empirical findings, while providing evidence for the existence 
of a gap between two sorts of. ideas, clearly points to, 
'some willingness to accept tax increases' (or a higher tax 
burden).. for the programs which are viewed as "important" 
(or, highly desirable). The findings summarised in Table I 
of her study "show that half of the people interviewed said 
that they were prepared to pay additional taxes in order to 
make possible large outlays on two or more government 
-x , 
programs", "with 41 per cent favouring greater outlays on 
education, even if these additional outlays would require tax 
increases". 1 
Our explanation of the displacement effect of the Great 
Depression is basically in terms of a shift in the attitude 
towards public expenditure. We argued that, because of the 
1. 
} 
See Eva Mueller, op. cit., pages 22, and 217. It is 
apparent from her findings that "people's reactions to 
any proposed tax change would be strongly influenced by 
the reasons for the tax change and the political and 
economic circumstances under which it occurred". 
(Page 224). 
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inspection process generated by that upheaval, many new 
expenditures came to be regarded as highly desirable by the 
people. The radical change in the accepted ideas about the 
role of government could have inspired willingness to accept 
tax increases after the recovery started. 
1 This seems to 
us a plausible explanation for the continuance of a level 
of public expenditure higher than that experienced before 
the Great Depression. Eva Mueller's empirical findings, 
with regard to people's attitude toward taxes, discussed in 
the previous paragraph, provide some support for our 
explanation. 
(ii) Explanations for changes in the rate of growth of 
Gc with relation to that of Y 
- 
In our time-series analysis in chapter IV, we, observed 
also, a significant change in the rate of growth of, Gc with 
relation to YC associated with each major social upheaval 
-in the case of each country., included in our study. 
However, 
with regard to the direction of change in the rate of growth 
Gc, no generalisation can be made. It., diminished after 
the 
shifts associated with World Wars in the case of the United 
-Kingdom. - In the case of Germany also it diminished after 
1. It is also demonstrated. in Eva Mueller's study, op. cit., 
that "certain aspects of the preference system for 
public goods and services are not clearly crystallised 
in the consumer's mind; hence these attitudes have 
elements of inconsistency and may change easily under 
the impact of new information or new circumstances", 
page 211. 
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the shifts associated with the 1st World War and the social 
upheaval of the thirties and the second World War. It 
diminished also after the shift associated with the Great 
Depression in the case of the United States and Canada. But 
the rate of growth of G increased after the second war in c 
the case of Sweden, the United States and Canada. What could 
be the plausible explanations of these different statistical 
findings, with regard to the change in the rate of growth of 
Gc with relation to that of Yc, for different countries? 
In what follows, we discuss first the plausible 
explanations for a decrease in the rate of growth Gc after{ 
the shifts associated with world wars in the case of the 
United Kingdom and. Germany. 
1 Some of the explanations 
already put forth in section I (i), for the hypothesis of a 
diminishing rate of growth of G/y with an increasing level 
of Yc, suggested by a cross-section approach in chapter III, 
could apply equally well to the statistical observation, 
mentioned above, from the time-series analyses. 
1. In the case of., Germany, aswas shown in chapter IV, 
section V (ii), the second major shift is associated 
with the social upheaval of the thirties and the second 
war. The shift could be-attributed to the consequences 
of-the Great Depression, ' Hitler regime and the second 
world war, which all consecutively exerted their influence 
as major social upheaval. 
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Firstly, our hypothesis concerning, the gap between 
the 'desirable level of public expenditure' and the 
'tolerable burden' of taxation (see Section I (i) (a)) 
may again provide a plausible explanation. It is argued 
elsewhere, that a gap usually exists between 'the desirable 
level of public expenditure' and the 'tolerable burden of 
taxation'; but if such a gap is narrowed, a government in 
its self interest. of maximising its. length of life, would 
have less incentive to raise finance, to, the, extent necessary 
to maintain the previous rate of growth of government 
expenditure. In section III(i) it was pointed out that 
although the changed attitude towards public expenditures 
due to the inspection effects of war, cannot be ignored, a 
shift in the people's ideas about the 'tolerable"burden' 
of taxation is of greater significance for the displacement 
effect of war. Because of such a significant shiftjin 
people's ideas about the tolerable burden of taxation, it 
is highly likely that the gap between the desirable level 
of public expenditure and the 'tolerable burden' was 
narrowed which therefore-suggests, as was observed in the 
case of the United Kingdom, and Germany,, a , 
decrease, 
, 
in the 
rate of growth of Gc with relation to that of Yc" 
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Secondly, the explanation. given in section I (i) 
(c), concerning the difficulties, encountered in: finding ýý. 
new efficient sources of taxation and methods of tax 
collection oryin increasing the rates of=taxation ors the,, 
existing . sources when the taxes are already 
high, may also-, 
provide an, explanation. 
During the` wars, possible.. sources. of_taxation-were, -. 
exploited -andefficiency, in the tax collection-was achieved 
to the extent. that it ; was, possible during. that period..,; 
Most 
of these 
, 
taxes-and methods of collection=continued'even after 
the wars. -, -., It did, not. seem possible to find new efficient 
sources of taxation and methods. of-, collection or. even to 
increase greatly the rates of taxation on the existing, 
sources when-the taxes were already. high, ýso as to 
finance 
the previous rate of-growth of government-expenditure.. 
Besides,, during- the wars-, although elastic. söurces-of 
revenue, for example income-tax, were utilised-as far as 
possible, it. seems, that great, reliance was-also placed on 
bhe indirect-taxes (i. e. commodity taxes such as purchase-" 
taxes which were introduced during world war II in the U. K. 
) 
by imposing new, indirect taxes or increasing the rates of 
the-existing ones. Most of these-indirect taxes continued 
after the-war. But as most, of them are usually less elastic 
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than the direct taxes, the income elasticity of the tax 
structure as a whole became less than it was. before the war. 
Thus, the rate of growth Gc with relation to that of -Yc r, ýko 
possibly,, declined after the war.. 
-Thirdly, the hypothesis that with: an increased level 
of government expenditure with relation to national-output, 
the percentage of people forced to_bear tax 'incidence' 
increases and/or the incidence of increases in tax. revenue 
, . - as a percentage of, national output., 
is,. likely to be 
relatively, heavier. on those on whom it had hitherto. been 
lighter,,, together with the vote maximisation hypothesis-, 
for a government, again may provide a plausible explanation. 
The public expendtire as a percentage of G. N. P. 
increased significantly because of the ! 'shifts" in the--level 
of government expenditure with relation to national output 
associated. with wars. With, such positive , shifts-in-this 
ratio the percentage of people bearing the tax 'burden' 
increased and/or some people on, whom this, burdenýhad 
hitherto been lower were compelled to bear a relatively 
higher. burden of the increase in, tax revenue as a share', of 
G. N. P. 
, 
This was so probably.. because of 
. 
the., disincentive 
effects . of very high_. taxation on, particular groups of 
people and/or because of, the strong opposition and-political 
pressure.. against. the. non-taxation of other groups and also 
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because of the increased efficiency in administration 
and methods of tax collection due to the exigencies of war 
which, enabled the general revision and considerable widening 
of the tax system. In, the United Kingdom, for example, as 
pointed out by Peacock and Wiseman "experience obtained 
during World liar I in the techniques and administrative 
problems of assessing lower income groups for income tax 
provided the foundation for the permanent extension of that 
tax. Similarly, the pay-as-you-earn system, through which 
a considerable proportion of the population, now has income 
tax deducted 
Fat source, was 
introduced during World War II., 
It was during this later period that the purchase tax was 
first 
, 
introduced". 1 Thus it seems highly likely that with 
the positive shifts in the ratio of public expenditure to 
G. N. P., the percentage of people bearing tax 'incidence' 
I increased and/or the tax 'burden' of the increase in 
the, ratio became relatively heavier on those on whom it had 
formerly been, lighter. 
As was argued in section T (i) (b) of this chapter, when 
public expenditure as a percentage of G. N. P. is a small 
proportion, as it was in the pre-lst World War, period in the 
U. K., and also in Germany, an overwhelming majority, of voters 
1. Peacock and Wiseman, op. cit., pages 67-68. 
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will prefer rapid increase of public expenditure because 
the taxes needed to finance such expenditure will not 
usually be borne by them and a government in its self-interest 
of maximising the length of its life will usually pursue 
policies of rapid increase in government expenditure. As 
was shown in the case of the U. K. in chapter IV, section V 
(a), the rate of growth of Gc with relation to that of Yc 
was even more than four times that during the pre 1st war 
period when the ratio G/y was relatively very small. But 
after the 1st war, this expenditure increased by about 
27jä. 
The ratio G/y being higher than it was in the pre-lst war 
period, the taxes needed to finance an increase in G/y were 
to hit some other people too who either escaped taxation 
or on whom the 'burden' was relatively lighter. Thus some 
of those people who supported a rapid increase in G/y could 
not support the previous rate of increase because then they 
probably would have to finance a substantial proportion of 
that increase, but still there was a large majority of 
voters which could gain from a rapid increase in government 
expenditure. The number of voters supporting the increase, 
however, was smaller than it was during the pre-lst war 
period; and the opposition and the disincentive effects 
being stronger, a government in its self interest of 
maximising its length of life could not pursue that rate of 
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increase in Gay which prevailed' during the pre-ist war 
period, and the rate of growth of Gc with relation"tb' 
that of Yc decreased from 4.6 to 2.1. 
It can be said that`for the same reasons, 'the rateof 
growth of government expenditure decreased after the 2nd, War. 
In the case of the 2nd World War, the "shift" wäs''relätively 
large, and accounted for about ? 3961 of the increase in 
government expenditure in the United IUngdom. The shift 
being much greater, and the G%y being ' much higher, the' 
relative decrease in the rate'of growth of Gc 'with relation 
to Yc was even greater after the 2nd World War. It became 
almost unity 
The explanation which we have given above for the 
negative change in the 'rate of growth Gc with jelationto 
that' Iof Yc in the case of the United 'Kingdom, could equally 
apply in the case of Germany. " 
Fourthly, the concept of `a Iproductivity 'lag 'may also 
provide'some explanation, if one thinks thI at this lag' 
diminished after each "World War. 
It is argued that the "productivity lag1t ' in 'the' 
government--services, although it is practically impossible 
to measure such a lag, would account for an important part 
of the growth of government expenditure with relation to 
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national output when both are deflated by indices of prices 
of, private output which assumes almost identical productivity 
changes in both the privateSand°-public sectors. As'pointed 
out by Mrs. Andic and Dr. _Veverka, -"the 
'productivity lag' 
adds to the relative growth , of government expenditure directly 
through a higher relative cost of providing a 'given output, 
and indirectly through a-transfer-of unprofitable sector 
under public control". 
1 It could,, therefore, beýconsidered' 
to be one of the important-factors contributing towards the 
growth of government expenditure with relation to national 
output. 
It seems, however, likely that such a lag for government 
expenditure, as a whole,. diminished after each world war,, 
'-- 
mainly because of two reasons.. Firstly, -it seems likely 
because of the technological innovations in the public 
expenditure field during the wars which were due to the 
urgent need to increase efficiency-or minimise costs in the 
provision of public goods. Secondly, it, seems probable 
because of, -the 
increased share of transfer payments in 
total public expenditure after the shift associated with war. 
1. 
_ 
Mrs. -Andic and-Dr., Veverka, op. cit., page " 
1: C 
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It was shown by Peacock-Wiseman and Andic-Veverka in 
their respective studies that the displacement effect for a 
transfer payment was more'prominent than for the purchase 
of goods and services. 
1 As was argued in section I (i) (d), 
the concept of 'productivity lag' is relevant only for 
government purchases of goods and services. There is no 
reason to assume that the people receiving the transfer 
payments spent such payments on goods and services for which 
productivity is lagging behind. Thus, as the percentage of 
total public expenditure for which such lag may operate 
diminished, its importance as a growth, factor for the 
government expenditure as awhole is likely to have become 
less significant. On both grounds, therefore, it is likely 
that the 'productivity lag' for government expenditure as 
a whole, which could account for an important part of the 
growth of Gc with relation to YC would diminish after the 
wares and this could also be one of the reasons for the 
decrease in such rate of growth of government expenditure 
after wars. 
The explanations offered below for a decrease in the 
rate of growth of Gc with relation to Yc1 after the shift 
associated with the Great Depression in the case of the'United 
States and are basically the-same as those given above. 
1. See Peacock and Wiseman, op, cit., chapter 5, and Andic 
and Veverka, op. cit., Table A. 13 and section IV. 
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The first plausible explanation again could be that' 
the gap between the "desirable" level of public expenditure 
and the "tolerable burden" of taxation was narrowed after 
the "shift" associated with the Great Depression. Such a 
"shift" was explained in the previous section mainly in 
terms of a shift in the people's ideas about desirable 
level of public expenditure because of the inspection process 
generated by the Great Depression. This suggests rather 
an increase in this "gap" during the Depression. But; 
as was argued in that section, the continuance of a higher 
level of public expenditure after the recovery than that 
prevalent before the Depression was due to the possible 
reason that such an increased 'gap' permitted the acceptance 
of new taxes and the consequent increase in the 'tolerable 
burden', which'thus could have decreased the 'gap'. The 
reason which seems more important, however, is that with 
recovery there was an automatic decrease inýsome "welfare" 
expenditures (e. g. unemployment benefits, poor reliefs, etc. ). 
Besides, the desirability of public projects, designed 
specifically to provide employment or public expenditures 
undertaken to provide incentives to private sector 
diminished with recovery. Thus, there was some decrease in 
the 'desirable' level of public expenditure with recovery, 
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which again decreased the 'gap'. A decrease in this gap, 
as argued previously, might possibly have lead to a 
decrease in the rate of growth of government expenditure 
after the shift associated with the Great Depression. 
Besides, with recovery, there was a gradual decrease 
in debt financing. Usually, especially in the United 
States, as was shown by Eva Mueller in her study, negative 
attitudes towards additional deficits have been prevelant. 
1 
Because of this gradual decrease in deficit financing, in 
order to maintain the pre-depression rate of growth of 
government expenditure, the rate of growth of tax revenue 
had to be even higher than the rate during the pre-depression 
time-period. Although a favourable change in the attitude 
towards public expenditure permitted the acceptance of 
some new taxes, a rate of increase in tax revenue, even 
higher than that during the previous time period so as to 
compensate for a decrease in debt financing, which would 
have enabled the maintenance of (or even increase in) 
the previous rate of growth of G with relation to Yc, would 
C 
have imposed a 'burden' too high to be accepted by the people 
at the time when per capita income was still lower than it 
was towards the end of the 1920's. Besides, on the grounds 
1. Eva Mueller, op. cit., page 21. 
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of disincentive effects, such taxation could not have been 
attempted. These, therefore, could be other possible 
reasons for a decrease in the rate of growth of government 
expenditure after a "shift" associated with Depression in 
the case of the United States and Canada. 
Again, it seems likely that with a positive "shift" in 
the level of public expenditure, associated with Depression, 
and a gradual acceptance of 'new' taxes because of the 
desirability of many 'new' expenditures due to the 
inspection process, the percentage of people bearing the tax 
'burden' increased and/or some people on whom such burden 
had been previously relatively lower were compelled to 
bear a relatively higher burden of the increase in tax 
revenue because of the widening of the tax system. This, 
in conjunction with the hypothesis of maximisation of length 
of life for a government, as explained earlier, provides a 
plausible explanation also. The concept of a productivity 
lag may again provide some explanation. It seems likely 
that such a lag could have diminished for government 
expenditure as a whole because of the increased share of 
transfer payments (specifically social insurance payments) 
in total public expenditure during and after the Great 
Depression, which could be another reason for a decrease in 
the rate of growth of G with relation to Y after a major cc 
"shift" in-the level of public expenditure associated with 
Great Depression. 
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In contrast to the negative change in the rate of 
growth of Gc with relation to Yc after the shifts 
associated with major social upheavals, discussed above for 
particular countries, there was a positive change in this 
rate of growth of Gc after the second World War in the case 
of Sweden, the United States and Canada. How could this 
difference be explained? 
In the case of Sweden, which did not participate in 
the war, there was no 'significant' shift in the level of 
government expenditure after the war. The acceptance of a 
higher tolerable burden of taxation which appeared in other 
countries fighting the war and gave rise to such 'shift', 
did not happen in Sweden. 
As has been already explained, such a shift was one 
of the principal causes diminishing the rate of growth of 
government expenditure. It may be said that in Sweden, the 
gap between the desirable level of public expenditure and 
the tolerable burden of taxation was not narrowed because 
no shift in the tolerable burden occurred. She did not 
have the 'benefits' of a displacement effect. Rather such 
a gap seemed to increase due to a "demonstration effect" 
of the high level of government expenditure in the neighbouring 
countries and also because of a change in the attitude 
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towards public expenditures partly due to the Keynsian 
revolution and also because of the acceptance of the ideas 
of 'Social Welfare State' . and of 
the objective of rapid 
economic growth thought to be achieved by an expansion of 
the public sector. 
Thus, the forces which seemed to decrease the rate of 
growth of government expenditure in the U. K. and Germany 
after wars were either absent or operating in the opposite 
direction in Sweden. And the government expenditures could 
increase at a faster rate after the war because of the 
political stability and the expansion of welfare expenditures 
(such as old age, unemployment, sickness benefits, medical 
care, education, etc. ) which helped to circumvent the 
resistence to an increased taxation. 
Our explanations for the increase in the rate of growth 
of GC with relation to Yc after the second World War in the 
case of the United States and Canada are the following. 
Firstly, in both countries such a rate of growth of 
government expenditure before the second World War was much 
less than unity, i. e. the government expenditure as a share 
of G. N. P. was falling with increasing real income. In the 
United Kingdom and Germany, where the rate of growth of Gc 
declined after the "shift" associated with the : Jars, it has 
been well above unity, even after such decline, during the 
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post second war period, i. e. government expenditure as a 
share of G. N. P. has been rising with increasing real 
income, although at a rate much. lower than in the previous 
time-periods. A further decline in the rate of growth of 
GC with relation to Yc, which was already less than unity, 
after the second war in the case of Canada and the United 
States would have accelerated the rate of decrease of 
government expenditure as a share of national output. The 
obvious question which arises is: why did it not happen? 
Although there was a displacement effect of the second 
World War in the case of United States and Canada, as in 
the United Kingdom, the 'shift' in the level of government 
expenditure was much smaller than in the case of the United 
Kingdom. The 'shift' accounts for only a 321% and 34% 
increase in Gc with-relation to Y after the second World C 
War in the case of the United States and Canada respectively, 
whereas for the United Kingdom it accounts for about a 73% 
increase. The government expenditure as a percentage of 
G. N. P. after the 'shift' was much smaller in the United 
States and Canada than the percentage after the second World 
War in the case of the United Kingdom or West Germany. A 
'demonstration effect' would suggest an, increase, rather than 
a decrease, in such percentage, i. e. a rate of growth of 
G with relation to Yc more than one. 
_ 
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Besides there was a comparatively large expenditure 
for defence, because of the additional costs of the cold 
war with Soviet Russia, especially in the case of the 
United States where approximately two dollars out of 
three are spent by the federal government on defence; and 
the emergence of new expenditure, e. g. on space research 
and military and economic aid to the newly independent countries, 
which again could be partly due to the demonstration effect 
from Russia; and the expansion of welfare programmes such as 
help of old and needy people, hospital and medical care, 
etc., have led to increase in the rate of growth of Gc. In 
the case of the United States, this increased rate of growth 
of Gc is mainly due to the warlike federal spending 
i 
necessitated by the competitive coexistence with Russia, 
although there has been also some increase in spending for 
services such as highways and welfare services. 
As shown by Eva Mueller in her study of the attitudes of 
American. people toward fiscal programmes, a large majority of 
American people have favourable attitudes towards major 
government expenditures programmes. In addition to the 
intensification of public concern about national security 
and 'status' which provides wide support for the huge 
1. Ansel N. Sharp and Bernard F. S1iSer, Public Finance, 
chapter III, The Dorsey Press, Homewood, Illinois, 1964. 
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expenditures on defence, space research, military aid, 
etc., the favourable public attitude for these and other 
expenditure programmes are closely connected with the 
'widely held belief' that in order to maintain Keynesian 
full employment level government expenditure 'should' go on 
increasing. The attitudes of the Canadian people-and 
government toward fiscal programmes one would not expect 
to be very different from those in its neighbouring country. 
The Canadian tax and expenditure policies are likely to be 
highly influenced by those of the United States, because of 
the close link between the two countries, not only geographically, 
but also with regard to trade and social background, and also 
because of the great similarities between them as regards 
the economic and socio-political structure. 
The increase in the different expenditure programmes 
so as to make the rate of growth G with relation to Yc 
more thantwo has been, however, possible because of the 
higher income elasticity of the tax structure as a whole. It 
was during World War II that there was considerable broadening 
of the income tax base and an increase in tax rates, which 
increased the elasticity of the tax structure as a whole. 
Besides, even the import duties are highly income elastic 
in the case of Canada because of the high propensity to 
import (especially investment goods). The high income 
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elasticity of the tax structure seems to have facilitiated 
the high rate of. growth of Go with relation to Y0. in both 
countries without a substantial increase in tax rates, 
i. e. without a. significant increase, in the 'tolerable burden' 
of taxation, if such a burden refers to tax rating. 
III. Compatibility of the Statistical Findings and 
Techniques used in two different approaches. 
Our study is based on two independent approaches, viz., 
cross-section and time-series approaches, the objectives of 
which are different. As already noted, in the cross-section 
approach we were primarily concerned with an examination of 
the relationship between government expenditure as a share 
of G. N. P. and real per capita income; whereas in the time- 
series studies the primary objective was to study the 
time-pattern of public expenditure with relation to economic 
growth or to examine the effects of social upheavals 
on the 
level and rate of growth of public expenditure with relation 
to economic growth. The objectives were different and our 
statistical analysis led to two different sets of statistical 
findings and inductive hypotheses. 
There are also differences in the statistical findings 
for different countries included in our time-series approach. 
One cannot expect the effects of different social upheavals 
to be identical for each country irrespective of different 
economic and socio-political structures. The explanations 
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offered in the preceding section for the statistical 
findings in the case of each country included in the time- 
series studies provide some plausible reasons for the 
difference in findings'for different countries. 
In this section we discuss below whether the results 
obtained and the statistical technique employed by one 
approach axe cömpatible with those of the other approach. 
The regression function used for cross-section analysis 
was a polynomial double-logarithmic function which showed 
that the average' relationship is that of aIdiminishing 
rate of increase'of'G/y-with relation to the rate of 
increase of real pe'rcapita income. 'But in our time-series 
we used a linear double-logarithmic function which measures 
a constant rate of increase of government expenditure with 
relation to that of real per capita income. ' Could such 
different functions, used for different approaches, be 
considered logically compatible? The complex polynomial 
function, 'of course, was not`used in our time-series studies 
because 'of the small size of our sample (i. e. the number of 
pairs of observations of Gc and Yc) for each sub-period into 
which the whole time-period was divided. Such ' a' function, 
even if it had been fitted, statistical'jüstification of 
which lies in the explanation of significant additional 
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variance, would hardly have been justified on the basis 
of the statistical tests. Besides, the use of a polynomial 
function would have made the measurement and tests of 
significance of the "effects" of social upheaal highly 
complex. We chose, therefore, the linear (in terms of 
logarithms) function for the time-series studies. Nevertheless, 
the different functions chosen for different approaches 
could be considered compatible on the following grounds. 
In the time-series studies, where the linear double 
logarithmic, function was used for different sub. time-periods 
into which the whole time-period for a country was divided, 
each sub-period. for a country covers,. only a short span of 
the level of economic development whereas the cross-section 
sample, for which a polynomial double logarithmic function 
was chosen, includes countries from different stages of 
economic development. The span or the range of the level- 
of economic development covered by. the cross-section sample 
is very large. A function depicting a changing rate (in 
our cross-section sample,. a diminishing rate) of increase-of.. 
G/y-with relation to the rate of, increase of real per capita 
income, which is found appropriate for a cross-section sample 
covering a large span of the level of economic development, 
is not incompatible with a function showing a constant rate 
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of such an increase in G/y for a short span of the level 
of economic, development. Besides, the curvature of the 
relationship in the cross-section sample (see chart 1, 
chapter III), although statistically significant for a 
large span of economic development, is quite small, so 
that it could be neglected for the short span of economic 
development covered by each sub-period in flour time-series 
studies. 
It could also be argued that (as in the case of 
consumption function). the cross-section samples tend to give 
long-run parameters,. whereas the time-series samples give 
short-run parameter,., For example, the income parameters 
estimated from Engel curves in across-section sample of 
family budgets are long-run because it takes time to adopt 
new habits of spending, and as stated by Professor Klein, 
"it is only in the long-run-that, we can expect a's spending 
to 1 patterned after that of bis when its income changes to 
b's level.. Thus we generally expect to estimate long-run 
relationships from this (cross-section) type of data". 
1 
The same arguments could apply for the estimates of parameters 
from a cross-section sample of government expenditure for 
different countries; and to an even greater extent, because 
1. Lawrence R. Klein, An Introduction to Econometrics, 
op. cit., page 54. 
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it is not easy to persuade people to accept higher 'burden' 
of taxation. The estimates of long-run parameters need not 
be identical with those of short-run parameters. Thus a 
polynomial function which may be considered to estimate a 
long-run relationship from a cross-section sample is not 
incompatible with the linear function which may give a 
short-run relationship from different time-series samples 
for each country. 
Furthermore, the statistical findings concerning the 
rate of growth of Gc with relation to that of Yc obtained 
from time-series studies, which pertain to the situation of 
income change, would not be expected to be identical with 
that obtained from a cross-section study, which refers to 
1 the situation of income differences. 
Their compatibility could also be considered on the 
basis of the explanations offered in sections I and II. 
Although the statistical observations and hypotheses suggested 
by one approach are not identical with those suggested by the 
F 
1. For a discussion of the limitation of transferring data 
about income differences to the situation of income 
change, for the study of consumption behaviour, see 
Gardner Ackley, Macroeconomic Theory, The Macmillan Company, 
New York, 1961, pages 223-22+T. If it is not only the 
absolute income but also the relative income that 
influences the level of expenditure, the cross-section 
and time-series analyses would provide different 
findings. 
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other, and differences are also observed in the statistical 
findings for different countries included in our time-series 
study, some of the explanations offered for one-could also 
explain-the other. The explanations offered for such 
observations are not mutually exclusive; rather an inter- 
relationship exists between some of these explanations. 
For example, the explanations offered for adiminishing rate 
of increase of, G/y with an increasing level of economic 
development (the statistical observations and hypotheses 
suggested by the cross-section approach) viz., i (i) (a) 
to (d)-are basically the same as those offered for a decrease 
in the rate-of growth Gc with relation to Yc after the 'shifts' 
associated with world wars, in the case of the United Kingdom 
and Germany, and the Great Depression in the case of the 
United States and Canada. Again our explanations of the 
'displacement effect' of war and Great Depression, which 
were shown to be compatible in section II (i), are closely 
linked with some of the explanations referred to above, 
particularly I (i) (a) and the corresponding explanation 
in II (ii), emphasis being on the people's notions about 
'desirable' level of public expenditure and the 'tolerable 
burden'. The explanation of the non-existence of a 
'significant' shift in the level of government expenditure 
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after the War in Sweden, which did not take part in the 
War, follows directly frort the explanation of the existence 
of such shifts in those countries which participated in 
the War, and that of the increase in the rate of growth of 
Gc in Sweden after the Second World War is again based 
on the explanation I (i) (a) and the corresponding 
explanation in section II, concerning the gap between the 
'desirable' level of public expenditure and the 'tolerable 
burden' of taxation. The explanations offered for an 
increase in the rate of growth of government expenditure 
after a 'shift' associated with the second War in the case 
of the United States and Canada, which again emphasise the 
importance of a favourable attitude towards public 
expenditure, the tolerable burden, and the 'demonstration 
effect' are also not incompatible with the explanations 
offered for other observations. 
It may be noted again that the importance of geographical 
location as a factor influencing the level of public 
expenditure was evident not only from the scatter diagram 
of our cross-section data, but also in the time-series 
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approach where we observed that the similarities between 
countries, with regard to the growth and time pattern of 
Gc with relation to Yc, are more pronounced between the 
countries which are geographically close to each other. 
Thus, on the various grounds discussed above, although 
the statistical findings and technique employed in one 
approach are not identical with those of the other, they 
are not incompatible. 
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IV. Concluding Remarks 
In the courses of our statistical analysis in Chapters III and 
IV, the conceptual and statistical difficulties involved in our 
statistical measures, the inadequacies-of our data (from the point 
of view of accuracy, consistency, and comparability), and the 
limitations of the statistical technique applied are dU. tifully 
detailed, which-creates doubts about the validity of our statistical 
findings and the hypotheses deduced from our observations. 
Besides, `in both the time-series and cross-section analyses, the 
statistical technique employed by us is an application of a bi- 
Variate regression function, in which wo considered real per 
capita income as the only explanatory variable. But besides 
income, there are various other variables - economic, socio- 
political, denographic, geographical location, etc., which affect 
the level of public expenditure. , The importance of geographical 
location, however, has been shown in the course of our analysis. 
It has not been possible to study the effects of such other 
variables because of the problems of evaluation, and other 
technical problems such as multicollinearity, lack of statistical 
data, and also because of the time-factor. 
However, depending upon the possibility of some quantitative 
measurement of the variables being considered relevant and the 
availability of the necessary statistical data and resources, 
future research in the study of the behaviour of public expenditure 
could possibly be carried on with the help of a polynomial 
W 
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multi-variate regression analysis of government expenditure with 
relation to various variables. Such an analysis could be pursued 
for both the cross-section and time-series approaches, each of 
which provides independent information. In the case of a time- 
series approach, depending upon the size of the sample (i. e. the 
number of years for which the necessary statistical data could be 
available), further sophisticated techniques (as was pointed out 
in chapter IV, section IV (iii)), according'to which a new set 
of transformed variables are to be computed each time until a 
random set of residuals result, could be adopted. If the sample 
in further research could be sufficiently large (N = 100 or more), 
one might even be able to test whether 'residuals' conform to the 
normal distribution or some other probability distribution. 
The relationship between government expenditure and one or 
more explanatory variables is sometimes non-linear. Linearity is 
only convenience and should at times be abandoned for reality. 
For example, the marginal real income effect (i. e. the rate of 
growth of Gc with relation to that of Yc) varies, as was shown 
in our cross-section approach, making the regression equation 
polynomial in real per capita income. This may also be true for 
some other variables (e. g. degree of urbanisation. ) Therefore, 
it may be worthwhile to use polynomials, i. e. to use a function 
which is non-linear in variables, thereby achieving a higher 
degree of realism. Of course, the necessary statistical tests  
should show whether the use of second or higher powers of a 
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variable (and also the introduction of particular variables) 
in the polynomial function is relevant (i. e. whether the use 
of each additional constant has significantly reduced the 
variance). Besides, the use of polynomials is more useful as 
an explanatory tool because then it is not necessary to have a 
very precise hypothesis concerning the relationship from the out- 
set; which, however, hardly exists because of the lack of a 
priori economic analysis of the complex behaviour of government 
expenditure. It may thus help to discover the relationships 
(or theories) hitherto unsuspected from a priori arguments alone. 
Obviously several problems arise for such an analysis. In 
addition to the problems of evaluation or quantification of the 
relevant variables and of obtaining the necessary statistical 
data, the technical problems such as multicollinearity in a 
multi-variate analysis are quite formidable. Inter-correlation 
or multi-collinearity is frequently unavoidable in time-series 
multi-variate regression models, and also would appear in cross- 
section analysis if the selected explanatory variables are e. g. 
population density, degree of urbanisation, per capita income, or 
occupational distribution. 1 When there is an inter-correlation 
See Roy W. Bahl, Jn., and Robert J. Saunders Determinants of 
changes in State and Local Government Expenditure, National 
Tax Journal, March 1965, vol. XVIII, No. 1. The authors of 
that study in their cross-section analysis of changes in state 
and local government per capita spending in the United States 
employ a linear multi-variate regression function. The. 
selected explanatory variables are changes in per capita income, 
population density, urban population, federal grants and public 
school enrollment. It is highly unlikely that the selected 
'variables are independent as assumed by them, and, therefore, the estimated coefficients are likely to be plagued by multi- 
collinearity. 
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between such explanatory variables, it is not possible to isolate 
the separate influences of each variable and a tendency towards 
indeterminancy arises, although absolute indeterminancy may not 
arise unless inter-correlation is larger than the multiple 
correlation among all the variables simultaneously. However, 
the complications due to the technical problems: 
1 
may to some extent 
be avoided by a careful choice of the explanatory variables and by 
pooling properly and carefully time-series and cross-section 
samples. 
With the increasing availability and reliability of 
statistical data, because of the increased work and research 
put into compilation of data by individual countries and 
international organisations and the possibility of quantifying 
some relevant variables which have not been amenable to 
quantitative measurement (e. g. some index of political democracy 
or ideologies can be roughly constructed, and the influence 
For a simple exposition of the specific technical problems 
which suggest the pooling of time-series and cross-section 
samples and the mechanism of such pooling see Lawrence R. Klein, 
An Introduction to Econometrics, op. cit., pages 61-75. The 
problems and pooling procedure suggested by Professor Klein, on 
the basis of other studies* are mainly with reference to demand 
analysis. Although technical prlblems are almost the same in 
government expenditure analysis, pooling procedure would not be 
useful to the same extent. For example, if one chooses per 
capita income and degree of urbanisation as the two explanatory 
variables for government expenditure (see Bahl and Saunder, 
op. cit. ), they both not only usually vary together over time, 
but also usually vary directly in a cross-section sample, 
because of which multicollinearity cannot be "skirted" by 
estimating the parameter for one explanatory variable from a 
cross-section sample and for the other from that of time-series. 
A careful choice of explanatory variable is rather more 
important in this respect. 
*(R. Stone, et al., Consumers' Expenditure and Behaviour in the 
United Kin, dom, 1920-1938,195, H. Wold and L. Jureen, Demand 
analysis 1951. ) 
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such factor then could also be studiecý, it would be possible in 
time to make a rigorous statistical study on the lines suggested 
above, of the effects of various variables on the behaviour 
of a government's expenditure. The problems of constructing 
an exhaustive model, by incorporating all the possible variables 
(which is also non-linear in variables, if not in parameters), 
for the study of the behaviour of government expenditure are 
highly complex, which shows the need for further research in this 
field. At the present state of development of social science, 
for a variety of such problems, either conceptual or technical, 
the'solutions to be adopted are bound to be rough and approximate. 
Therefore, any generalisation one would make about the behaviour 
of public' expenditure is also bound to be rough and approximate - 
the difference lying only in degree. 
Furthermore, our analyses (cross-section and time-series) 
have been confined only to the aggregate of government expenditure. 
Although analyses of government expenditure classified into 
different economic categories, functions, and by levels of 
authority, were intended to be carried out at the beginning of 
this project, it was decided later to drop such analyses from 
this study, in view of the lack of readily available necessary 
data for many countries included in our sample, and also because 
of the enormous work and time which such analyses would require. 
It'may, however, be mentioned that such analyses and also the 
analysis of government receipts (total and classified into different 
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categories) would reveal further facts about the actual behaviour 
of government expenditure. 
The limitations of our study, listed in the earlier chapters 
and emphasised again in this section, may make one sceptical about 
our statistical observations and the hypotheses'suggested by 
such observations. The explanations offered are also, by and 
large, speculative; and some other explanations could also be 
equally appropriate. But, "the social scientist", to quote 
Professor Musgrave, "unlike the astronomer, cannot postpone 
judgement until a wholly conclusive proof can be given. Short 
of the limiting case of complete ignorance, the economist is 
called upon to produce as good a hypothesis as may be developed, 
even though it be less than perfect". 
1 
1 R. A. Musgrave, The Theory of Public Finance, op. cit., page 364. 
233. 
Appendix A. 
Table and Sources of data used in Cross-Section Study 
This appendix provides the statistical table and the sources 
(for public expenditure, G. N. P., and per capita real G. N. P. ) data 
used in our cross-section study in chapter III. 
We utilised a large variety of sources for public expenditure 
data. The sources and the major divergences, if any, from the 
concept of public expenditure adopted in our cross-section study 
in the case of each country included in our sample are noted 
below. 
Government expenditure figures are for fiscal years ending 
at different dates for different countries. Such figure noted 
in our table for a year refers to the fiscal years ending in 
that particular year. But the G. N. P. estimates are usually for 
calendar years. We have not made any adjustment for this 
discrepancy for the countries which have different calendar and 
fiscal'years. It was not considered worth-while because the 
conversion to calendar year estimates'of fiscal year government 
bow'k 
expenditure data, usually . on the assumption 
that there asc Re is ? %o 
seasonal variation, would hardly change the ratios of government 
expenditure to G. N. P., when both the numerator and denominator 
are averaged over several years. 
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The source utilized for G. N. P. estimates for most of the 
countries is the United National Year Book of National Accounts, 
in which the estimates conform, with some exceptions, to the 
definition recommended by S. N. A., 
1 
and every effort has been 
made to present the estimates of the various countries in a form 
designed to facilitate international comparability. 
2 Important 
differencesin concept, scope and coverage are described in the 
General Notes and footnotes to the relevant tables in the Year 
Book. Therefore, we have noted below only the adjustments, if 
any, done by us in the case of a particular country or if any 
other source utilised for a country. 
For per capita real G. N. P. data, we have used Rosenstein-Rodan's 
estimates. The adjustments, if any, done by us in the case of a 
particular country are noted below. 
ASIA 
1. Ceylon 
Sources: Statistical Yearbooks 1962 and 1963; Economic Survey 
of Asia and Far East, 1963, United Nations. The figure for 1962 
is taken from Economic Survey because figure given in Survey is that 
of Account, whereas the figure in yearbook for that year is that of 
Estimate. 
G. N. P. at market prices are estimated by adding Net Factor 
I 
2 
As stem of National Accounts and Supporting Tables Studies in 
Methods, Series F, No. 2, Rev. 2, United Nations, New York, 1964. 
Year Book of National Accounts Statistics, 1963, United Nations, 
page VII. 
x'35. 
Income from abroad to G. D. P. at market prices. (Sources are: 
Economic Survey of Asia and Far East and Yearbook of National 
Accounts Statistics, U. N. 1963). 
2. India 
Source: Combined Finance and Revenue Accounts of the Central 
and State Governments of India for the years 1958-1963. Appropria- 
tion for reduction and avoidance of debt is excluded from public 
expenditures. 
Figures of National Income are increased by 14.1 per cent and 
then indirect taxes are added in order to obtain the estimates of 
G. N. P. at market prices. (See Rodestein-Rodan's article, op. cit. 
Table 2-A-2 for relation between G. N. P. and National Income. ) 
3. Indonesia 
Sources: Statistical Yearbook, 1963, United Nations, Economic 
Survey of Asia and Far East, op. cit; Statistical Pocket Book of 
Indonesia, Biro Pust, Statistik Djakarta. 
Total expenditure is shown before deduction of 'revenue 
directly related to expenditure' i. e. (a) certain receipts from 
sale of commodities such as rice (b) the internal sales of government 
supply departments (c) fees and charges and (d) other receipts of 
related nature. 
Indirect taxes are added to G. D. P. at factor costs in order 
to obtain a reasonable estimate at market prices. 
The real per capita G. N. P. for 1961, i. e. 9147.9 is reduced to 
0137.34, assuming 3.9 per cent average annual rate of growth. See 
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Table 2A of Yearbook of National Accounts. Statistics, 1963 for 
average annual rate of growth of real gross domestic product for 
different countries. 
4. Iran 
Source:. Survey of Asia and Far East, 1963, U. N. 
G. N. P. figures at factor costs, from the above mentioned 
source,, are increased by the amount of the indirect taxes. 
Statistical Yearbook, 1963, U. N. provides the necessary figures 
for the indirect taxes. G. N. P. for 1962 is estimated from that 
of 1961 on the basis of the assumption of 4 per cent rate of growth 
per annum. 
5., Israel 
Source: Statistical Yearbook, 1963, United Nations. 
6 .. _ 
Jarman, 
Source: Statistical Yearbooks, 1962 and 1963, Bureau of 
Statistics, Office of the Prime Minister, Japan. 
Total public. expenditure includes expenditure of both 
general and Special Accounts, net of internal transactions. It 
excludes debt redemption (except for 1957 and 1960 for which 
'national debt' figures which include interest payments are 35.18 
and 26.46 billion yens respectively. ) 
7. Malaya, Federation of 
Sources: Statistical Yearbook, 1963, United Nations, and 
Economic Survey of, Asia and Far East, op. cit.; Monthly Statistical 
Bulletin, of the Federation of Malaya, January 1963, Department of 
Statistics, Federation of Malaya, Kualalumpur. 
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The real, per capita G. N. P. for 1961, i. e. 9552.4 is reduced to 
0531.15 for 1960, assuming 4 per cent rate of growth per annum. 
8. Pakistan 
Source: Statistical Yearbook, 1963, U. N. 
Total public expenditure figures refer to the combined expenditure 
of-central government (including railway budget) and state govern- 
ment & after excluding. transfers, and loans and advances to the 
States by the central government. The year 1959 is excluded because 
for that year gigures refer to 15 months ending 30 June, 1959. 
- National Income figures are increased 
by 11.1 per cent and 
indirect taxes are then added in order to estimate G. N. P. figures 
at market prices. Such adjustment is'made on the basis of Table 
2-A-2''Relation between G. N. P. and National Income' for different 
countries as given. in Usi and Hagen, World Income 1957 quoted in the 
appendix of Rodestein-Rodan's 'International Aid for Underdeveloped 
Countries', op. cit. page'122. 
9. - Phillipines 
Source: -. Economic Survey of Asia and Far East 1961-63, United 
Nations, op. cit. 
10. Thailand 
Sources: ' Economic'Survey of Asia and Far East, 1962, United 
Nations, Table'34, Major Components of Government Expenditure. 
Asian Economic Statistics; Statistical Yearbook, 1963, United 
Nations. 
- Total, government expenditure includes gross expenditure of water 
supply, electricity and posts and telegraph up to 1959" 
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11. Turkey 
,. 
Source: 
, Annuaire Statistique 1960-1962, Institut National de 
la Statistique, Presidence du Conseil Republique Turque. 
AFRICA 
12. Ethiopia 
Source: Statistical Abstract of Ethiopia, 1963. 
Figures of G. N. P. at market prices are not available. G. D. P. 
at factor costs for, 1958 was estimated from Table 3A (page 321) 
of Yearbook of National. Accounts Statistics, 1963, United Nations, 
to which we added the indirect taxes in order to obtain a reasonable 
estimate of G. N. P. at, market prices. A-similar figure for 1962 was 
estimated with the help of the average annual rate of growth estimated 
from the Table-3B of the above mentioned publication and by adding 
the indirect taxes. 
13. Ghana 
Sources: Quarterly Digests of Statistics, December 1962 and 
December 1963 and Statistical Yearbooks 1960-1963, Central Bureau 
of Statistics, Acctra. The total public expenditure figures are 
estimated after the necessary exclusion of the repayment of debt 
and refund of revenues. 
14. Federal Republic of Nigeria 
Source: Digest of Statistics, Volume 13, Number 2, April 1964, 
Federal Office of Statistics. 
Total Public expenditure, includes both federal and regional 
governments' expenditures, excluding grants and allocations of 
federal government to the regions. 
G. D. P. estimates at factor costs (at 1957 prices) only are 
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available. To such figures we have added indirect taxes in order 
to get reasonable estimates at market prices. 
15. Sudan 
Statistical Yearbook, 1963, United Nations and Economic Survey, 
1962, The Republic of Sudan, Ministry of Finance and Economics, 
Khartoum. 
The real per capita G. N. P. of 1961, i. e. $120 is reduced to 
1117.07 for 196Ö, assuming 2.5 per cent rate of growth per annum. 
See Rodestein-Rodan's 'International Aid for Underdeveloped 
Countries, Table 2-A-1 page 119, op. cit. for average annual 
rate of growth for different countries for the period 1961-66. 
16. South Africa 
Source: "Public Expenditure in South Africa" by T. Van 
Waasdijk, Witwaterstrand University Press, 196k. 
Total public expenditure figures are estimated from Table 10, 
i. e. current expenditure of Central Government (including Social 
Insurance Fund), Table 11, i. e. Central Government's capital 
expenditure; Table 16, i. e. Expenditure of Provinces. The 
total excludes subsidies and loans to provinces by Central 
Government. We have also excluded "interest and redemption" 
in the case of the expenditure of the provinces, because it was 
not possible to obtain separate figures for interest and redemption 
of debt. However, the amount spent on interest and debt redemption 
was very small for our time-period (51.5 million and for 1958-1962). 
17. Tanganyka 
Sources: Statistical Abstracts, 1961 and 1962, Statistical 
Division, the Treasury. 
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Since figures of G. N. P. at market prices are not available, 
figures of G. D. T. at market prices are taken. 
The real per capita G. N. P. for 1961, i. e. 230.2 is reduced to 
212.2 for 1959, assuming a4 per cent rate of growth per annum. 
18. U. A. R. 
Source: StatisticalýYearbook, 1963, United Nations. 
Total public expenditure figures are for ordinary budget 
(including gross transaction of public enterprise) plus development 
budget. 
National Income figures are increased by 20.1 per cent in 
order to derive an approximate estimate of G. N. P. 
NORTH AMERICA 
19. Canada 
Source: National Accounts Income and Expenditure 1961 and 1963, 
Dominion Bureau of Statistics, Canada. 
20. Costa Rica 
Source: Statistical Yearbook, 1963, United Nations. 
21. Guatemala 
Source: Statistical Yearbook, 19639 United Nations. 
Total public expenditure includes gross figures of public 
enterprises (post, telecommunication, etc. ) 
22. Honduras 
Source: Annuarlo Estadistica, Direccion General De Stadistica 
Y Censon, Secretaria de Economica Y Hacienda. 
23. El Salvador 
Source: Annuario Estadistica 1960-1962, Republica De El 
241. 
Salvador, C. A., Ministerio De Economics, Direccion General De 
Estadistica Y Censon; and Statistical Yearbook, United Nations. 
Total public expenditure includes debt redemption. The 
expenditure on debt service, i. e. debt redemption and interest 
payment, however, are negligible. (3. ßf% of the total public 
expenditure for 1958-1962. ) 
24. Haiti 
Source: Statistical Yearbook, 1963, United Nations. 
Figures of 1960 and 1961 are not taken because each refers 
to a ten-month period ending 30th September. We have, therefore, 
taken only an average of public expenditures for 1959 and 1962. 
Average G. N. P. at market prices is estimated roughly from 
the Tables 3A and 3B of Yearbook of National Accounts Statistics, 
United Nations, adjustment being also made for the indirect taxes. 
25. Mexico 
Source: Compendio Estadistico, 1960, Secretaria De 
Industraria Y Conecrio, Direccioh General De Estadistica. 
Total public expenditure includes expenditures of federal and 
state governments excluding debt redemption. The figure of total 
expenditure of federal government is taken from Statistical Year- 
book, 1963, United Nations. 
The real per capita income figure of 1961, i. e. 0415.4 is 
reduced to $380.39 for 1959 on the assumption of, -5 per cent of 
growth per annum. 
26. Panama 
Source: Statistical Yearbook, 1963, United Nations. 
242. 
27. Puerto Rico 
Source: Statistical Yearbooks, 1961 and 1962, Puerto Rico. 
G. N. P. figures are also taken from the same source. 
The real per capita income figures for 1961, i. e. '771.6 
is reduced to , 749.126 for 1960, on the assumption of Y) rate 
of growth per annum. 
28. U. S. A. 
Sources: Statistical Abstract of United States, 1963, U. S. 
Department of Commerce, Bureau of Census; Statistical Yearbook, 
1963, United Nations. 
Figures refer to the combined expenditure of the federal and 
state governments, excluding grants from the federal government to 
the state governments. Total expenditure includes grants to local 
governments by federal and state governments for various functions. 
SOUTH M2 ICA 
29. Brazil 
Sources: Anuario Estadistico De Brasil, No. 24 1963, IBGE, 
Conselho National De Estadistica; Statistical Yearbook, 1963, 
United Nations. 
Total public Expenditure includes expenditures of the federal 
government, including that of public enterprise on gross basis, plus 
expenditure of the states and federal districts. 
The real per capita income figure for 1961, i. e. 0374.6 is 
reduced to 0359.3 for 1960 on the assumption of-4.25% average rate 
of growth per annum. 
243. 
30. British Guina 
Source: Quarterly Statistical Digest, June 1964, The 
Statistical Bureau, Ministry of Development and Planning, 
Georgetown. 
31. Chile 
Source: Statistical Yearbook, 1963, United Nations. 
In order to exclude debt redemption, we have subtracted 
expenditure on debt service from and added interest payments to the 
figures of total public expenditure given in the above mentioned 
source. -The figure for interest payments Fare taken from Year- 
book'of National Accounts Statistics, 1963, United Nations, page 584. 
32*'' Columbia 
u Source: Anuario General De Estadistica, 1961, Departmento 
Administrativo Nacional De Estadistica Colombia. Expenditure 
figures include expenditure of public departments. Adjustment 
for debt redemption has been made by subtracting public debt 
figures from and adding interest payments (Source: Statistical 
Yearbook, U. N. ) to figures of total expenditure. 
33. E uador 
Source: Statistical Yearbook, 1963, United Nations. 
34. Paraguay 
Source: Boletin Estadistico del Paraguay, Ministerio De 
Hacienda, Direccion general De Statistica Y Censon, Asuncion. 
The real per capita income figure for 1961, i. e. %193.2 is 
a 
reduced to , 1182.1 for 1959 on the assumption of $ rate of growth 
jlý 
per annum. 
244. 
35" Peru 
Source: Boletin De Estadistica Perunama, Ministerio De 
Hacienda Y Comerico Direccion Nacional De Estadistica Y Censon, 
1961. 
The real per 
to 0250.65 on the 
36. Venezuela 
Source: Sta 
Total public 
capita income of 1961, i. e. x'265.8 is reduced 
assumption of°k. 3.5% rate of growth per annum. 
tistical Yearbook, United Nations. 
expenditure includes gross figures of public 
enterprises (post and telegraph services, radioconrnunication and 
salt works). 
EUROPE 
37" Austria 
Source: Statistical Yearbook, 1963, United Nations. 
The real per capita. G. N. P. figure for 1961 is estimated from 
the figure at money exchange rate of per capita G. D. P. at factor 
cost given in Table, 3A in Yearbook. of National Accounts Statistics, 
1963, adjustment being made for G. N. P. at market prices and by 
increasing the adjusted figure by 30.5%. For Western Europe, per 
capita real G. N. P. estimates are about 30. y%", more than such 
estimates at money exchange rate. 
38. Belgium 
Source: Statistical Yearbook, 1963, United Nations. 
Total expenditure includes expenditure under the ordinary 
and the extraordinary budgetS# and the Special funds. 
39. Finland 
Sources: Tilastokatsauksia Statistica var sikter; Bulletin of 
245, 
Statistics, Helsinki, No. 1,1961 and No. 2 1964, Central 
Statistical Office. 
40. France 
Source: Statistical Yearbook, 1963, United Nations. 
41. Greece 
Sources: Statistical Yearbook, 1961, Monthly Statistical 
Bulletin, Feb. 1963, National Statistical service of Greece, Kingdom 
of Greece. 
Total expenditure includes expenditure under ordinary and 
investment budget and the extrabudgetary Special Accounts. 
42,. Italy 
Public-Expenditure figures are based on data collected by 
Dr. Cassadio. Source: Relazional Generala Sula Situazione 
Economica D ei Paesa, Rome, Our figures also include transfer to 
local governments (SOURCE: Statistical Yearbook, 1963, United 
Nations. ) 
The real 'per capita" income for 1959 has been estimated from 
that of . 1961, on the assumption ofar, 
ý rate of growth per annum. 
43. Ireland 
Source: National Income and Expenditure, 1962, C. S. O. Dublin. 
The real per capita income figure for 1961 is estimated from 
figure at money, exchange of per capita G. D. P.. at factor cost. The 
adjustment is based on the procedure outlined above in case of Austria. 
44. Netherlands 
Sources: --The Netherlands Budget Memorandum, 1963 and 1964, 
Ministry of Finance; Statistical Yearbook, 1963, United Nations. 
246. 
Total expenditure figures are estimated after adjustments being 
made for debt redemption. 
45. Norway 
Source: Statistical Yearbook, 1962 and 1963, United Nations. 
46, Portugal 
Source: Estatisticas Financeiras, 1962, Instituto Nacional 
De Estatistica: Statistical Yearbook, 1963, United Nations. 
The real per capita income figure for 1961, i. e. 0513.6 is 
reduced to 0498.06 for 1960 on the assumption ofý', ö rate of growth 
per annum. 
47. Spain 
Source: Annuario Estadistica, Espana, 1961 and 1962. 
Total public expenditure includes expenditure under general 
budget and that of autonomous institutions, contributions from 
government to such institutions are subtracted from the total. 
The real income figure for 1960 is estimated from that of 
1961 on the a: siümption of 3 rate of growth per annum. 
48. Sweden 
} 
Source: Statistical Yearbook, 1962 and 1963% United Nations. 
49. Switzerland 
Sources: Botschaft des Bundesrates an die Bundesversammlung 
zur Staatsrechnumg für das Jahr 1963, Seite 54; Eidgenössisches 
Statistisches Amt, Statistisches Jahrbuch der Schweiz; 
Eidgenössisches Statistisches Amt, Finanzen und Steuern von Bund, 
Kantonen und Gemeinden. 
Total government expenditure refer to combined expenditure of 
247. 
central and state governments-after excluding tax transfer to the 
states. 
50. U. K... , ._... 
Source: National Income and Expenditure, 1964, C. S. O. 
51. West Germany 
Sources: Staticýhes Jahrbuch fur the Bundesrepublik, 1960- 
1964, Deutschland. 
OCEANIA- 
52. Australia 
Source: Australian National Accounts National Income and 
Expenditure, 1948-1949 to, 1961-1962, Commonwealth Bureau of 
Statistics, Cannebera., l 
Our estimate of real per capita G. N. R. is 1810.7 (see 
explanatory notes for Table 1-A and 1-B-in Rodestein-Rodan's paper, 
op. cit., and Table 3A in Yearbook of"National Accounts Statistics, 
1963, United Nations. 
53. New Zealand 
Source: Statistical Yearbook,; 1963, United Nations. 
The real income figure estimate for'1961 is 1954. 
(See 
Explanatory Notes 1-A and 1-B in Rodestein-Rodan's Article, op. cit. ) 
Table A. 1 248. 
Government Expenditure, Gross National Product, and Per Capita Real G. N. P. of Countries included in 
Cross-section Sample. 
C t Y 
Currency Govt. Expend- 
Gross 
National G/% Y 
Per 
Capita 
oun ry ear Units sture Product at Real 
(G) Market GNP $ 
Prices (Yc) 
(Y) 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
ASIA 
1. Ceylon 1958 million 1,444.2 5,622.4 
1959 rupees 1,656.4 6,295.3 
1960 1,740.8 6,448.8 
1961 1,880.9 6,543.1 214.5 
1962 1,850.0 6,742.0 
Total 8,572.3 31,651.4 27.08 
2. India 1958 million 19,901.1 1409114.8 
1959 rupees 20,945.0 154,605.5 
1960 23,323.0 159,740.0 
1961 -25,813.1 174,915.3 139.8 
1962 28,002.4 184,157.4 
Total 117,984.6 "813,533.0 14.50 
3. Indonesia 1956 thousand) 17.297 171.47 
1957 
'1958 
millions) 
rupiah 
21.912 
31.696 
201.28 
212.96 137.34 
1959 . 
40.432 247.88 
Total 111.346 833.59 13.36 
4. Iran 1958 thousand 39.660 PR 281.73 
1959 millions 47.920 PR 319.05 
1960 
1961 
rials 52.594 
54.761 
PR 332.70 
PR 344.17 180.4 
1962 54.667 PR 357.94 
Total 249.602 1,635.587 15.26 
5. Israel 1959 million 1,184.3 3,834 
1960 
1961 
Israeli 
pounds 
1,296.7 - 
1,442.4 
4,320 
5,124 1,026.8 
1962 1,755.3 6,120 
Total 5,678.7 19,398 29.27 
.. 
ýý4ý. 
ý" - (1) (2) . (3) (14) (5) (6) C? ) 
6. Japan 1958 billion 2,463.0 9,972.9 
1959 yen 2,592.5 12,038.7 
1960 2,860.9 14,065.3 
1961 3,257.9 17,203.0 613 
1962 3,729.0 18,995.8 20.62 
Total 14,903.3 72,275.7 
7. Malaya, 1957 million 988.7 4,942 Federation 1958 dollars 1,043.5 4,750 
of 1959 1,062.4 5,306 
1960 1,057.4 5,843 531.15 
1961 1,208.7 5,891 
Total 5,360.7 26,732 20.05 
8. Pakistan 1958 million 3,610.5 28,800.7 E 
1960 rupees 4,312.3 34,323.5 
1961 4,585.6 37,760.8 124.8 
1962 4,544.8 37.875.2 
Fw 
Total 17,053.2 138,760.27 12.29 
9. Phillipines 
1958 million 1,086 10,684 
1959 pesos 1,045 11,369 
1960 1,233 12,126 
1961 1,494 13,427 
1962 1,576 14,835 
Total 6,434 62,441 10.30 
10. Thailand 
1958 million 6,013.0 43,452 
1959 baht 6,441.8 48,347 
1960 6,710.4 55,088 
1962 8,157.5 63,059 
Total 27,322.7 209,946 13.01 
11. Turkey 1958 million 4,977.1 38,506 
1959 L. T. 6,728.0 47,727 
1960 79320-3 50,970 
1961 11 382.6 53,720 
1962 9,172.2 60,738 
Total 39,580.2 251,661 15.73 
282.3 
202.4 
(for 1961) 
333.7 
250. 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
AFRICA 
12. Ethiopia 1958 million 175.5 2,039.8 
1959 Ethiopian 212.9 
1960 dollars 157.6 
1961 213.1 129 
1962 253.1 2,349.9 
Total 1.012.2: 5 4,389-2 
202.44 =2,194.8 9.22 
13. Ghana 1958 million 59.824 381 
1959 ¬G 77.692 432 
1960 87,388 464 
1961 112.182 490 
1962 115.633 530 
Total 452.719 2,297 19.71 
14. Federal 1958 million 104.367 961.7 Republic of 1959 ¬ 124,547 1,008.7 
Nigeria 1960 152,464 19033.7 
1961 i88. lo4 1,101.5 
1962 187.745 1,123.5 
Total_ 757.227 5,231.1 14.48 
15. Sudan 1959 million 56.50 '379.6 
1960 U. S. ) -57.24 387.6 1961 65.48 ý430.0 
Total 179.22 1,197.2 14.97 
16. South -1959` million -984.7 5,034 Africa 1960 rand 954.9 5,373 
1961 994.4 59571 
1962 1,087.5 5,942 
Total -4,021.5 21,920 18.35 
17. Tanganyk a 
1957 million 23.046 170.9 
1958- ¬ 24.426 176.1 
1959 24-995 187.6 
1960 25.983 -197.4 
1961 30.482 -200.2 
Total 128.932 932.2 13.83 
210 
134 
117.07 
180 
123.3 
rr. rýrý 
251. 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
18. U. A. R. 1958 million 309.56 1,524,83 
1959 (L. E. ) 308.31 1,695.80 212.83 
1960 387.76 1,808.96 
Total 1,005.63 5,029.59 19.99 
NORTH AMERICA' 
19. Canada 1958 million 8,012 32,906 
1959 dollars 8,498 34,904 
1960 
1961, 
9,103 
9,862 
361249 
37,383 2, o48 2,048 
1962 10,588 40,359 
Total 46,063 181,806 25.34 
20. Costa 1958 million 310.7 2,522.2 
Rica 1959 colones 322.9 2,624.6 
1960 357.4- 2.7? 9.9 6 361 
ý;. 1961. 386.4 
2,852.5 . 
1962 444.6 3,131.7 
Total 1,822.0 13,910.0 13.10 
21. Guatemala 2 
1959 million 108.2 651. 
1960 quetzales 95.8 674.3; 
1961 88.5 685.1 257.7 
1962 101.2 698.5 
Total 393.7 2,709.1 14.53 
22. Honduras 
1958 million 74.0 715.8 
1959 Lempiras 78.3. 749.4 
1960 81.6 779.0 
1961 85.5 793.2 251.7 
1962 92.7-- 836.8- 
Total 412.1 3,874.2 10.64 
23. El Salvador 
1958 million 1$4.7 1,240.6 
1959 colones 165.3' 1,188.9 
1960 161.2 1,219.8 
1961 173.4, 1,271.4 267.5 
1962 173.8 1,566.6 
Total 858.4 6,487.3 13.23 
252. 
_(i).. (2) "(3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
-24'. Räiti. 1959 million 192.0 
1962 gourdes 152.7 149.2 (for 1961) 
Total 344.7 
Average 172.35` 1,910 9.02 
25. Mexico 1958 million 14,089.3 127,152 
1959 pesos 14,923.3 136,200 380.39 
1960 19,622.5 154,137 
Total 48,635.1 417.489 11.65 
26. Panama 1958 million 59.1 371.2 
1959 balboas 66.7 390.3 
1960 70.7 409.4 
1961 87.8 455.5 371.0 
1962 85.4 491.4 
Total 369.7 2,117.8 17.46 
27. Puerto 1958 million 319.935 1,383.7 
Rico 1959 
1960 
dollars 364.016 
409.365 
1,481.9 
1,644.6 749.13 
1961 450.503 1,794.3 
Total 1,543.819 6,304.5 24.49 
28. U. S. A. 1958 thousand) 106.784-- 446.287 
millions) 
1959 dollars 115.914.. 484.194 
1960 117.688 503.561 
1961 126.694 519.463 279.0 
1962 134.694 556.190 
Total 601.592 2,509.694 23.97 
SOUTH AMERICA thousand) 
29., Brazilý 1958 millions) 258.311 1,300.0 
1959, cruzeiros 307.012 1,774.3 
1960 458.789 2,363.6 359.3 
1961 736.817 3,499.0 
Total 1,787.929 8,936.9 20.01 
30. British 1957 million` 43.073 229.3 
Guina 1958 B. W. I. 46.510 220.4 
1959 
1960 -Dollars 
45.507 
50.691 
225.9 
249.3 343.69 
1961 57.012 256.8 E 
Total 242.793 1,402.8 ' 17.31 
253. 
(3) (4) (5) 
.. _. 
(6) 
. 
(7) 
31. Chile 1958 million 438.9 2,927.5 
1959 escudoes 602.6 4,077.3 
1960 850.9 4,? 39.4 
1961 947.4 51342.0 452.9 
1962 1,245.4 6,361.0 
Total 4,085.2 23,447.2 17.423 
32. Columbia 1958 million 21294.6 20,267.4 
1959 pesos 2,424.1 23,150.9 
1960 2,981.5 26,162.2 357.32 
1961 4,250.4 29,637.8 
: Tota1 11,950.6 99,218.3 12.04 
33-'Ecuador 1958 million 1,308 12,053 
1959 - sucres 1,415 12,624 
1960 1,803 13,662 
1961 2,058 14,612 222.?, 
1962 1,794 PR 15,390, 
', Total 8,378 68,341 12.26 
34. Paraguay 1958 ;,, million 9,407.5 21.051 
1959 guarani- 2,627.6 23,303 182.11 
1960 2,740.6 25,034 
Total 7,774.7 69,388 11.21 
35. Peru 1956 million 5; 960.0 31,626 
1957 soles 5,532.5 33,716 
1958 6,307.3 36,936 
1959 7,282.4 42,196 250.65 
1960 7,869.4 51,183 
Total -32,951.6 195,651 16.84 
36. Venezuela 1958 million 6,093.1 22,488 
1959 bolivares 6,615.1 23,668 
1960 6,407.2 23,443 
1961 6,269.2 24,185 644.5 
1962 5,334.4 25,927 
Total 30,719.0 119,711 25.67 
EUROPE 
37. Austria 1958 thousand 38.883 136.2 
1959 million 390296 143.2 
1960 Schillings 42.155 161.4 
1961 45.899 176.1 1,275.04 
1962 51.044 186.6 
Total 217.277 803.5 27.04 
251+. 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
38. Belgium 1958 thousand 116.100 521.9 
1959 million 131.851 535.9 
1960 francs 135.612 572.2 
1961 133.034 601.2 1,658 
1962 147.774 637.2 
Total 664.371 2,868.4 23.16 
39'"'Finland° 1958 million 2,946 11,825 
1959 markka* 3,288 12,558 
1960 3,553 14,294 
1961 3,960 15,901 1,286.5 
1962 4,451 17,021 
Total 18,198 71,599 25.42 
40. France 1958 thousand 55.07 244.7 
1959 million 64.47 267.4 
1960 francs 65.85 296.2 
1961 ? 1.11 319.7 1,444.5 
1962 ? 7.61 353.6 
Total 334.11 1,481.6 22.55 
41. Greece 1958 million 15,835.0 87,454 
1959 drachuras 17,514.0 90,597 
1960 19,038.5 96,962 
1961 21,279.8 lio, 14o 613.1 
1962 22,689.4 117,643 
Total 96,356.7 502,796 19.16 
42. Italy 1957 thousand 3,600.2 15,992 
1958 million 3,943.2 17,114 
1959 Lire 4,433.1 18,290 813.38 
1960 5,016.2 19,937 
Total 16,992.7 71,733 23.69 
43. Ireland 1958 million -157.826 5$6.5 1959 £ 149.406 623.4 
1960 160.349 658.4 
1961 177.790 704.5 956.72 
1962 199.262 761.0 
Total. 844.633 3,333.8 25.34 
44. Nether- 1958 million, 7,721.3 35,930 
lands 1959 guilders 8,454.0 38,443 
1960 8,967-7 , 42,732 8 
1 
4 1961 10 572.4 44,8oo . 2; 7 1, 
1962 10,873.7 47,550 
Total 46,589.1 209,455 22.24 { 
2 55 . 
45. Norway 1958 million 5,440.0 28,658 
1959 krona 5,586.5 30,417 
1960 5,876.2 32,340 
1961 7,245.7 35,241 1,578.75 
1962 8,029.1 37,771 
Total 32,177.5 164,427 19.57 
46. Portugal 1958 million 8,161.9 59,021 
1959 escudos 9,161.9 62,092 
1960 10,653.2 68,864 372.2 
1961 12,767.9 74,198 
Total 40,744.9 264,175 15.44 
47. Spain 1958 thousand 78.08 574.8 
1959 million 87.78 580.2 
1960 pesotas 101.40 615.1 
1961 114.38 696.9 
Total 381.64 2,467.0 15.47 
48. Sweden 1958 million 13,774 55,202 
1960 kronor 16,137 58,477 
1961 17,092 63,884 
1962 18,296 69,608 
1963 21,001 75,272 
Total 86,299 322,443 26.76 
49. Switzer- 1958 thousand 4.907 32.0 
land 1959 million 4.976 33.6 
1960 Swiss 5,224 36.8 
1961 francs 6.354 41.5 
1962 6.737 46.3 
Total 28.198 190.2 14.83 
50. U. K. 1958 million 6,705 22,912 
1959 £ 7,327 23,976 
1960 7,497 25,375 
1961 8,072 27,057 
1962 8,501 28,184 
Total 38,102 127,504 29.89 
51. West 1958 million 56,058 231,500 
Germany 1959 Deutsche 60,315 250,900 
1960 mark 70,248 296,800 
1961 76,706 326,400 
1962 85,512 355,100 
Total 348,839 1,460,700 23.88 
498.06 
2,024 
1,944.5 
1,749.5 
1,591.5 
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
OCEANIA 
52. Australia 1957 million 1,407.863 5,695 
1958 ¬A 1,504.908 6,084 
1959 1,637.446 6,736 
1960 1,749.992 7,099 1,810.7 
1961 1,886.551 7,205 
Total 8,186.76 32,819 24.95 
53" New 1958 million 346.3 1,135 
Zealand 1959 N. Z. 366.5 1,217 
1960 402.2 1,305 
1961 416.2 1,352 1,954 
1962 451.1 1,444 
Total i, 982.3 6,453 30.72 
257. 
Appendix B 
Tables and Sources of Data used in Time-series Studies. 
This appendix provides the statistical tables and the 
sources of those tables used in our analysis of the growth of 
public expenditure with relation to economic growth on the 
basis of time-series approach. It is not intended here to 
discuss the conceptual and statistical problems, and the 
methods of computation of the statistical series provided in 
the tables. Such problems, concepts and methods of calculation 
for each series are discussed in the corresponding source or 
sources given below. The ones which relate particularly to 
our statistical findings and analysis, e. g., the major divergences, 
if any, from the concept of government expenditure adopted for 
time-series analysis, the adjustments made to government 
expenditure and GNP series (such as for war-related expenditure, 
the population and price effects) in the case of each country 
are pointed out in chapter IV. The sources given below concern 
only those publications from which we have obtained our 
statistical series, but not the sources on the basis of which 
such series were originally computed. 
Table B-1U. K. 
The series of per capita gross national product at 1900 
prices for the period 1890 - 1955 is taken from Table 
A. 2 in'tt'- 
appendix of The Growth of Public Expenditure in the United 
Kingdom by Professors Peacock and Wiseman. For the years 
1956 - 1962, our estimates are computed from Table B-3 and 
B-4 given in this appendix, the sources of which are given below. 
25E. 
Table B-2U. K. 
The aeries of government expenditure other than for 
war-related purposes, per head of population, at 1900 prices, 
for the period 1890 - 1955 is taken from Table A. 10 given 
in,, 1appendix of Peacock-Wiseman study. For the years 1956 - 
1962 such estimates of per capita government expenditure are 
derived from Table B-3 and B-5, the sources of which are 
given below. 
Table B-3U. K. 
The figures of total population for the period 1956 - 1962 
are taken from Annual Abstract of Statistics, lam, published 
by Central Statistical Office. The figures are that of de facto 
population and are mid-year estimates. 
Table B-4U. K. 
a Statistics-of gross national product at factor cost of 
the United Kingdom at 1958 prices are taken from the official 
estimates given in the Central Statistical Office's Blue Book 
on National Income, and Expenditure, 1964, which are divided 
by the population figures for the corresponding years given 
in Table B-3 in order=tocompute the per capita estimates 
at 1958 prices. The index implicit in the official estimates 
of national product at current and constant 1958 prices was 
spliced with the Peacock-Wiseman index for the period 
1890 - 1955 with 1900-as base year, which was then used to 
obtain per capita GNP estimates at 1900 prices. 
259. 
Table B- - : 5. U. K; 
Figures of total, public expenditure and of expenditure 
for°war-related purposes (viz., national debt, war pensions, 
and war damage compensation) at current prices for the period 
1956 - 1962 are taken from Central Statistical Office's Blue 
Book on National Income and Expenditure, 1964. The category 
of War Pensions includes war pensions and service grants 
paid to the residents, and national insurance and war pensions 
paid to non-residents. Figures of`war pensions and national 
insurance'paid to non-resident`s are both given under one 
category in the Blue Book, because, of which national insurance 
paid tonon-residents is also included in our category of war 
pensions. The amount paid for national insurance to non-residents, 
however, is quantitatively unimportant. 
Table B-6U. K. 
The indices of prices for consumer goods and services and 
for fixed assets for the period 1956 - 1962 with 1900'as base 
year are computed by splicing such indices having 1958 as 
base year, -given in the C. S. O's Blue Book on National Income 
and Expenditure, 1§641respectively with the Peacock-Wiseman 
indexes of Prices for current goods and services and for 
government fixed capital -formation for the period 1890 - 1955 
with 1900 as base year. 
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Table B-7U. K. 
Figures of total government expenditure other than for 
war-related purposes for the period 1956 - 1962 at current 
prices are derived from the Table B-5, those of government 
gross fixed capital formation are taken from Blue Book, 
1964. The figures of government gross capital formation at 
1900 prices are computed by deflating the corresponding 
estimates at current prices by the index of prices of fixed 
assets given in Table B-6; the rest of government 
expenditure is deflated by index of prices for consumer goods and 
services given also in Table B-6. 
Table B-8 Germany 
The series of per capita gross national product at 1900 
prices for the period 1881 - 1958 is taken from Table A. 5 
in the appendix of the study, "The Growth of Government 
Expenditure in Germany since the Unification" Finanzarchiv, 
January 1964 by Mrs. Suphan Andic and Dr. Jindrich Veverka. 
Table B-9 Germany 
The per capita total government expenditure figures at 
1900 are obtained from Tables A. 35 (after rounding) and A. 6 
given in the appendix of the above mentioned study by 
Mrs. Andic and Dr. Veverka. 
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Table B- 10-German y 
War-related expenditures as percentages of government 
expenditures are estimated from Table A. 30 of Kirs. Andic and >L. 
Veverka's study. War-related expenditure include war-damage 
compensation (including reparation), war-related social assistance 
and national debt. Defence expenditures are not included in the 
war-related expenditures. 
Table B- 11 Germany 
The per capita figures of government expenditure other than 
for war-related purposes, at 1900 prices, are estimated from our 
Tables B- 9 and-B, - 10. 
Table B -12 U. S. A. - 
The series of total population for the period 1923 - 1957 
is taken from Historical Statistics of United States, Colonial 
Times to 1957, Bureau of the Census. For the years 1956 - 1961, 
the total population figures are taken from Statistical Abstract 
of the United States, 196 , Bureau of the Census. 
The estimates 
are as of July 1st. Total population includes armed forces 
overseas for the period 1930 - 19570 
Table B- 13 U. S. A. 
The series of gross national-product, total and per head, at 
current and at 1929 prices for the, period 1923 - 1955 are taken 
from the Historical Statistics of the United States mentioned above. 
Figures of G. N. P., total and per capita, at current prices for 1956 
and 1957 are also obtained from that publication. For the years 
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1958 - 1961, such figures at current prices are obtained from 
Statistical Abstract of the United States, 1963. The G. N. P. 
estimates, total and per capita, at 1929 prices for the period 
1956 - 1961 are computed by us from the G. N. P. series at 195'+ 
dollars for that period. The index implicit in the official 
estimates of G. N. P. at current and 1954 prices was spliced with 
the implicit index in 
series 
prior to 1955 at 1929 prices, which 
was then used to obtain G. N. P. estimates at 1929 prices. 
Table B- 14 U. S. A. 
For the years 1923 - 1955, the price index implicit 
in the 
estimates of gross national product at current and 1929 prices are 
taken from the Historical Statistics of the United States, quoted 
above. For the years 1956 - 1961, the index is computed 
by splicing 
the index implicit in the G. N. P. series at 1954 prices to that 
implicit in the series for the period prior to 1955 with 1929 as 
base year. 
Table B- 15 U. S. A. 
In the case of federal government expenditure (including that 
of Trust Accounts), the basic data for the fiscal years 1932 - 1962 
were taken from Historical Summary of Government Finances in the 
United States, 1957 and Historical Statistics on Government Finances 
and Employment, 1962, both published by Bureaus of the Census. 
Several adjustments discussed in detail in section V of chapter IV 
are made to the census data in order to obtain a series of government 
expenditure which is conceptually akin, as far as possible, to 
our definition. Federal grants-in-aid to state and local governments, 
2(3. 
and 50 per cent of expenditure under 'Non-Highway Transportation' 
and 'other and unallocable direct general expenditures' (50 per 
cent of the corresponding items for the period 1957 - 1962) are 
deducted from federal government total expenditure figures in the 
census publications. The other adjustments made consist of the 
conversion to calendar year estimates of fiscal year data, and 
interpolation between biennial estimates until 1950. For the 
years 1923 - 1931, the federal government expenditure data are 
taken from Table D. 7 given in appendix of the study, The Trend of 
Government Activity in the United States since 1900 by Solomon 
Fabricant and Robert E. Lipsey, N. B. E. R., 1952, (after adjustment 
being made for conversion of fiscal year data to calendar year 
estimates). 
In the case of state and local government expenditure data 
for the fiscal years 1932 - 1962, the basic data are taken 
from the above 
mentioned census publications. In their case, the adjustments 
consist of the exclusion of 'Utility and Liquor store expenditures' 
and 50 per cent of 'Non-Highway Transportation' and 'other and 
unallocable direct general expenditures', and also conversion of 
fiscal year estimates to calendar year estimates and interpolation 
between biennial estimates for the missing years until 1949. For 
the years 1929 - 1931, state and local government expenditure 
figures are taken from the following sources: National Income, 1954 
edition, 'A supplement to the survey'of current business, Table 9, 
published by the National Income Division of the Office of Business 
Economics, Department of Commerce. For the fiscal years 1922 and 
2.6'+. 
i927 ,` the, adjusted census data is taken and for the missing years 
the figures are estimated by relying-on straight line interpolation 
on'a semi-log graph between the available adjusted census benchmarks. 
Table B- 16 U. S. A. 
Figures. for.. interest on federal debt, at current prices, for 
the period 1932 - 1961 are obtained from the aboved census publica- 
°tions, after adjustments which consist of conversion of fiscal years 
estimates to calendar year estimates and interpolation between 
biennial estimates-until 1950. 
Table B_- 17 U. S. A. 
Government' expenditures other than for interest on federal 
debt, ° total and`per--. capita, iat current prices are computed with 
the 
help of our tables B- 15, B, '- 16 and B -12. Per capita 
figures 
for such expenditures at 1929 prices are computed by deflating 
the 
-corresponding estimates at current prices by price index given 
in 
Table 14. 
'Table B -: 18 Canada 
The series of total population of Canada for the period 1926 - 
1961 is taken from Series A. 1 given in-_of 
Canada, 1965, edited, by M. C. Urquhart and K. A. H. Buckley. The 
figures apply to 1st June. 
Table B- 19'Canada 
The series of total gross national expenditure at 1949 prices 
for the whole period is taken from series F. k5 of the above mentioned 
publication, Historical Statistics of Canada. The per capita 
estimates are computed by dividing the above series by the population 
series given in Table B- 18. 
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1927,, the adjusted census data is taken and for the missing years 
the figures are estimated by relying on straight line interpolation 
on a semi-log graph between the available adjusted census benchmarks. 
Table B -'16 U. S. A. 
Figures for-interest on federal debt, at current prices, for 
the period 1932 - 1961 are obtained from the aboved census publica- 
tions, after adjustments which consist of conversion of fiscal years 
estimates to calendar year estimates and interpolation between 
biennial estimates until 1950. 
Table B- 17 U. S. A. - 
Government expenditures other than for interest on federal 
debt, total and per capita, -at current prices are computed with 
the 
help of our tables B- 15, B'- 16 and B- 12. Per capita figures 
for such expenditures at1929 prices are computed by deflating 
the 
-corresponding estimates at current prices by price index given 
in 
Table 14. 
Table B ---18 Canada 
The series of total population of Canada for the period 1926 - 
1961 is taken from Series A. 1 given in-Historical Statistics of 
Canada, 1965, -. edited by 
M. C. Urquhart'and K. A. H. Buckley. The 
figures apply to 1st June. 
Table B- 19 Canada 
The series of total gross national expenditure at 19+9 prices 
for the whole period is taken from series F. 45 of the above mentioned 
publication, Historical Statistics of Canada. The per capita 
estimates are computed by dividing the above series by the population 
series given in Table B- 18. 
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Table B- 20 Canada 
The series of government purchases of goods and services, 
transfer payments and subsidies are taken from series F. 98 - 100 
of the above mentioned source. 
Table; B, - 21 Canada 
For figures of. interest on federal debt, the following sources 
are used: 
1926. - 1949: Government Transactions Related to the National 
Accounts, 1926 - 1951, (supplement No. 1 to the 
. 
National Accounts), Dominion Bureau of Statistics, 
Ottawa, Canada, December, 1952. 
1950 - 1960: National Accounts Income and Expenditure, 1947 - 
1961 and 1961, Dominion Bureau, of Statistics. 
- For the series of other war-related expenditures 
(viz., World 
'dar : pensions and War Veterans' allowance) the same sources namely 
Government Transactions Related to the National Accounts and 
National Accounts. Income and Expenditure (1961) were used for the 
period 1926, - 1951 and 1955 - 1960 respectively. - For the missing 
years, 1952 - 1954, we have relied on straight line interpolation 
on a semi-log. paper, between the. years 1951 and 1955, for which 
such figures were available. 
Table .B -22 Canada. - 
Consumer Price Index, 1926 to 1960, with=1949 as base year 
is. taken from the Series J. 147 of the Historical Statistics of 
Canada. 
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Table B- 23 Canada 
The series of government expenditure on goods and services at 
1949 prices is obtained from Series E. 28 of the Historical 
Statistics of Canada. The series of government expenditure on 
transfers and subsidies other than for war-related (given in Table 
B- 21) at current prices is deflated by a consumer price index 
(given in Table B'- 22) in order to obtain the series of such 
expenditures at 1949 prices. Table B- 18 which provides series of 
total population for the corresponding period was used in order to 
obtain the per capita. estimates. , 
TableB - 24 Sweden- 
The series of total population, in Sweden for the period 1929 - 
1958 is obtained from Statistisk, Arsbok for $yer (Statistical 
Abstract of Sweden) for various years published by Central Bureau of 
Statistics, Stockholm. 
Table B =_. L5, Sweden 
Wholesale price index for Sweden for the period 1929 - 1958 with 
(1881 - 1885) as base period is obtained by splicing the indices with 
1935 as base year for the period 1945 1954-and other with 1949 as 
base year for the period 1953 - 1958 to such index 
for the period 
1920 - 19+9 with 1881 - 1885 as be period. - The above, mentirined 
indices with different base year (or period) were obtained from 
Statistisk Arabok for Sverige for several years. 
Table -B - 26, 
Sweden 
The series of gross domestic product at current prices is obtained 
from the following sources: 
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1920 - 1950: Sveriges National Produkt, 1861 - 1951 (The Gross 
Domestic Product of Sweden`1861 - 1951), Meddelanden 
Fran Konjunkiturinstitutet, Serie B: 20. 
1952 - 1958: National Accounts 1950 - 1964, National Bureau 
of Statistics, Stockholm, Sweden; and Yearbook 
of National Accounts Statistics, 1963, United 
Nations. 
Net income from abroad (given in Table B- 27) taken from 
the latter source is subtracted from thw'G. N. P. provided by the 
former source in order to obtain G. D. P. The per capita G. D. P. 
estimates at current and constant prices are computed with the 
help of the Tables B- 24 and B- 25 respectively. 
Table B- 27 Sweden 
Source: Yearbook of National Accounts Statistics, 1963, 
United Nations. 
Table B- 28 Sweden 
The series of 'adjusted' total government expenditure is 
taken 
from the Table 1 of the study "Den offentliga Sektorns expansion" 
by Erik Hook, Ianquist and'. ikseils Boktryckeri AB, Uppsala 1962. 
The per capita estimates at current prices are computed with the 
help of the series of total population given in Table B- 24. 
Such estimates at constant (1881 - 1885) prices are computed 
by 
deflating the estimates at current prices by the price index given 
in Table B- 25. 
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Table B-1 
Gross National Product of the United Kingdom, per 
Head of Population, at 1900 Prices, 1890 - 1962. 
Year 
1890 
1895 
1900 
1905 
1910 
1913 
e 
x+0.2 
42.5 
47.2 
45.5 
45.8 
49.8 
1923 
1924 
1925 
1926 
1927 
1928 
1929 
1930 
1931 
1932 
1933 
1934 
1935 
1936 
1937 
1938 
1947 
1948 
1949 
1950 
1951 
46.4 
47.4 
48.2 
46.5 
51.0 
50.2 
51.8 
50.1 
48.7 
48.1 
51.1 
53.2 
56.2 
57.? 
58.6 
59.6 
56.4+ 
57.5 
59.3 
60.3 
60.8 
/Continued ... 
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Table B-1 (Continued) 
Year E 
1952 62.1 
1953 64.6 
1954 67.9 
1955 68.8 
1956 70.06 
1957 71.05 
1958 70.75 
1959 72.68 
1960 75.64 
1961 77.59 
1962 77.48 
0 
Table B-2 270. 
Government Expenditure Other Than for War-Related Purposes of the 
United Kingdom, per head of population, at 1900 Prices, 1890-1962 
Year f, 
1890 3.0 
1895 3.8 
1900 6.3 
1905 5.0 
1910 5.5 
1913 
, 5.8 
1923 7.2 
1924 7.1 
1925 7.7- 
1926 7.9 
1927 8.2 
1928 8.2 
1929 8.4 
1930 9.2 
1931 10.0 
1932 9.9 
1933 9.8 
1934 10.0 
1935 10.6 
1936 11.3 
1937 12.2 
1938 15.0 
1947 19.1 
1948 19.1 
1949 19.8 
1950 20.0 
1951 21.5 
1952 22.4 
1953 23.0 
1954 22.5 
/Continued ... 
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Table B-2 (Continued) 
Year 
1955 
1956 
1957 
1958 
1959 
1960 
1961 
1962 
9 
22.2 
23.29 
23.57 
23.98 
25.55 
26.88 
28.43 
29.39 
272, 
Table B-3 
Population of the United Kingdom, -195 
6-1962 
(number in thousands) 
1956 51,184 
1957 51,430 
1958 . .. 51,652 
1959 51,956 
1960 52,352 
1961 52,816 
1962 53,341 
Table B-4 
Gross 'Natiönäl Pr66uct` of theUn ted Kingdom at' 1958 
and 1900 Prices, 195 6- 19 2 
G. N. P. at 1958 Prices G. N. P. at 1900 Prices 
Year Total 
e million 
Per Head Per Head 
9 
.. ý. ti ýZ 
1956 19,909 388.81 70.06 
1957 20,279., 394.30 71.05 
1958 20,281 392.65 70.75 
1959 20,959, 403.40 72.68 
1960 21,978 419.81 75.64 
1961 22,744 430.63 A 77.59 
1962 22,938. 430.03 77.48 
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Table B=5 
Total Government Expenditure and Expenditure for War-Related 
Purposes of the United Kingdom at Current Prices, 1956 - 1962 
Total Govt. National War War 
Year Expenditure Debt Pensions Damage Compensation 
9 million £ million ¬ million £ million 
1956 6,714 725 93 23 
1957 6,978 707 90 21 
1958 7,373 782 103 18 
1959 7,812 776 102 12 
1960 8,378 867 100 9 
1961 9,138 906 105 7 
1962 9,807 887 107 6 
Table B-6 
Index of Prices (1900 = 100), 1956 - 1962, U. K. 
Consumer 
Goods and Fixed 
Year Services Assets 
1956 475.6 641.3 
1957 490.8 661.8 
1958 506.0 682.2 
1959 506.0 675.4 
1960 511.1 682.2 
1961 526.2 695.9 
1962 546.5 716.3 
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Table B-7 
Government Expenditure Other Than for 'dar-Related Purposes 
of the United Kingdom at Current and 1900 Prices, 1956-196 
Pit CIAKhchi- hhtices At -1900 17 cas 
Govt. Govt. 
Gross Fixed Others Gross Fixed Total 
Year Total Capital (1)minus Capital, Others (4) + Per £ mn. Formation (2)f, mn. Formation £ mn. (5) Head 
£ mn. £ mn. ¬ mn. £ 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
1956 5,873 787 5, o86 122.? 2 1,069.39 1,192.11 23.29 
1957 6,160 815 5,345 123.15 1,089.04 1,212.19 23.57 
1958 6,470 780 5,690 114.34 1,124.51 1,238.85 23.98 
'1959 6,922 819 6,103 121.26 1,206.13 1,327.39 25.55 
1960 7,409 865 6,544 126.80 1,280.38 1,407.18 26.88 
1961 8,120 901 7,219 129.4? 1,371.91 1,501.38 28.43 
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Table B-8. 
Gross National 
. Product, per Head of Population, at 1900 prices, 
_Germany, 
1881 - 1958 
Year DM. 
1881 418.7 
1891 476.0 
1901 584.5 
1907 626.2 
1913 673.3 
1925 598.4 
1926 616.5 
1927 673.1 
1928 700.5 
1929 693.4 
1930 672.0 
1931 607.3 
1932 547.5 
1950 781.9 
1951 844.9 
1952 902.0 
1953 956.6 
1954 1,017.4 
1955 1,125.2 
1956 1,193.4 
1957 1,258.3 
1958 1,286.9 
Table B-9 
276. 
Government Expenditure of Germany, per Head of 
Population, at 1900 prices, 1881 - 1958 
Year DM. 
1881 37 
1891 53 
1901 77 
1907 9o 
1913 103 
1925 150 
1926 167 
1927 184 
1928 206 
1929 212 
1930 225 
1931 216 
1932 200 
1950 319 
1951 341 
1952 370 
1953 387 
1954 415 
1955 439 
1956 480 
1957 531 
1958 567 
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Table B-10 
War-Related Expenditure as a Percentage of 
Government Expenditure, Germany, 1881 - 1958 
Year 
1881 0.71 
1891 1.76 
1901 1.77 
1907 2.02 
1913 1.88 
1925 19.60 
1926 18.09 
1927 17.97 
1928 18.81 
1929 17.90 
1930 16.92 
1931 13.84 
1932 11.78 
1950 16.14 
1951 15.02 
1952 13.66 
1953 15.42 
1954 16}. 08 
1955 14'. 81 
1956 14.44 
1957 13.42 
1958 12.50 
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Table B-11 
Government Expenditure Other Than for War-Related Purposes, 
per Head of Population, at 1900 prices, Germany, 1881-1958. 
Year 
1881 
1891 
1901 
1907 
1913 
1925 
1926 
1927 
1928 
1929 
1930 
1931 
1932 
1950 
1951 
1952. 
1953 
1954 
1955 
1956 
1957 
1958 
DM. 
36.74 
52.06 
75.64 
88.18 
101. o6 
120.60 
136.80 
150.30 
167.25 
174.06 
186.94 
186.11 
176.44 
267.51 
289.78 
319.46 
327.32 
348.27 
373.99 
410.68 
459.. 74 
496.11 
Table B-12 
279. 
Population of the United States, 1923 - 1961 (in thousands) 
1923 111,950 1944 
1924 114,113 1945 
1925 115,832 1946 
1926 117,399 1947 
1927 119,038 1948 
1928 120,501 1949 
1929 121,770 1950 
1930 123,188 1951 
1931 124,149 1952 
1932 124,949 1953 
1933 125,690 1954 
193+ 126,485 1955 
1935 127,362 1956 
1936 128,181 1957 
1937 128,961 1958 
1938 129,969 1959 
1939 131,028 1960 
19k0 132,122 1961 
1941 133,402 
1942 134,860 
1943 136,739 
138,397 
139,928 
141,389 
144,126 
146,631 
149,188 
151,683 
154,360 
157,028 
159,636 
162,417 
165,270 
168,174 
171,229 
17+, 149 
177,135 
179,983 
183,043 
0 
Table B-13 280. 
Gross National Product, Total and per Head of Population, 
U. S. A., at'Current and at 1929 Prices, 1923 - 1961. 
Current Prices 1929 Prices 
Total Per Total Per 
Year ' ''' Billion , 'Capita Billion Capita 
Dollars Dollars Dollars Dollars 
1923 86.1 769 85.8 766 
1924 87.6 768 88.4 775 
1925 91.3 -788 90.5 
781 
1926 97.7 832 96.4 821 
1927 96.3 809 97.3 817 
1928 98.2 815 98.5 817 
1929 104.4 857 1o4.4 857 
1930 91.1 740 95.1 772 
1931 '76.3 615 89.5 721 
1932 58.5 468 76.4 . 611 
1933 56.0 446 ? 4.2 590 
1934 65.0 514 8o. 8 639 
1935 72.5 569 91.4 718 
1936 82.7 645 100.9 787 
1937 90.8 704 109.1 846 
1938 85.2 656 103.2 794 
1939 91.1 695 111.0 847 
1940 10o. 6 761 121.0 916 
1941 . 125.8 943 138.7 
1,040 
1942 159.1 1,18o 154.7 1,147 
1943 192.5 1,408 170.2 1,245 
1944 211.4 1,527 183.6 1,327 
1945 213.6 1,526 180.9 1,293 
1946 210.7 1,490 166.8 1,179 
1947 234.3 1,626 165.6 1,149 
1948 259.4 1,769 174.4 1,189 
1949 258.1 1,730 171.1 1,147 
/Continued ... 
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Table, B-13 (Continued) 
Current Prices 1929 Prices 
Total Per Total Per 
Year Billion Capita Billion Capita 
Dollars Dollars Dollars Dollars 
1950 284.6 1,876 187.1 1,233 
1951 329.0 2,131 199.9 1,295 
1952 347.0 2,210 206.7 1,317 
1953 365.4 2,289 215.3 1,349 
1954 363.1 2,236 212.6 1,309 
1955 397.5 2,405 230.8 1,396 
1956 419.2 2,493 235.5 1,400.3 
1957 440.3 2,572 238.0 1,390.0 
1958 44.5 2,552 235.2 1,351.3 
1959 482.7 2,725 250.1 1,411.9 
1960 503.4 2,797 256.8 1,426.8 
1961 518.7 2,823 262.0 1,431.4 
Table B-14 282. 
Price Index Implicit in the Estimates of Gross National Product 
at Current and 1929 Prices, 1923 -1961 U. S. A. (1929 = 100). 
1923 
1924 
1925 
1926 
1927 
1928 
1929 
1930 
1931 
1932 
1933 
1931+ 
1935 
1936 
1937 
1938 
1939 
1940 
19+1 
191+2 
191+3 
100 
99 
101 
101 
99 
100 
100 
96 
85 
77 
75 
80 
79 
82 
83 
83 
82 
83 
91 
103 
113 
1944 115 
1945 118 
1946 126 
1947 141 
1948 149 
1949 151 
1950 152 
1951 165 
1952 168 
1953 170 
1954 171 
1955 172 
1956 178 
1957 185 
1958 189 
1959 193 
1960 196 
1961 198 
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Table B-15 
Government Expenditure by Levels of Government, at Current Prices, 
1923 -_1961, United States. (All figures in millions of dollars) 
Year Federal State and Total 
Government Local Government, 
,., 
Government 
Expenditure 
1923 2,565 5,4oo 7,965 
1924 2,570 5,760 8,330 
1925 2,655 6,145 8,800 
1926 2,720 6,560 9,280 
1927 2,820 7,005 9,825 
-1928 2,975 7,100 10,075 
1929 3,195 7,700 10,895 
1930 3,470 8,380 11,850 
1931 4,120 8,450 12,570 
1932 4,025 7,490 11,515 
1933 4,465 7,230 11,695 
1934 5,470 7,215 12,685 
1935 7,035 7,440 14,475 
1936 7,645 7,875 15,520 
1937 7,290 8,515 15,805 
1938 ?, 470 9,030 16,300 
1939 8,185 9,415 17,600 
1940 14,715 9,565 24,280 
1941 27,065 9,490 36,555 
1942 49,060 9,310 58,370 
1943 80,705 99025 89 , 730 
1944 88,535 9,630 98,165 
1945 72,555 11,130 83,685 
1946 56,685 13,375 70,060 
1947 40,925 16,370 57,295 
1948 35,205 19,430 54,635 
1949 39,520 22,555 62,075 
1950 43,655 24,785 68,440 
/Continued ... 
Table B-15 (Continued) 
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Federal State and 
Total 
Year Government Government Local Government Expenditure 
1951 56,815 26,120 82,935 
1952 72,005 27,655 99,660 
1953 74,885 30,220 105,105 
1954 71,590 33,575 105,165 
1955 70,520 36,460 106,980 
1956 74,245 39,625 113,870 
1957 78,508 44,359 122,867 
1958 83,016 49,394 132,410 
1959 87,329 52,683 140,012 
1960 92,445 56,391 148,836 
1961 99,902 60,761 160,663 
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Table B-16 
Interest on Federal Debt, at Current Prices, 
1932 - 1961, U. S. A. 
(in millions of dollars). 
Year 
1932 615 
1933 691 
1934' 729 
1935 720 
1936 747 
1937 8o9 
1,938 854 
1939 933 
1910 980 
1941 994 
1942 1,307 
1943 1,869 
1944 2,579 
1945 3,436 
1946 3,979 
1947 41208 
1948 4,342 
1949 4,383 
1950 4,312 
1951 4,241 
1952 4,562 
1953 4,829 
1954 4,820 
1955 5,077 
1956 5,403 
1957 5,8o6 
1958 5,830 
1959 6,602 
1960 7,573 
1961 7,324 
Table B-17 286. 
Government Expenditure Other Than for Interest on Federal Debt, 
Total and Per Capita, at Current Prices; and Per Capita, at 
1929 Prices, 1923 - 1961, U. S. A. 
Year 
At 
Total 
(millions of 
Current Prices 
Per Capita 
dollars) (dollars) 
At 1929 Prices 
Per Capita 
(dollars) 
1923 7,965 71.15 71.15 
1924 8,330 73.00 73.74 
1925 8,800 75.97 75.22 
1926 9,280 79.05 78.27 
1927 9,825 82.54 83.37 
1928 10,075 83.61 83.61 
1929 10,895 89.47 89.47 
1930 11,850 96.19 100.20 
1931 12,570 101.25 119.12 
1932 10,900 87.23 113.29 
1933 11,004 87.54 116.72 
1934 11,956 94.53 118.16 
1935 13,755 108.00 136.71 
1936 14,773 115.25 146.55 
1937 14,996 116.28 140.10 
1938 15,646 120.38 145.04 
1939 16,667 127.20 155.12 
1940 23,300 176.35 212.47 
1941 35,561 266.57 292.93 
1942 57,063 423.13 41o. 81 
1943 87,861 642.55 568.63 
1944 95,596 690.74 600.64 
1945 80,249 573.50 486.02 
1946 66,091 467.44 370.98 
1947 53,087 368.34 261.23 
1948 50,293 342.99 230.19 
1949 57,692 386.71 256.01 
/Continued 
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Table B-17 (Continued) 
Year 
At Current Prices 
Total 
(millions of dollars) 
Per Capita 
(dollars) 
At 1929 Prices 
... 
Per Capita 
(dollars) 
1950 64,128 422.78 278.14 
1951 78,694 509.81 308.98 
1952 95,098 605.61 360.48 
1953 100,276 628.15 369.50 
1954 100,345 617.82 361.30 
1955 101,903 616.58 358.48 
1956 108.467 644.97 362.31+ 
1957 117.061 683.65 369.54 
1958 126,580 727.23 384.78 
1959 133,41o 753.17 390.24 
1960 141,263 784.87 4oo. 44 
1961 153,339 837.72 423.09 
Table B-18 
288. 
Population of Canada, 1926 - 1960 (Thousands) 
Year Total Population 
_ 
Year Total Population 
.r 
1926 9,451 1949 13,4+7 
1927 9,637 . 1950 13,712 
1928 9,835 1951 14,009 
1929 10,029 1952 14,459 
1930 10,208 1953 14,845 
1931 10,376 1954 15,287 
1932 10,510 1955 15,698 
1933 10,633 1956 16,081 
1934 10,741 1957 16,610 
1935 10,845 1958 17,080 
1936 10,950 1959 17,483 
1937 11,045 1960 17,870 
1938 11,152 
1939 11,267 
1940 11,381 
1941 11,507 
1942 11,654 
1943 11,795 
1944 11,946 
1945 12,072 
1946 12,292 
1947 12,551 
1948 12,823 
Table B-19 289. 
Gross National Expenditure, Totals and per Head of 
Population, at 1949 Prices, 1926-1960, Canada. 
(millions of dollars) 
Year Total Per Head 
1926 7,576 801.61 
1927 8,270 858.24 
1928 9,037 918.86 
1929 9,061 903.48 
1930 8,679 850.22 
1931 7,567 729.28 
1932 6,798 646.81 
1933 6,359 598. x+ 
193+ 7,127 663.53 
1935 7,678 707.98 
1936 8',; 022 732.60 
1937 8,820 798.55 
1938 8,871 795.46 
1939 9,536 846.37 
1940 10,911 958.70 
1941 12,486 1,085.08 
1942 14,816 1,271.32 
1943 15,357 1,301.99 
1944 15,927 1,333.25 
1945 15,552 1,288.23 
1946 152251 1,240.73 
1947 15,446 1,230.66 
1948 15,735 1,227.09 
1949 16,343 1,215.36 
1950 17,471 1,274.14 
/Continued 
... 
Table B-19 (Continued) 
290. 
Year Total Per Head 
1951 18,547 1,323.93 
1952 20,027 1,385.09 
1953 20,794 1,400.74 
1954 20,186 1,320.46 
1955 21,920 1,396.36 
1956 23,811 1,480.69 
1957 24,117 1,451.96 
1958 24,397 1,428.40 
1959 25,242 1,443.80 
1960 25,849 1,446.50. 
r 
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Table B-20 
Government Expenditure by Component, all 
Governments, at Current Prices, 1926-1960, Canada 
(millions of dollars) 
Year 
Purchases of 
Goods and 
Services 
(1) 
Transfer 
Payments 
c2) 
Subsidies 
(3) 
Total Government 
Expenditure. 
(1) + ý2ý + (3) = 
1926 488 305 2 795 
1927 531 311 3 845 
1928 56o 318 5 883 
1929 640 328 5 973 
1930 721 356 7 1,084 
1931 688. 394 18 1,100 
1932 584 435 9 1,028 
1933 462 464 8 934 
1934 503',,. 504 8 11015 
1935 542 501 23 1, o66 
1936 544 501 14 1,059 
1937 619 510 10 1,139 
1938 666 492 62 1,220 
1939 683 504 17 1,170 
1940 1,116 48o 53 1,649 
1941 1,635 485 74 2,194 
1942 3,674 532 93 4,299 
1943 4,177 581 211 4,969 
1944 4,978 682 267 5,927 
1945 3,656 1,058 262 4,976 
1946 1,796 1,660 236 3,692 
1947 1,541 1,398 177 3,116 
1948 1,797 1,420 75 3,292 
1949 2,127 1,520 77 3,724 
1950 2,344 1,575 63 3,982 
/Continued ... 
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Table B-20 (Continued) 
Year 
Purchases of 
Goods and 
Services 
(1) 
Transfer 
Payments 
(2) 
Subsidies 
(3) 
Total Government 
Expenditure 
(1) + Via) + (3) 
1951 3,271 1,585 128 4,984 
1952 4,279 1,939 100 6,318 
1953' 4,432 2,071 110 6,613 
1954 4,461 2,303 86 6,850 
1955 41792 2,406 82 7,280 
1956 5,386 2,480 123 7,989 
1957 5,722 2,815 116' 8,653 
1958 6,180 3,419 146 9,745 
1959 6,490 3,718 205 10,413 
1960 6,769 4,215 235 11,219 
293. 
Table B-21 
Interest on Federal Debt and Other War-related 
Expenditures at Current Prices, 1926-1960, Canada. 
(Millions of dollars) 
Year 
Interest on 
-Federal 
Debt 
(1) 
Pension World tIar I 
and II, and War 
Veteran's Allowance 
(2) 
Total 
(1) + (2) 
(3) 
1926 113 33 146 
1927 112 35 147 
1928 106 37 143 
1929 102 36 138 
1930 101 42 143 
1931 102 45 147 
1932 114 41 155 
1933 119 39 158 
1934 118 40 158 
1935 116 40 156 
1936 119 40 159 
1937 119 39 158 
1938 113 40 153 
1939 118 41 159 
1940 120 41 161 
1941 133 42 175 
1942 153 42 195 
1943 218 44 262 
1944 276 53 329 
1945 355 59 424 
1946 420 85 505 
1947 431 94 525 
1948 431 112 543 
1949 439 111 550 
1950 427 114 541 
/Continued .... 
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Table B-21 (Continued) 
Year 
Interest on 
Federal 
Debt 
(1) 
Pension World War I 
and III and 'liar 
Veteran's Allowance 
(2) 
Total 
(1) + (2) 
(3) 
1951 427 114 541 
1952 441 122 563 
1953 461 132 593 
1954 504 144 648 
1955 494 158 652 
1956 524 163 687 
1957 519 177 696 
1958 544 196 740 
1959 678 199 877 
1960 753 200 953 
Table B-22 
1926 
1927, 
1928 
1929 
1930 
1931 
1932 
1933 
1934 
1935 
1936 
1937 
1938 
1939 
1940 
1941 
1942 
1943 
295. 
Consumer Price Index, 1926 to 1960, Canada. 
(1949 -100). 
75.8 
7L.. 5 
74.8 
75.7 
75.2 
67.8 .. ý. ,. 
61.6 
58.7 
59.5 
59.9 
61.1 
63.0 
63.7 
63.2 
65.7 
69.6 
72.9 
74.2 
1944 
1945 
1946 
1947 
1948 
1949 
1950 
1951 
1952 
1953 
1954 
1955 
1956 
1957 
1958 
1959 
1960 
74.6 
75.0 
77.5 
84.8 
97.0 
-100.0- 
102.9 
113.7 
116.5 
115.5 
116.2 
116.4 
118.1 
121.9 
125.1 
126.5 
128.0 
Table. 296 
Government Expenditure Other Than for War-Related, 
by Components, Total and per Head of Population, 
at 191+9 Prices, 1926 - 196©, Canada. 
Government Transfer + 
Year--- Expenditure -Subsidies - Total 
on Goods and War-related. (1) + (2) Per Head. 
services. 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
(million $ millions (millions 
1926 792 212.4 1, oo44 106.27 
1927 868 224.2 1,092.2 113.33 
1928 908 240.6 1,148.6 116.79 
1929 1,027 257.6. 1,284.6 128.09 
1930 1,178 292.6 1,470.6 144.06 
1931 1,16o 390.9' 1,550.9 149.47 
1932 1,041 469.2. 1,510.2 143.69 
1933 842 534.9 1,376.9 129.49 
1934 916 595.0. 1,511.0 14o. 68 
1935 971 614.4 1,587.4 146.37 
1936 961 582.7 1,543.7 140.98 
1937 1,056 574.6 1,630.6 147.63 
1938 1,127 629.5 1,756.5 157.50 
1939 1,156 519.0 1,675.0 148.66 
1940 1,794 566.2 2,360.2 207.38 
1941 2,531 551.7 3,082.7 267.90 
1942 5,189 589.8 5,778.8 495.86 
1943 5,714 714.3 6,428.3 545.00 
1944 6,499 831.1 7,330.1 613.60 
1945 4,542 1,194.7 5,736.7 475.20 
1946 
, 
2,294 1,794.8 4,088.8 332.64 
1947 1,850 1,238.2 3,088.2 246.05 
/Continued 
... 
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Table B-23 (Continued) 
Government Transfer + 
Expenditure Subsidies - Total 
Year on Goods and War-related. (1) + (2) Per Head 
Services 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
(millions $) (Millions $) (millions $) $ 
19+8 1,902 981.4 2,883.1 224.86 
1949 2,127 1,047.0 3,174.0 236.04 
1950 2,21+2 1, o66.1 3,308.1 241.26 
1951 2,806 1,030.8 3,836.8 273.88 
1952 3,516 1,267.0 4,783.0 330.80 
1953 3,517 1,374.9 4,891.9 329.53 
1954 3,415 1,498.3 4,913.3 321.40 
1955 3,563 1,577.3 51140.3 327.45 
1956 3,794 1,622.4 5,416.4 336.82 
1957 3,833 1,833.4 51666.4 341.14 
1958 4,093 2,290.2 6,383.2 373.72 
1959 4,155 2,407.9 6,562.9 375.39 
. 1960 
49197 2,729.7 6,926.7 387.62 
Table B-24 298. 
Population of Sweden, 1920-1958 
Year Population 
1920 5,904,489 
1922 5,987,520 
1924 6,036,118 
1926 6,074,368 
1928 6,105,190 
1930 6,142,191 
1932 6,190,364 
1934 6,233,090 
1936 6,266,888 
1938 6,310,214 
194o 6,370,538 
1942 6,458,200 
1944 6,597,348 
1946 6,763,685 
1948 6,924,888 
1950 7,041,829 
1952 7,150,606 
1954 7,234,664 
1956 7,338,991 
1958 7,429,675 
299. 
Table B-25 
Wholesale Price Index, 1920-1958, Sweden. 
(1881-1885 = 100) 
1920 
1922- 
1924 
1926 
1928 
1930 
403 
188 
180 
167 
167 
134 
1932 
1934 
1936 
1938 
1940 
1942 
1944 
1946 
1948 
1950 
1952 
1954 
1956 
1958 
117 
124 
135 
149 
200 
235 
236 
233 
251 
267 
373 
349 
381 
385 
A 
Table B-26 300" 
Gross Domestic Product, Totals and per Head of Population, 
at Current Prices, and per Head of Population at (1881-1885) 
Prices, 1920-1958, Sweden 
At Current Prices At (1881-1885) Prices 
Year 
Total 
(Millions of 
Per Head Per Head 
Kroner) (kroner) (kroner) 
1920 12,222 2,069.95 513.64 
1922 7,665 1,280.17 680.94 
1924 7,911 1,310.61 728.12 
1926 8,336 1,372.32 821.75 
1928 8,794 1,44o. 41 862.52 
1930 9,307 1,515.26 1,130.79 
1932 7,923 1,279.88 1,093.91 
1934 9,047 1,451.44 1,170.52 
1936 10,421 1,662.86 1,231.? 5 
1938 12,143 1,924.34 1,291.50 
1940 14, ooo 2,197.62 1,098.81 
1942 16,680 2,582.76 1,099.05 
1944 19,183 2,907,68 1,232.08 
1946 23,338 3,450.49 1,480.90 
1948 27,834 4, o19.41 1,601.36 
1950 31,763 4,51o. 64 1,689.38 
1952 41,573 5,813.92 1,558.69 
1954 44,963 6,214.94 1,778.24 
1956 52,845 7,200.58 1,889.91 
1958 59,339 7,986.76 2,074.48 
301. 
Table B-27 
Net Factor Income From Abroad, at Current Prices, 
1948 - 1962, Sweden. 
Year (Millions of Krona) 
1948 19 
1952 70 
1953 65 
1954 95 
1955 90 
1956 130 
1957 152 
1958 152 
1959 142 
1960 152 
1961 146 
1962 194 
Table B-28 
302, 
Government Expenditure, Totals and per Head of Population, 
at Current Prices; and per Head of Population, at (1881-1885) 
Prices, 1920-1958, Sweden 
At Current Prices At (1881-1885) Prices 
Year Total 
(millions of 
Per Capita Per Capita 
klier) 
(kroner) (kroner) 
1920 1,373.4 232.60 57.72 
1922 1,374.6 229.58 122.18 
1924 1,210.4 200.53 111.41 
1926 1,259.6 207.33 124.15 
1928 1,310.9 214.72 128.57 
1930 1,405,5 228.83 170.77 
1932 1,528.9 246.98 211.09 
1934 1,543.2 247.58 199.66 
1936 1,744.1. 278.30 206.15 
1938 2,156.4 341.73 229.35 
1940 4,311.1 676.73 338.36 
1942 5,077.9 786.27 334.58 
1944 5,253.1 796.25 337.39 
1946 4,682.3 692.27 297.11 
1948 6,618.2 955.71 380.76 
1950 7,729.3 . 1,097.63 
411.10 
1952 10,813.1 1,512.19 4o5.41 
1954 12,451.8 1,721.12 492.45 
1956 15,031.0 2,048.10 537.56 
1958 18,18o. 8 2,447.04 635.59 
Ad 
303. 
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